Com. v. Strong

• Decision Date: 29 November 2000
• Citation: 761 A.2d 1167,563 Pa. 455
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. James Lincoln STRONG, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

761 A.2d 1167

563 Pa. 455

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. James Lincoln STRONG, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted November 29, 1999.

Decided November 29, 2000.

Billy Nolas, Michael Wiseman, Kathy Swedlow, Defender Ass'n of Pa., for James L. Strong.

Andrew D. Bigda, Dist. Attorney's Office, for the Com.

Robert A. Graci, Harrisburg, for Office of Atty. Gen.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

OPINION

CAPPY, Justice.

This is a direct appeal from the order of the trial court denying appellant's petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (Hereinafter "the PCRA"). 42 Pa.C.S. § 9546(d). (Suspended August 11, 1997, reinstating subsection (d) from the 1988 Act). Appellant alleges that he is entitled to relief under the PCRA, as his conviction resulted from a constitutional violation of due process in contravention of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(2)(i). As for the following reasons we find appellant is entitled to relief, we reverse the order of the trial court.¹

Our resolution of this case requires that we set forth a brief synopsis of the facts that led to appellant's conviction. On August 18, 1983, John Henry Strock was driving a white Ford Grenada along Route 81 in Green Castle, Pennsylvania. Mr. Strock stopped the car on the side of the road and offered a ride to two hitchhikers, James Strong, the appellant herein, and James Alexander. According to the trial testimony of James Alexander, Alexander sat in the front seat and appellant sat in the backseat. (Trial Transcript, hereinafter "T.T." p. 1224). Alexander testified that he promptly fell asleep. (T.T. p. 1225).

When Alexander woke, he observed appellant produce a .20 gauge sawed-off shotgun and rest it upon Mr. Strock's shoulder. (T.T. p. 1225). Appellant directed Mr. Strock to pull the car to the side of the road and exchange seats with Alexander, so that Alexander could drive the car. (T.T. p. 1226). After driving for some time, Alexander pulled the car to the side of the road along an isolated stretch of interstate 81. (T.T. p. 1227). Alexander walked into the woods a few steps in order to relieve himself. When Alexander returned to the car, appellant and Mr. Strock were not present. Alexander then heard a gunshot. Approaching the sound of the gunshot, Alexander saw that Mr. Strock had been shot and his body had fallen into a gully. Appellant was holding the shotgun. (T.T. p. 1232). Alexander asked appellant why he had shot Mr. Strock. Appellant replied that he was tired of leaving witnesses behind. (T.T. p. 1232). Appellant directed Alexander to go through Mr. Strock's pockets. (T.T. p. 1234). Alexander complied, handing the items to appellant. Appellant then directed Alexander to shoot Mr. Strock. Alexander refused and began walking back to the car when he heard another gunshot. (T.T. p. 1236).

Alexander and appellant got into the Ford Grenada and continued their journey. (T.T. p. 1237). Appellant and Alexander ultimately abandoned Mr. Strock's Grenada when it ran out of gas. (T.T. p. 1240). Appellant and Alexander continued hitchhiking until they were apprehended in Pottsdam, New York. At the time of the arrest, the officers discovered a .20 gauge sawed-off shotgun. (T.T. p. 1252). While in the custody of the New York police, Alexander agreed to cooperate with authorities and assist them in locating Mr. Strock's body. In furtherance of this objective, Alexander waived extradition from New York to Pennsylvania and it was agreed that the authorities would bring no charges against him in the State of New York. (T.T. p. 1253). Upon returning to Pennsylvania, Alexander assisted the Pennsylvania State Police in locating the body.

