Com. v. Snoke

• Decision Date: 24 August 1990
• Citation: 525 Pa. 295,580 A.2d 295
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Lynn K. SNOKE, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 295

580 A.2d 295

525 Pa. 295

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Lynn K. SNOKE, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Dec. 15, 1989.

Decided Aug. 24, 1990.

[525 Pa. 297] Frederick C. Timm, for appellant.

Henry S. Kenderdine, Dist. Atty., James J. Karl, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

NIX, Chief Justice.

Appellant, Lynn K. Snoke, was convicted by a jury of indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126, and corruption of a minor, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301, stemming from an incident involving his five-year-old daughter. The cause was appealed in the Superior Court which affirmed the judgment of sentence. After review, for the reasons that follow, we also affirm the judgment below.

The principal issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial judge committed error in refusing to instruct the jury specifically addressing the five-year-old victim's failure to disclose the alleged assault upon her by her father until approximately five months after the event. The premise of this contention is that the delay in disclosure was of such significance that it necessitated a specific instruction on the lack of a prompt complaint. A collateral issue raised is whether the trial judge also erred in permitting the cross-examination of a defense witness to go beyond the scope of the direct examination.

The pertinent facts of this case are as follows: In March of 1985, the victim, Melanie Snoke, then five years old, watched a film at school concerning child abuse. Present during the viewing of the film were the child's mother, Cindi Snoke, and the mother's boyfriend, William Leed. ¹ The child became visibly upset during the film and confided in her mother that her father, Lynn Snoke, had "touched" her around the Halloween season of 1984. The child described an incident which occurred on a night her mother was working and she was left in the care of her father. She testified that during the night she and her father watched a "Snoopy" cartoon. She said her father had told her to come into his bedroom; once there, he told her to disrobe and he then proceeded to perform oral and vaginal intercourse. The victim also testified that her father rubbed his penis until he caused a "white cream" to discharge. Following the assault, she and her father took a bath together and he told her that this would be "their little secret" and not to tell her mother. Lynn Snoke was later charged with indecent assault and the corruption of a minor.

At trial the Commonwealth produced the program manager of a local television station who testified that the station played the Peanuts cartoon, "It's the Great Pumpkin, Charlie Brown," on October 26, 1984, which includes the character, Snoopy. The Commonwealth also produced Cindi Snoke's employer, who testified that Mrs. Snoke was working from 5:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. on the night of October 26, 1984. Finally, the Commonwealth presented the volunteer from Rape Aid and Prevention who played the film for the children at Clay Elementary School in March, 1985 in order to describe how the film explained to the children of the elementary school the difference between "good touching" and "bad touching". The film gave the children instructions on what to do if someone assaulted them.

The appellant presented the testimony of Doreen Pavone, an employee from The Lancaster County Children and Youth Agency who interviewed Melanie shortly after the film. The appellant asked the witness to read into the record the statement of Melanie as documented by the employee in a report, in an attempt to establish inconsistencies in the victim's testimony. On cross-examination the Commonwealth was permitted to question the employee about what recommendation she included in the report after the interview with Melanie. Pavone testified that as a result of her interview she was able to gather information that substantiated that there was sexual contact between the victim and her father. Defense counsel objected to this testimony on the basis that it was beyond the scope of direct examination and irrelevant. This objection was overruled.

The jury convicted the appellant on both charges. The appellant appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the trial court. We granted allocatur to address the question of whether the trial judge in this case was under an obligation to instruct the jury specifically with regard to the lack of a prompt complaint.

Under common law, the promptness of a complaint or the "hue and cry" was considered an element for a jury to consider when weighing the veracity of a complainant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Allen, 135 Pa. 483, 19 A. 957 (1890); Commonwealth v. Krick, 164 Pa.Super. 516, 67 A.2d 746 (1949); see also, IV Wigmore on Evidence § 1135. The theory is based on the principle that a victim of a violent assault would be expected to complain of the assault at the first safe opportunity. Commonwealth v. Lane, 521 Pa. 390, 555 A.2d 1246 (1989); Commonwealth v. Green, 487 Pa. 322, 409 A.2d 371 (1979); Commonwealth v. Stohr, 361 Pa.Super. 293, 522 A.2d 589 (1987); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 295 Pa.Super. 467, 441 A.2d 1327 (1982). This principle has been codified in our crimes code at 18 Pa.C.S. § 3105. Section 3105 states:

Prompt reporting to public authority is not required in a prosecution under this chapter: Provided, however, that nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a defendant from introducing evidence of the alleged victim's failure to promptly report the crime if such evidence would be admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence.

