Com. v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 17 October 2000
• Citation: 761 A.2d 584
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Keith E. SNYDER, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

761 A.2d 584

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Keith E. SNYDER, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued June 19, 2000.

Filed October 17, 2000.

John P. Moses, Wilkes-Barre, for appellant.

Scott C. Gartley, Asst. Dist. Atty., Wilkes-Barre, for Com., appellee.

BEFORE: CAVANAUGH, KELLY, POPOVICH, JOHNSON, HUDOCK, FORD ELLIOTT, EAKIN, TODD and MONTEMURO,¹ JJ.

CAVANAUGH, J.:

¶ 1 Did the trial court err when it concluded that there were valid reasons to justify the delay in filing the criminal charges against Keith Snyder until they were filed and that the reasons for the delay in filing the charges were proper?

¶ 2 This case was remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of making the above determination with the direction that a finding of the absence of valid reasons for the late filing of the charges would mandate vacation of the judgment of sentence and discharge of the appellant. The court, after an extensive hearing, found valid reasons for the delay and that the delay was proper and, of course subject to review, affirmed the judgment of sentence.

¶ 3 The core issue under scrutiny in the trial court and in the decision of the supreme court, which remanded for the hearing, is whether appellant Snyder had been deprived of his constitutional right to due process by reason of the pre-arrest delay of over eleven years from the time of the alleged offense.². In the supreme court decision which remanded, the court equated the delay in prosecution issue under the Pennsylvania Constitution to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and placed reliance upon two cases decided in the United States Supreme Court. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971) and United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). Accordingly, our supreme court in Snyder stated, "Thus, the Marion and Lovasco decisions stand for the proposition that to establish a due process violation for delay in prosecution, a defendant must show that the passing of time caused actual prejudice and that the prosecution lacked sufficient and proper reasons for postponing the prosecution". Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44, 713 A.2d 596 at 601 (1998). After a review of the evidence from the trial, the court then concluded that the delay in prosecution did result in actual prejudice to appellant. The court, again following the Marion/Lovasco analyses, concluded that the record was inadequate to determine if the second prong of the standard, whether the reasons for the delay were proper, was proven, and, thus, remanded.

Burden of Proof

¶ 4 At the outset, the parties are in disagreement as to the allocation of the burden of proof which governed the hearing on remand. Appellee Commonwealth cites language in Snyder "... to establish a due process violation... a defendant must show that..." Commonwealth v. Snyder, 713 A.2d at 601. Also cited is language from Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 532 A.2d 385 (1987), "appellant must show" and "appellant has failed to produce", 532 A.2d at 387-8 n. 2, and Commonwealth v. Daniels, 480 Pa. 340, 390 A.2d 172 (1978), "appellant's claim must fail because he has shown no actual prejudice", 390 A.2d at 181. On the other hand, appellant argues, not unpersuasively, that if the burden were not on the Commonwealth, there would be no reason to remand for a further hearing. We conclude that it is not necessary to decide this issue in our disposition since, although the hearing court did not explicitly discuss the allocation of burden of proof, it is apparent that the matter was considered in the light of the burden being placed on the Commonwealth. It is certainly clear that the Commonwealth assumed the burden of going forward with the evidence. At the remand hearing conducted on August 6 and August 7, 1998, it was the Commonwealth which went forward and produced all the witnesses and, in fact, the defendant rested without offering any evidence. This was to be expected since on an issue of the propriety for a delay in prosecution, substantially all of the evidence is in the hands of the Commonwealth. Viewed in this context, the hearing court viewed its mandate as one of discovering whether there were valid reasons to justify the filing of charges after the extensive delay. In execution of this mandate, the court concluded that the reasons for the delay were valid and proper. From the court's exhaustive discussion of the evidence, it is evident that it was found that the evidence preponderated in favor of the Commonwealth's position.