Alexander ultimately testified for the Commonwealth at appellant's trial. Prior to trial, appellant had requested any evidence pertaining to an agreement between Alexander and the Commonwealth. The assistant district attorneys prosecuting the case assured appellant that no deal had been made in exchange for Alexander's testimony. Alexander denied that his testimony against appellant was in exchange for favorable treatment by the Commonwealth, although Alexander was also facing trial on charges of murder and kidnapping arising from the same incident.² (T.T. p. 1303). Subsequent to appellant's trial, Alexander entered a plea of guilty on the charges of murder and kidnapping in exchange for a sentence of 40 months' of incarceration. (H.T. p. 33). Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death on October 30, 1984. The judgment of sentence was affirmed in Commonwealth v. Strong, 522 Pa. 445, 563 A.2d 479 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1060, 110 S.Ct. 1536, 108 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990).

In 1995 appellant filed a pro se petition seeking post-conviction relief. Counsel was appointed to assist appellant and an amended petition was filed. Evidentiary hearings were held on April 7th and 8th, and May 8th, 1997. On June 30, 1998 the lower court denied the petition for PCRA relief. This direct appeal followed.³

In preparation for the post-conviction evidentiary hearing scheduled for April 7, 1997, appellant's counsel requested copies of all relevant documents contained in the prosecution's file. On April 3, 1997, several letters were faxed to counsel which revealed that Alexander's public defender and the District Attorney of Luzerne County had been discussing an agreement with Alexander prior to appellant's trial. This was the first time this information was made available to appellant. Appellant alleged at the post-conviction hearing that in failing to reveal this information, which he specifically requested prior to trial, the prosecution had deprived him of a fair trial in accordance with the dictates of Brady. During the course of the evidentiary hearing, testimony was elicited regarding these letters and any possible deal between Alexander and the Commonwealth impacting upon Alexander's credibility at appellant's trial. At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court determined that there was no actual deal struck between Alexander and the Commonwealth; therefore, there was no material evidence that had been withheld from appellant and thus no Brady violation.

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in its determination that Brady had not been violated. To obtain relief on this claim pursuant to the PCRA, appellant must establish that the constitutional violation at issue so undermined the truth determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(2)(i); see Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326 (1999). In assessing appellant's right to relief, we must determine whether a Brady violation occurred.⁴

In Brady, the United States Supreme Court declared that due process is offended when the prosecution withholds evidence favorable to the accused. Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Brady and a co-defendant, Boblit, were tried and convicted of first-degree murder in separate trials. Brady was tried first, and testified on his own behalf, naming Boblit as the actual killer. Prior to trial Brady had requested Boblit's extrajudicial statements. The prosecution turned over several statements, but withheld one statement wherein Boblit admitted that he committed the actual killing. The United States Supreme Court found the action of the prosecutor in withholding Boblit's statement violative of Brady's right to due process. The Brady decision extended the principle of Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935), which prohibits the prosecution from obtaining a conviction through deliberate deception. The Brady court established the obligation of the prosecution to respond affirmatively to a request for production of exculpatory evidence with all evidence material to the guilt or punishment of the accused.⁵ Where evidence material to the guilt or punishment of the accused is withheld, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecutor, a violation of due process has occurred. Brady, at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194.

Exculpatory evidence favorable to the accused is not confined to evidence that reflects upon the culpability of the defendant. Exculpatory evidence also includes evidence of an impeachment nature that is material to the case against the accused. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). As the court in Napue sagely observed: "[t]he jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying that a defendant's life or liberty may depend." Id. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173. Any implication, promise or understanding that the government would extend leniency in exchange for a witness' testimony is relevant to the witness' credibility. United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). As Brady and its progeny dictate, when the failure of the prosecution to produce material evidence raises a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different if the evidence had been produced, due process has been violated and a new trial is warranted. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985).

Appellant alleges a Brady violation occurred in this case because despite appellant's requests, the Commonwealth denied the existence of any arrangement with Alexander relevant to Alexander's testimony against appellant. The trial court found no violation as the evidence failed to reveal the existence of a completed deal between the Commonwealth and Alexander prior to appellant's trial. However, Brady does not require a signed contract between the prosecution and its witnesses.

In Giglio, the government needed the testimony of Taliento, a bank...