Com. v. Smith
Decision Date | 06 March 2003 |
Citation | 572 Pa. 572,818 A.2d 494 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Charles H. SMITH, Jr., Appellee. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Andrea F. McKenna, D. Michael Fisher, Jerome T. Foerster, William H. Ryan, Rober A. Graci, Harrisburg, for the Com., Appellant. David Russell Yoder, Chambersburg, for Charles H. Smith, Appellee.
Before: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and LAMB, JJ.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the Commonwealth) seeks review of an Order of the Superior Court, which vacated a decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County (PCRA court) that dismissed a pro se petition filed by Charles H. Smith Jr. (Smith) pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 After reviewing the claim raised by the Commonwealth, we affirm the decision of the Superior Court.
On April 1, 1996, Smith pled guilty to four counts of burglary,2 and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of twelve to twenty-four years' imprisonment. Smith did not file a direct appeal. On May 1, 1996, Smith's Judgment of Sentence became final. See Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1410(A)(3) ( ).
On June 4, 1999, more than three years after sentencing, Smith filed his first pro se petition for relief pursuant to the PCRA, in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel resulting from his trial counsel's failure to file a direct appeal. Smith specifically averred that he made several explicit requests to counsel to file a direct appeal. In the petition, Smith requested an evidentiary hearing, a restoration of his right to file a direct appeal nunc pro tunc, and a reconsideration of the sentence imposed on him by the trial court. Additionally, Smith sought appointment of counsel.
On July 11, 1999, the PCRA court notified Smith, in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907,3 that it intended to dismiss his PCRA petition because it was not filed within the one-year period and none of the statutory exceptions to the one-year time limitation, enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii), appeared to apply. Rule 907 (Disposition Without Hearing) provides as follows:
On August 1, 1999, Smith filed a Notice of Objection, arguing that he had an absolute right to a direct appeal. Smith stated that he believed that trial counsel filed a direct appeal when, in fact, his trial counsel did not. Smith requested that the PCRA court appoint counsel and reconsider its intention to dismiss. Additionally, Smith asked for a hearing to determine whether his trial counsel was instructed, but unjustifiably failed, to file a direct appeal. On August 23, 1999, the PCRA court dismissed the petition and appointed counsel to represent Smith on appeal only.4
After an intervening remand, the Superior Court filed an unreported Judgment Order. The Superior Court made no findings regarding the timeliness of Smith's PCRA petition. The Superior Court explained that the PCRA court's appointment of counsel to represent Smith on appeal did not satisfy the requirements of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 904 (Rule 904),5 which provides for the appointment of counsel to represent an indigent petitioner during post-conviction relief proceedings. Rule 904 ( ) provides as follows:
Accordingly, the Superior Court vacated the Order of the PCRA court and remanded the matter for appointment of counsel. The Judgment Order of the Superior Court specifically provided that, "counsel should address the applicability of the section 9545(b) timeliness exceptions in [Smith's] amended petition...." Commonwealth v. Smith, No. 1540 MDA 1999, slip op. at 3, 792 A.2d 618 (Pa.Super. November 14, 2001) (Judgment Order). The Commonwealth appealed to this Court.
The Commonwealth challenges the jurisdiction of a PCRA court to appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner where the petition is untimely.
The Commonwealth contends that Smith was not entitled to the appointment of counsel because the PCRA's timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, therefore, a petitioner must first establish that his petition is not time-barred in order to qualify for court-appointed counsel pursuant to Rule 904. The argument advanced by the Commonwealth is that the timeliness requirements of the PCRA supersede Rule 904...
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