Com. v. States
| Decision Date | 27 December 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 44 WAP 2006.,44 WAP 2006. |
| Citation | 938 A.2d 1016 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Lawrence STATES, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Robert L. McTiernan, Tucker Arensberg, P.C., Pittsburgh, for Swissvale and Bethel Park, appellees.
Alfred C. Maiello, Donald Allen Walsh, Jr., Maiello, Brungo & Maiello, L.L.P., Pittsburgh, for Bethel Park, North Allegheny, Penn Hills, Chartiers, Moon School Districts, appellees.
Thomas Paul Peterson, Tucker Arensberg, P.C., Pittsburgh, for Mt. Lebanon School Dist., appellee.
Blaine Allen Lucas, Babst, Calland, Clements & Zomnir, P.C., Pittsburgh, for Frazer Tp. and Borough of Aspinwall, appellees.
Craig Cryan Stephens, Allegheny County Bd. of Assessment, Appeals and review, appellee.
W. Theodore Brooks, Tucker Arensberg, P.C., Pittsburgh, for Shaler, Brentwood and South Fayette School Districts, appellees.
William C. Andrews, Andrews & Price, Pittsburgh, for Northgate, Avonworth, Cornell, Elizabeth Forward, Duquesne City, Highlands, et al., appellees.
BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, BALDWIN and FITZGERALD, JJ.
In this case, we consider principles of double jeopardy in the context of a simultaneous jury/bench trial for multiple criminal offenses. In a relatively unusual procedure, the jury was charged with rendering a verdict on some of the charges, while the trial judge had the task of deciding another. We must determine whether a mistrial on some charges due to a hung jury, coupled with an acquittal in the bench trial, implicates double jeopardy protections such that a retrial cannot occur. We conclude that under the circumstances of this case, the prohibition against double jeopardy, specifically, the principle of collateral estoppel, operates to prevent the Commonwealth from proceeding with a retrial on those charges on which the jury could not agree.
On August 5, 2000, Lawrence States and two other men were in an automobile that was in a single vehicle accident on Bunola River Road in Forward Township, Allegheny County. States survived the crash, but the two other men died. The Commonwealth charged States with two counts each of Involuntary Manslaughter,1 Accidents Involving Death or Personal Injury While Not Properly Licensed,2 Homicide by Vehicle,3 and Homicide by Vehicle While Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.4 States also faced three counts of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.5 States filed a pretrial motion seeking dismissal of the Involuntary Manslaughter charges, which the trial court granted. States also sought severance of the Accidents Involving Death charges. He asserted potential jury prejudice based on the fact that he did not hold a valid driver's license. The trial court agreed and granted severance. Following the Commonwealth's invocation of its right to a jury trial, the trial court suggested a simultaneous jury/bench trial, with the court determining guilt on the Accidents Involving Death charge, and the jury reaching a verdict on all other charges. The parties agreed to this procedure and the joint trial commenced on October 7, 2003.
On October 15, 2003, the jury informed the trial court that it was hopelessly deadlocked on all charges before it. The trial court declared a mistrial and dismissed the jury. On the same date, the trial court rendered its verdict on the Accidents Involving Death charge. The court explicitly stated that it was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that States was the driver of the vehicle; as a result, it acquitted States of the single charge before it.
In light of the trial court's findings and verdict, States filed a motion to dismiss the remaining charges based on double jeopardy principles. According to States, the trial court's finding that the Commonwealth failed to prove he was the driver precluded further litigation on the issue. States argued that because each of the remaining charges required the jury to find he was the driver, the charges must be dismissed.
The trial court denied States' motion and, following an unsuccessful attempt at reconsideration, States filed an appeal with the Superior Court.6 Upon review, the Superior Court concluded that because the trial court explicitly found that the Commonwealth failed to prove States was driving, collateral estoppel principles precluded the Commonwealth from attempting to prove States was the driver in any subsequent proceeding. The Superior Court reversed the trial court's order denying dismissal of the charges.
The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal and this Court granted allocatur in order to address the application of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel principles in the context of joint jury/bench trials. The issue is one of constitutional magnitude, a pure question of law. "Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary." Commonwealth v. White, 589 Pa. 642, 910 A.2d 648, 652 n. 3 (2006) (citation omitted).