It has been said that "hue and cry follow rape like smoke follows fire." See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 295 Pa.Super. at 475, 441 A.2d at 1131. The presumption follows that if a complaint is made promptly after the alleged offense, the victim has not had time to fabricate the story and the story is given more credibility. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Krick, supra. Conversely, if a complaint is delayed substantially without any reasonable explanation, an inference can be drawn regarding the credibility of that complaint and against whether the incident in fact occurred.

In Commonwealth v. Lane, supra, this Court considered the proper implications of a delay in making a complaint with regard to credibility where the minor victim was violently assaulted by a neighbor. In that case the Court was faced with whether the trial judge properly permitted the Commonwealth to challenge a venireperson for cause because he stated that he would be unable to disregard the time delay between the incident of sexual assault and the complaint. In holding that the trial judge had erred, this Court stated that the delay issue was a "legitimate factor to be considered in the trial of the case," and therefore "there was no basis for concluding that [the venireperson] was unqualified to serve as a juror." Id. 521 Pa. at 401, 555 A.2d 1252.

We stated in Lane, "[u]nquestionably, a prompt complaint is a factor which must be assessed with all of the other pertinent evidence bearing upon the question of the credibility of the complaining witness." Id. at 397, 555 A.2d 1250. We further stated, "[t]he lack of a prompt complaint by a victim of a crime, although not dispositive of the merits of the case, may justifiably produce a doubt as to whether the offense indeed occurred, or whether it was a recent fabrication by the complaining witness." Id. at 398, 555 A.2d 1250. See also, Note, Rape Reform Legislation and Evidentiary Concerns, 44 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 955 (1983). However, the Court in Lane recognized that consideration should be given to factors inherent in cases involving minor victims which may explain the delay without reflecting unfavorably on the minor witness' credibility.

The untimely complaint might be made in order to protect the truly guilty party, as in the case of a child blaming an innocent party for the wrongdoing of a parent. It might be the act of revenge against the accused prompted by dislike or by an unrelated dispute between either the minor complainant and the accused or, possibly, between the family of the minor complainant and the accused. It is also possible that the immaturity of the victim would cause the child not to appreciate the offensiveness of the encounter and the need for its prompt disclosure. (Emphasis added.)

Lane, supra, at 398, 555 A.2d 1250.

The appellant in the present case alleges that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury as to the proper inference to be drawn from the five month delay in the complaint. The trial judge is required to instruct the jury as to the applicable law of the case. Commonwealth v. Ford-Bey, 504 Pa. 284, 472 A.2d 1062 (1982); Commonwealth v. Schaller, 493 Pa. 426, 426 A.2d 1090 (1981); see also, Brandimarti v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 364 Pa.Super. 26, 527 A.2d 134 (1987). There is no requirement for the trial judge to instruct the jury as requested by either counsel if the issue is not in dispute or the law is not applicable to the case. Commonwealth v. Yarris, 519 Pa. 571, 549 A.2d 513 (1988); Commonwealth v. Carter, 502 Pa. 433, 466 A.2d 1328 (1983).

Questions of credibility must always be put before the jury as the fact finder and the judge must instruct the jury as to credibility considerations applicable to the case. Commonwealth v. Smith, 502 Pa. 600, 467 A.2d 1120 (1983); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 415, 406 A.2d 510 (1979); Commonwealth v. Hampton, 462 Pa. 322, 341 A.2d 101 (1975); Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 605, 334 A.2d 255 (1975). As this Court stated in Lane:

The validity of our system of justice is dependent upon the integrity of our fact-finding process. The hallmark of that system is trial by jury. To achieve this goal, we are committed to provide a jury of one's peers and require that they be willing to decide the cause on the evidence presented following...