Com. v. Swanger

• Decision Date: 02 July 1973
• Citation: 453 Pa. 107,307 A.2d 875
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Glenn R. SWANGER, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

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307 A.2d 875 453 Pa. 107 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania
v.
Glenn R. SWANGER, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. July 2, 1973.

[453 Pa. 108]

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Frederick S. Wolf, Beaver & Wolf, Lebanon, for appellant.

Paul D. Boas, Samuel A. Vitaro, Pittsburgh, for The National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, Amicus Curiae, in support of appellant.

George E. Christianson, Dist. Atty., Lebanon, Israel Packel, Atty. Gen., J. Andrew Smyser, Leonard Packel, Marc Kapustin, Deputy Attys. Gen., Harrisburg, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

[453 Pa. 109] OPINION OF THE COURT

EAGEN, Justice.

The appellant, Glenn R. Swanger, was convicted by a jury of burglary. Post trial motions were denied and Swanger was sentenced to serve a term of ten to twenty years imprisonment. A timely appeal was filed in the Superior Court, which affirmed the judgment and conviction. Allocatur was granted by this Court and on November 8, 1972, the issue was submitted for decision without oral argument. On January 19, 1973, we reversed the judgment and conviction and remanded for a new trial. A petition for reargument by the attorney general of the Commonwealth was granted and the case was orally argued before the Court on April 24, 1973. After further consideration, we again reverse and remand the case for a new trial.

The following facts are established by the record:

On the night of April 1, 1970, at approximately 3:45 a.m., Swanger was a passenger in an automobile operated by one John Krall. Two Pennsylvania state police officers stopped the automobile for a 'routine' check. The officers determined the operator of the vehicle did not have a valid driver's license, and the vehicle did not have valid registration plates. During the questioning, one of the officers pointed a flashlight in the automobile and noticed burglary tools on the floor of the vehicle. The two passengers were ordered to step out of the vehicle and placed under arrest for possession of burglary tools. Subsequent investigation linked appellant to a burglary, the conviction of which he challenges instantly.

Pretrial Swanger questioned the validity of the 'routine' stop of the automobile and made a motion to suppress all evidence

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which was the fruit of the allegedly illegal stop. After a hearing, the motion to suppress was denied, notwithstanding the testimony of the arresting officer that he saw nothing unusual about the [453 Pa. 110] vehicle or the manner in which it was operated before he ordered the stop.

Appellant argues the 'routine' stop was violative of the Fourth Amendment, ¹ whereas, the Commonwealth counterargues the officers could validly stop the vehicle under the Motor Vehicle Code of Pennsylvania, ² even though the officers observed nothing unusual about the vehicle before hand. Initially, we emphasize the only issue here involved is whether a police officer may stop a single automobile without any outward sign of a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. ³

The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear the Fourth Amendment protects people wherever the individual may harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Once it is established the individual is within an area where he has a reasonable expectation of privacy, he is entitled to be free from unreasonable intrusions by the government. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

[453 Pa. 111] An automobile is a place where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Cf. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Commonwealth v. Linde, 448 Pa. 230, 293 A.2d 62 (1972); Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91, 288 A.2d 727 (1972). Moreover, when a police officer stops a vehicle he has 'seized' the vehicle and its occupants, and thus, the protections of the Fourth Amendment must be considered. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, supra; ⁴ Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); Commonwealth v. Pollard, 450 Pa. 138, 299 A.2d 233 (1973).

The crucial question, therefore, is whether the stop or seizure of the vehicle here was unreasonable and, therefore, constitutionally impermissible. In assessing the reasonableness of a seizure, the Supreme Court of the United States has set forth the following standard:

'(I)t is necessary 'first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly

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justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,' for there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.'

392 U.S. at 20--21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, citing, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534--537, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1735, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967).

Focusing on the government interest, the Commonwealth asserts the automobile is a dangerous instrumentality,[453 Pa. 112] one of the nation's highest ranking causes of death, bodily injury and destruction of property. It is argued that in order to insure the safety of the highways and for the protection of the public, the police should be given the right to stop automobiles at random, without cause, to ascertain if the operator and the vehicle meet the comprehensive standards set forth in the Motor Vehicle Code. On the other side, we must consider the personal liberty and right of the individual to be free from government intrusions without apparent reason. ⁵ On balance, we conclude the interest of the individual outweighs that of the...