Com. v. Stokes

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: PRICE; SPAETH
• Citation: 421 A.2d 240,279 Pa.Super. 361
• Decision Date: 11 July 1980
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert STOKES, Appellant.

Page 240

421 A.2d 240 279 Pa.Super. 361 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania
v.
Robert STOKES, Appellant. Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted March 23, 1979.
Filed July 11, 1980.

Page 241

[279 Pa.Super. 364] John W. Packel, Chief, Appeals, Asst. Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Eric B. Henson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Page 242

Before PRICE, SPAETH and LIPEZ, JJ.

PRICE, Judge:

Following a non-jury trial commenced on August 22, 1977, appellant was convicted of indecent exposure ¹ and [279 Pa.Super. 365] rape. ² Post-trial motions were denied, and appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one and one-half to seven years on the rape count. Sentence was suspended on the charge of indecent exposure. Finding merit to appellant's contention that his certification to stand trial as an adult was improper due to the trial court's failure to make adequate findings of facts to support its order, we remand to the court of common pleas for a new certification hearing.

The pertinent facts are as follows. During the morning of July 1, 1976, the complainant, a girl of tender years, went to appellant's residence to visit his sister, Hope. After knocking on the door, the complainant was admitted by appellant who, upon closing the door behind her, forced the complainant into the basement and there raped her. A medical examination of complainant conducted shortly after the criminal incident disclosed recent vaginal tears and bleeding, and traces of spermatozoa.

On appeal, appellant contends that the court of common pleas erred by improperly certifying him to stand trial as an adult, denying his motion to dismiss the complaint, and denying his motion for a mistrial.

Appellant was seventeen years old when the instant offenses were committed and eighteen years old when his certification hearing was held. At the time of this certification hearing, January 28, 1977, transfers from juvenile court to the criminal section of the court of common pleas were governed by section 28 of the Juvenile Act. ³ That section provided that a juvenile may be tried as an adult if:

"(1) The child was fourteen or more years of age at the time of the alleged conduct; and

[279 Pa.Super. 366] (2) A hearing on whether the transfer should be made is held in conformity with this act; and

(3) Notice in writing of the time, place, and purpose of the hearing is given to the child and his parents, guardian, or other custodian at least three days before the hearing; and

(4) The court finds that there is a prima facie case that the child committed the delinquent act alleged, and that the delinquent act would be considered a felony if committed by an adult, and the court finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (i) the child is not amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile through available facilities, in determining this the court may consider age, mental capacity, maturity, previous records and probation or institutional reports; and (ii) the child is not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill; and (iii) the interests of the community require that the child be placed under legal restraint or discipline or that the offense is one which would carry a sentence of more than three years if committed as an adult."

In interpreting the statute, our supreme court has held that in situations in which the Commonwealth seeks to remove the juvenile from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for trial as an adult, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that the juvenile is not the proper subject for the care and solicitude of the juvenile system. Commonwealth v. Greiner, 479 Pa. 364, 388 A.2d 698 (1978). See Commonwealth v. Pyle, 462 Pa. 613, 342 A.2d 101 (1975).

Page 243

"In essence, the Act creates a presumption that the errant juvenile can best be supervised, directed and rehabilitated under its provisions absent evidence to the contrary. It therefore follows that the party raising the objection to the juvenile court's jurisdiction must shoulder the burden of presenting evidence to establish those facts which would warrant the conclusion that in a given case the provisions of the Act are inappropriate." Commonwealth v. Greiner, supra, 479 Pa. at 370, 388 A.2d at 701.

[279 Pa.Super. 367] In reviewing the actions of the certification court, we are mindful that it need not make a statement of conventional findings of fact in order to comply with the statute. Commonwealth v. Harrod, 260 Pa.Super. 312, 394 A.2d 567 (1978). However, the court must make a statement of its reasons for certification, and this statement "should be sufficient to demonstrate that ... the question (of certification) has received the careful consideration of the Juvenile Court; and it must set forth the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). Absent a failure by the certification court to advance specific reasons for its conclusion that the juvenile is not amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile through available facilities, we will not set aside a certification unless an appellant demonstrates that the court committed a gross abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Harrod, supra; Commonwealth v. Bey, 249 Pa.Super. 185, 375 A.2d 1304 (1977).

In the instant case, the Commonwealth concedes that the findings of the certification court were inadequate, and indeed, our review of the record supports this conclusion. After testimony was adduced that established a prima facie case against appellant, the following exchange occurred:

"THE COURT: I think the history of this man warrants certification.

MR. RICHARDSON (Assistant District Attorney): Yes, particularly given the fact that his Counsel stated the defendant is released from the service. My file indicates his birth date is December 19, 1958 which means he's over 18 years of age at the present time.

THE COURT: The file indicates December 19, 1958. That's what the Court records indicate.

MR. RICHARDSON: It would indicate he's 18 years of age.

THE COURT: The date of birth in the Court file is December 19, 1958.

[279 Pa.Super. 368] MR. RICHARDSON: The question is whether he's amenable to the supervision of the Juvenile Court given the defendant's age.

Also, the defendant's record I believe it's clear he's not amenable to supervision under the Juvenile Court system.

The question here is what can the Juvenile Court do with the defendant if he was in fact adjudicated. I don't believe there's anything this Court could do with the defendant as far as rehabilitation.

MR. SMITH (Counsel for Appellant): I would like to point out to the Court that we had extensive-this is the seventh listing of the case. We had extensive pretrial motions already heard, some of which were granted some of which were denied.

THE COURT: This is a question of a prima facie case at this point.

For the record the Court finds that the age of the defendant or date of birth of the defendant is December 19, 1958.

Further the Court finds that the age of the complainant or date of birth of the complainant is April 3, 1964.

The Court further finds there is nothing to indicate that this matter has any aspects which relate to the mental health field.

The Court does note the nature...