Com. v. Tallon
Decision Date | 02 June 1978 |
Citation | 387 A.2d 77,478 Pa. 468 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert Carl TALLON, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Francis A. Searer, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Lewistown, for appellee.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
The Court being equally divided, the Judgment of Sentence is affirmed.
O'BRIEN, J., files an Opinion in Support of Affirmance in which ROBERTS and POMEROY, JJ., join.
EAGEN, C. J., and NIX and MANDERINO, JJ., would reverse the Judgment of Sentence believing the corpus delicti has not been established.
Appellant, Robert C. Tallon, was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and robbery. Post-verdict motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of five to ten years for each offense. A direct appeal from the voluntary manslaughter judgment of sentence was filed in this court. The judgment of sentence on the robbery conviction was appealed to the Superior Court, which certified that appeal to this court.
The facts are as follows. On July 3, 1973, the decomposed body of Daniel Sebolt was discovered on the floor of his apartment. Blood stains were on the pillowcase and the victim's eyeglasses and false teeth were found in the bed sheets. Both the victim's wallet and change purse were missing. The state of the body's decomposition indicated that the victim had been dead for a week, but an autopsy did not reveal the manner or cause of death.
At the time the body was discovered, appellant was incarcerated in Akron, Ohio on unrelated charges. He sent a letter to the Sheriff of Mifflin County, site of this homicide, which led to an investigation culminating in appellant's arrest. He gave two confessions, one while in the Akron jail and one after returning to Mifflin County. In both confessions he stated that he and the victim were arguing when appellant began choking the victim. Appellant told police he then took the victim's wallet. When he discovered that the wallet contained no money, he threw it into the river.
Appellant first claims that the trial court erred in admitting his confession because the Commonwealth had failed to first establish the corpus delicti of the crimes for which he was charged. We do not agree.
Our corpus delicti rule 1 was first set forth in Gray v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380, 386 (1882), where we stated:
More recently, we stated in Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 365, 329 A.2d 258, 274 (1974):
"We have followed Professor Wigmore's analysis that a crime conceptually consists of three elements: 'first, the occurrence of the specific kind of injury or loss . . .; secondly, somebody's criminality (in contrast, e. g., to accident) as the source of the loss, these two together involving the commission of a crime by somebody; and, thirdly, the accused's identity as the doer of this crime.' 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2072, at 401 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis removed); see Commonwealth v. May, 451 Pa. 31, 32, 301 A.2d 368, 369 (1973). Corpus delicti, meaning 'body of the crime,' consists of the first two elements. Commonwealth v. May, supra; Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 225 Pa.Super. 208, 213, 310 A.2d 406, 409 (1973). Specifically, ' "(t)he corpus delicti (in a murder prosecution) consists of proof that a human being is dead and that such death took place under circumstances which indicate criminal means or the commission of a felonious act. " ' Commonwealth v. Milliken, 450 Pa. 310, 317, 300 A.2d 78, 82 (1973), quoting Commonwealth v. Frazier, 411 Pa. 195, 202, 191 A.2d 369, 373 (1963)."
We further stated in Ware :
Id., at 367, 329 A.2d, at 275 (n. 43).
We must then determine if independent evidence for the crimes of murder and robbery existed to allow the introduction of appellant's confession.
As previously stated, the corpus delicti in a murder prosecution consists of proof that an individual is dead and that death resulted from criminal means. Commonwealth v. Milliken, 450 Pa. 310, 300 A.2d 78 (1973). As we stated in Commonwealth v. Frazier, 411 Pa. 195, 202, 191 A.2d 369, 373 (1963):
(citations omitted.)
In this case, appellant claims that the victim's death may well have been a result of natural causes. We believe, however that the blood on the pillow, along with the evidence that the victim's glasses and dentures were tangled in the bedsheets, and the fact that the victim's wallet and change purse were missing, offer sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove the corpus delicti of murder.
The same is true of the robbery charge. The Crimes Code provides:
"(2) An act shall be deemed 'in the course of committing a theft' if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in flight after the attempt or commission." Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa.C.P.S.A. § 3701. (Emphasis added.)
To establish the corpus delicti of robbery, the Commonwealth must show an injury (theft or attempted theft) by criminal means (by the infliction of serious bodily injury). Again, we believe the Commonwealth has met its burden, as testimony indicates that the victim always had a change purse in his possession. Yet, when the body was discovered, neither a change purse nor a wallet was found. The requirement of serious bodily injury is self-evident because the victim was dead. The Commonwealth offered sufficient evidence for the robbery charge to allow appellant's confession to be admitted.
In the same vein, appellant argues that the corpus delicti was not established because a Dr. Thomas Magnani was unable to assign a cause of death. In Commonwealth v. Ilgenfritz, 466 Pa. 345, 351, 353 A.2d 387, 390 (1976), we stated:
". . . We have held that 'it is not fatal that the Commonwealth cannot establish by direct evidence that the blows causing the fatal injury were inflicted by human agency. " Admittedly, there were no eyewitnesses to the alleged beating; but the Commonwealth need not provide its case directly. Circumstantial evidence can be as reliable and persuasive as eyewitness testimony. " ' Commonwealth v. Blevins, 453 Pa. 481, 486, 309 A.2d 421 (1973)."
We believe that the circumstantial evidence surrounding this death is of a sufficient nature to permit an inference that death was by criminal human agency.
Appellant next argues that the court erred in charging the jury on what evidence could be considered in determining the corpus delicti of the crimes charged. It is the rule in this Commonwealth that before a jury can consider a defendant's confession, it must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the corpus delicti has been established. Commonwealth v. May, 451 Pa. 31, 301 A.2d 368 (1973) (n. 2). Our review of the trial court's charge reveals that the court did define the corpus delicti rule and therefore we are satisfied that the charge was proper and appellant's contention is meritless.
Appellant next argues that the court erred in permitting a hypothetical question. When Dr. Magnani was on the stand, he was asked whether "it is possible to strangle a person without doing any damage to any of the neck bones or other bones located within the neck?" Dr. Magnani replied, " Yes, it is possible." Because of the use of the word possible, appellant believes the question was improper, citing Sweeney v. Blue Anchor Bev. Co.,325 Pa. 216, 222, 189 A. 331, 334 (1937), where we stated:
". . . No matter how skilled or experienced the witness may be, he will not be permitted to guess or to state a judgment based on mere conjecture."
We believe, however, that the rule in Sweeney is inapposite, because Dr. Magnani gave an affirmative response to a question which did not require conjecture on his part; rather, Dr. Magnani's expertise allowed him to answer the proffered question.
Appellant next complains about various alleged prejudicial comments by the prosecutor which appellant believes entitle him to a new trial. During the prosecutor's opening remarks, he mentioned the letter which appellant had sent to the Mifflin County sheriff. Because a confession is inadmissible...
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