The Prosecutor's Duty

¶ 5 In remanding for a hearing, the supreme court was explicit. The trial court was charged to determine if the delay was proper or improper. The court concluded that appellant was actually prejudiced by the delay and sought a determination of whether there were valid reasons to justify the delay. In making such a determination, it is apparent that a court is somewhat confounded. The inquiry necessarily immerses the judicial branch of government in an assessment of the performance of the executive which, of course, has distinct constitutional obligations and variant calls for service by its constituency. The ready legal analogy is to the familiar line of cases which interpret the right to a speedy trial. The accused's right to a speedy (prompt) trial is rooted in Amendment VI of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. However, other than the commonality that they both implicate a burden on the judiciary to assay the performance of the executive prosecutor, there exist marked differences between an accused's right to a prompt trial after an accusation has been lodged and a citizen's right to be seasonably charged after a criminal episode. In the first instance, which finds its expression in Pa.R.Crim. P. 1100, the accused has already been subjected to public charges and has a right to a public trial to defend against the state, and demonstrate his innocence or, at least, the overstatement of the charges. In such instance, it is altogether reasonable that the law should require the prosecutor, having made a claim which brings a citizen into a position of obloquy and dishonor to proceed with promptitude with proof of his assertion. Appropriately, in such circumstances the prosecutor is burdened with an obligation to act with due diligence to prepare and proceed to trial. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(g).

¶ 6 Conversely, the citizen who may be a suspect, has certain rights—not to a prompt trial—but to be free from an extraordinary pre-arrest delay which may render charges constitutionally infirm. This infringement is based upon Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania as part of the "law of the land". See Commonwealth v. Snyder, supra. In these circumstances, the law has not imposed a due diligence standard, but rather, as instantly, has sought to determine if there has been actual prejudice and if there has been valid or proper reason for delay. While recognizing that the law imposes a constitutional duty on the prosecutor, our courts have been careful not to invade the prerogatives of the prosecutor and to respect the quotidian decision making responsibility which attaches to that high office. Accordingly, the supreme court in Marion, supra, relied on the absence of evidence that there was intentional delay to gain a tactical advantage. In Lovasco, the court noted that no one's interest is well served by compelling prosecution as soon as they have gathered evidence of probable cause. The court further recognized that charging decisions often involve policy considerations which should be free from interference. It also opined with approval that investigative delay until a prosecutor is "completely satisfied" that he should prosecute and be able to "promptly establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" is consistent with fair play and decency. Id., 431 U.S. at 793-95, 97 S.Ct. 2044.

¶ 7 In our own jurisdiction, our supreme court has specifically rejected the claim that courts should hold prosecutors to a duty to prosecute promptly when it appears that a probable case is demonstrable. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 480 Pa. 340, 390 A.2d 172, 180 (1978). In Commonwealth v. Clayton, Id., at 516 Pa. 263, 532 A.2d 385 (1987), the court rejected the unreasonable delay argument on the basis that there was a failure to show "that delay was a deliberate tactical move in bad faith by the Commonwealth". 516 Pa. 263, 532 A.2d 385, 388. This court has rejected a delay in prosecution argument on the basis, inter alia, that there was no showing that the delay was "motivated by improper considerations" or was "deliberate or purposeful". Commonwealth v. Patterson, 392 Pa.Super. 331, 572 A.2d 1258, 1263 (1990). In Commonwealth v. Sneed, 514 Pa. 597, 526 A.2d 749 (1987), it was opined that even in the face of prejudice, delay is excusable if it is a derivation of reasonable investigation.

The Hearing on Remand

¶ 8 At the hearing before Judge Mundy, the Commonwealth assumed the responsibility of going forward with the evidence, as well as, implicitly, the burden of proof that the reasons for the delay were both valid and proper. In order to do so, it called as witnesses the decision and policy-makers who were in authority from the time of the fatal arson to the time of appellant's arrest. The District Attorney of Luzerne County, at the time of the fatal fire, Robert J. Gillespie, Jr., established that the victims were appellant's wife, Diane, and his 36 day-old son, Brian, and that Keith Snyder, appellant, was a suspect. Two aspects of the case which were problematic, were the burn time of the fire and the presence of the drug tuinal in Diane's bloodstream. He opined that, while he felt there was sufficient evidence to arrest appellant, he was not...