Com. v. Stafford
Decision Date | 16 March 2000 |
Citation | 2000 PA Super 76,749 A.2d 489 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. William R. STAFFORD, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Samuel C. Stretton, West Chester, for appellant.
Marianne K. Fogelsanger, Asst. Dist. Atty., Harrisburg, for the Com., appellee.
Before POPOVICH, EAKIN, and OLSZEWSKI, JJ.
¶ 1 William Stafford appeals his convictions for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, conspiracy, possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and corruption of a minor. The convictions arose from his growing marijuana in his home and exposing his then fifteen-year-old wife to the marijuana from April 22, 1997 to April 29, 1997. We affirm.
¶ 2 Initially, we must note our disapproval with appellant's counsel's brief in this matter. The statement of questions involved encompasses five pages, and his numbered items each include more than one question.1 Not only is this a violation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure,2 it is a disservice to counsel's client and this court. It makes review of this matter unnecessarily time consuming and difficult. Although it is within our power to quash the appeal, see Sell v. Sell, 714 A.2d 1057, 1059 (Pa.Super.1998), we decline to do so in the interests of justice.
¶ 3 Appellant first argues that the district attorney failed to disqualify himself due to a conflict of interest and the court erred in failing to remove him and his office from the case. A brief recounting of the procedural chronology is necessary to understand the issue.
¶ 4 Appellant and his wife filed various civil actions and a private criminal complaint against Bradford County District Attorney Robert McGuinness arising from this matter.3 Appellant alleged in pre-trial motions that this caused a conflict of interest and that there was a possibility that the district attorney was a necessary witness in the case. He contended that this conflict mandated removal of the district attorney's office. On November 6, 1998, the trial court, pursuant to the Commonwealth Attorneys Act, referred the matter to the President Judge of the Middle District to request that the state attorney general intervene in the case and replace the district attorney. In a letter dated January 20, 1999, the attorney general declined to intervene in the matter. Subsequently, the court found that "the Bradford County District Attorney's Office was the only entity left to prosecute the case," and that appellant did not demonstrate that the district attorney was, in fact, a necessary witness, and, regardless, that it had no power to remove the office under Pennsylvania law. District Attorney McGuinness did ultimately prosecute the case himself, but was not called as a witness.
¶ 5 The Commonwealth Attorneys Act provides that the Attorney General may prosecute a county criminal court case "[w]hen the president judge in the district having jurisdiction of any criminal proceeding has reason to believe that the case is a proper one for the intervention of the Commonwealth ... [and] ... the Attorney General agrees that the case is a proper one for intervention." 71 P.S. § 732-205(a)(5) (emphasis added). The Act also provides that "[i]f the Attorney General determines that the case is not a proper case for intervention, he shall notify the president judge accordingly." Id.
¶ 6 Appellant argues that the court's order asking the president judge to request that the attorney general intervene was a finding that there was a conflict of interest precluding the district attorney's office from prosecuting him. In its Rule 1925(b) statement, however, the trial court explained that it made no such finding; rather, "all [it] found by that order was that, based on the record made by the Assistant District Attorney at the argument on November 4, 1998, [it] then had reason to believe that this case was a proper one for the intervention of the Attorney General." Trial Court Rule 1925(b) Opinion, at 8 (emphasis added). We agree that a "reason to believe" is not equivalent to a conclusive determination.
¶ 7 Absent an abuse of discretion, we are constrained to accept the trial court's finding that there was no conflict of interest. See Commonwealth v. Khorey, 521 Pa. 1, 555 A.2d 100, 110 (1989)
. A "prosecution is barred when an actual conflict of interest affecting the prosecutor exists in the case; under such circumstances a defendant need not prove actual prejudice in order to require that the conflict be removed." Commonwealth v. Eskridge, 529 Pa. 387, 604 A.2d 700, 702 (1992). Mere allegations of a conflict of interest, however, are insufficient to require replacement of a district attorney. See Commonwealth v. Mulholland, 549 Pa. 634, 702 A.2d 1027, 1037 (1997).
¶ 8 There are no reported cases in Pennsylvania where a defendant sought to remove a district attorney because the defendant has brought civil or criminal allegations against the district attorney for actions arising from the charges against the defendant. We have found an impermissible conflict exists where the district attorney has a financial interest in obtaining defendant's conviction. See Eskridge, 604 A.2d at 701
(. ) But see Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 551 Pa. 96, 709 A.2d 849, 860 (1998) ( ). We have also found that a new trial is warranted where the district attorney has a non-economic, personal interest in the matter. See Commonwealth v. Balenger, 704 A.2d 1385, 1386 (Pa.Super. 1997) (, )appeal denied 556 Pa. 670, 727 A.2d 126 (1998). Here, by contrast, the trial court found, and we agree, that the district attorney had no pecuniary or personal interest in seeing appellant prosecuted, and that appellant's conviction would not affect the pending civil suits or criminal complaint. Mere animosity, even it if it existed, is not sufficient by itself to require replacement of a prosecutor. Therefore, the prosecution by the district attorney did not compromise appellant's rights.
¶ 9 As we agree with the trial court's determination that replacing the district attorney's office was not required in this case, we need not speculate on the action to be taken by trial courts in cases where a real conflict exists and the Attorney General, nonetheless, declines to intervene. Nor do we intimate that an entire district attorney's office must be disqualified if one prosecutor must be. We note in passing, however, that if an entire district attorney's office does have a real conflict of interest, it would undoubtedly be a violation of a defendant's right to due process for the office to prosecute a matter under such circumstances, even if it is the "only entity left to prosecute the case."
¶ 10 Appellant next contends in two separate arguments that the court erred in allowing two witnesses to testify that they observed appellant smoking marijuana before the time in question. The bill of information charged appellant with various crimes occurring "between Tuesday, the 22nd day of April, 1997, and Tuesday, the 29th day of April, 1997." Bill of Information, at 1. One witness, Joseph Walburn, testified on direct examination that he observed appellant smoking marijuana in appellant's home in the presence of other people including appellant's wife on unspecified occasions. See N.T., 2/16/99, at 50 ( ). Another witness, Gregory Weisbrod, testified that he smoked marijuana with appellant outside appellant's home.4 Appellant argues that this testimony is inadmissible evidence of prior criminal conduct. We agree, but find that the admission of the statements was harmless error.
Commonwealth v. Stanley, 484 Pa. 2, 398 A.2d 631, 633-34 (1979). ¶ 12 The Commonwealth argues that the earlier marijuana use indicates appellant's knowledge and intent of his crimes. "`To be admissible to show intent or motive, the evidence must give sufficient ground to believe that the crime currently being considered grew out of or was in any way caused by the prior set of facts and circumstances.'" Commonwealth v. Camperson, 417 Pa.Super. 280, 612 A.2d 482, 484 (1992) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 280 Pa.Super. 303, 421 A.2d 734, 736 (1980)). In the present matter, there is no "direct and logical connection" between appellant's drug use prior to the time period in question and the charged crimes other than they both involved marijuana. Commonwealth v. LeGares, 709 A.2d 922, 926 (Pa.Super.),appeal denied 556 Pa. 705, 729 A.2d 1127 (1998). Appellant does not claim that he did not know about marijuana; he maintains that he was not aware that it was in his home in the...
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