The proscription against twice placing an individual in jeopardy of life or limb is found in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). The double jeopardy protections afforded by our state constitution are coextensive with those federal in origin; essentially, both prohibit successive prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense. Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 580 Pa. 403, 861 A.2d 898, 912 (2004). We have described double jeopardy rights as "freedom from the harassment of successive trials and the prohibition against double punishment." Commonwealth v. Hude, 492 Pa. 600, 425 A.2d 313, 318 (1980) (plurality). The specific basis for relief asserted here, collateral estoppel (also known as issue preclusion), is most familiar in the civil context, where its stated purpose is to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication." Shaffer v. Smith, 543 Pa. 526, 673 A.2d 872, 875 (1996).
However, collateral estoppel does not operate in the criminal context in the same manner in which it operates in the civil context. For instance, in civil practice the doctrine is applicable, in equal measure, to both parties, whereas in the criminal context, the use of the doctrine is considerably restricted, particularly where the Commonwealth seeks to use it against a criminal defendant. See Commonwealth v. Holder, 569 Pa. 474, 805 A.2d 499 (2002) () (plurality). With respect to the criminal law defendant, collateral estoppel is treated as a subpart of double jeopardy protection and is defined as follows: "Collateral estoppel ... does not automatically bar subsequent prosecutions[,] but does bar redetermination in a second prosecution of those issues necessarily determined between the parties in a first proceeding which has become a final judgment." Commonwealth v. Smith, 518 Pa. 15, 540 A.2d 246, 251 (1988) (citation omitted). As simple as this definition appears, the principle's application is not as straightforward as it is in the civil context because it must be viewed through the lens of double jeopardy. Commonwealth v. Brown, 503 Pa. 514, 469 A.2d 1371, 1373 (1983) ().
"The efficiency concerns that drive the collateral estoppel policy on the civil side are not nearly as important in criminal cases because criminal cases involve a public interest in the accuracy and justice of criminal results that outweighs the economy concerns that undergird the estoppel doctrine." Holder, 805 A.2d at 508 (Saylor, J. concurring and dissenting) (citation omitted). Application of collateral estoppel principles to the criminal law was "intended to enhance the traditional double jeopardy protection and to provide relief from the growing threat of multiple prosecutions ... [it] is to be applied with `realism and rationality' and not `applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book.'" Hude, 425 A.2d at 319 (citation omitted).
The facts set out in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1969), demonstrate the primary effect, and underlying purposes, of both double jeopardy protection and its narrower subpart, collateral estoppel. In Ashe, the government charged Bob Ashe with the gunpoint robbery of six men while they played poker in a friend's basement. The government's theory of the case was that Ashe committed the armed robbery with two or three other men. Ashe initially was tried for his...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Commonwealth v. Ball
...or limb.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 10. We have interpreted the rights provided by the two clauses as coextensive. Commonwealth v. States, 595 Pa. 453, 938 A.2d 1016, 1019 (2007).“Perhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has been that ‘[a] verdict of acqu......
-
In re Moi
...Supreme Court opinion that found collateral estoppel barred retrial in a factually similar situation. See Commonwealth v. States,595 Pa. 453, 938 A.2d 1016 (2007). There, the defendant, Lawrence States, was the only survivor of a single car accident that killed two people. Id.at 456, 938 A.......
-
Commonwealth v. Barnes
...murder. Second, it is well-settled that inconsistent verdicts are permissible in this Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. States, 595 Pa. 453, 938 A.2d 1016, 1025 (2007). As we explained in Commonwealth v. Petteway, 847 A.2d 713 (Pa. Super. 2004) :We note first that inconsistent verdicts, whi......
-
Com. v. Rose
...to reversal.12 We agree. ¶ 27 "[T]he law is clear that inconsistent verdicts are permissible in Pennsylvania." Commonwealth v. States, 595 Pa. 453, 938 A.2d 1016, 1025 (2007). Specifically, "a mere facial inconsistency in verdicts is not a valid basis upon which to upset a conviction which ......