Com. v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 10 September 2003
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Jeffrey TAYLOR, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

831 A.2d 587

574 Pa. 390

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Jeffrey TAYLOR, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted February 3, 2003.

Decided September 10, 2003.

Carole Melissa Owen, John A. Knorr, Pittsburgh, for Jeffrey Taylor, Appellant.

Michael Wayne Streily, Karen T. Edwards, Pittsburgh, for Com. of PA, Appellee.

Before: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and LAMB, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE NEWMAN.

Jeffrey Taylor (Taylor) appeals from an Order of the Superior Court, which affirmed an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (PCRA court) denying his petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the Superior Court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 9, 1995, Taylor met with Anthony Martin (Martin) and Paris James (James), at which point the three decided to rob a jitney (unlicensed taxi) driver. They approached Harold Michie (Michie) at a jitney station in the Hill District of Pittsburgh and asked Michie to transport them to a different part of the district. During the trip, James brandished a shotgun, pointed it at Michie, and ordered Michie to stop and exit the vehicle. After Michie refused to get into the trunk of the car, Taylor and Martin forced him into the trunk. Taylor, Martin, and James then drove the car to a gas station in the Oakland section of the city. At this location, James pulled out his shotgun again and pointed it at the gas station attendants while Taylor and Martin robbed the men of approximately sixty dollars. James and Martin then dropped Taylor off on Wylie Avenue and drove to a nearby baseball field, where they shot Michie at least six times in the head and body, killing him.

In a statement to police, Taylor recounted his participation in the above events. Taylor also told detectives that he knew James and Martin were going to kill Michie because the two had previously robbed a different jitney driver, forced him into the trunk, and killed him. Following a trial that commenced on January 27, 1998, the jury convicted Taylor of robbery,¹ robbery of a motor vehicle,² kidnapping,³ conspiracy,⁴ and involuntary manslaughter.⁵ The trial court sentenced Taylor to terms of imprisonment of: (1) five to twenty years for robbery; (2) five to twenty years for robbery of a motor vehicle; (3) five to twenty years for kidnapping; (4) five to twenty years for conspiracy; and (5) two-and-one-half to five years for involuntary manslaughter. The court imposed all sentences consecutively, arriving at an aggregate sentence of twenty-two-and-one-half to eighty-five years' incarceration.

Taylor appealed the Judgment of Sentence, contending, inter alia, that the sentence of two-and-one-half to five years' imprisonment imposed for involuntary manslaughter violated the then-applicable Sentencing Guidelines. The Superior Court agreed and remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing on the involuntary manslaughter conviction.⁶ On remand, the trial court imposed no additional sentence for involuntary manslaughter.⁷ Accordingly, Taylor is currently serving an aggregate term of twenty to eighty years' imprisonment.

On September 26, 2000, Taylor filed a timely PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel, C. Melissa Owen, Esquire (Attorney Owen), to represent Taylor. Attorney Owen filed an amended PCRA petition on February 20, 2001, and a second amended petition on April 2, 2001. In his amended petitions, Taylor contended that his appellate counsel⁸ was ineffective for failing to challenge the decision of the trial court to admit his confession when the Commonwealth had failed to establish the corpus delicti for robbery, robbery of a motor vehicle, conspiracy, and kidnapping. By Order dated June 14, 2001, the PCRA court dismissed the petition without a hearing, prompting Taylor to appeal to the Superior Court. In a memorandum Opinion, the Superior Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. We granted allowance of appeal to address a conflict in our jurisprudence regarding the prerequisites of the "closely related crimes exception" to the corpus delicti rule.

DISCUSSION

It is beyond cavil that, in this Commonwealth, "a confession is not evidence in the absence of proof of the corpus delicti .... [W]hen the Commonwealth has given sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti to entitle the case to go to the jury, it is competent to show a confession made by the prisoner connecting him with the crime." Gray v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380, 386 (Pa.1882). See Commonwealth v. Smallwood, 497 Pa. 476, 442 A.2d 222, 225 (1982)

(extending rule to admissions and statements of the accused; not limited to formal confessions). "Corpus delicti" means, literally, "the body of a crime." Black's Law Dictionary 344 (6th ed. 1990). The "corpus delicti consists of the occurrence of a loss or injury resulting from some person's criminal conduct." Commonwealth v. McMullen, 545 Pa. 361, 681 A.2d 717, 721 (1996). The corpus delicti rule requires the Commonwealth to present evidence that: (1) a loss has occurred; and (2) the loss occurred as a result of a criminal agency. Commonwealth v. May, 451 Pa. 31, 301 A.2d 368, 369 (1973). Only then can "the Commonwealth ... rely upon statements and declarations of the accused" to prove that the accused was, in fact, the criminal agent responsible for the loss. Id. "The grounds on which the rule rests are the hasty and unguarded character [that] is often attached to confessions and admissions and the consequent danger of a conviction where no crime has in fact been committed." Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A.2d 401, 404 (1940).

In Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 329 A.2d 258 (1974), we explained that the corpus delicti rule should not be viewed as a condition precedent to the admissibility of the statements or confessions of the accused. Id. at 274, n. 41. Rather, the rule seeks to ensure that the Commonwealth has established the occurrence of a crime before introducing the statements or confessions of the accused to demonstrate that the accused committed the crime. The rule was adopted "[t]o avoid the injustice of a conviction where no crime exists.... The fact that a crime has been committed by someone must be shown before a confession will be received." Commonwealth v. Leslie, 424 Pa. 331, 227 A.2d 900, 904 (1967) (internal citations omitted) (a minor defendant confessed to having committed arson, but the Fire Marshal could not support his suspicion that the fire was of an incendiary origin; accordingly, this Court overturned the conviction).

Starting in 1973, the Superior Court began to develop an exception to the corpus delicti rule, commonly referred to as the "closely related crimes exception." In Commonwealth v. Stokes, 225 Pa.Super. 411, 311 A.2d 714 (1973), the defendant admitted in a statement to police that he pointed a gun at a police officer and pulled the trigger, but no round discharged from the weapon. The Commonwealth charged Stokes with pointing a firearm and attempt with intent to kill. To prove attempt with intent to kill, the Commonwealth had to establish that Stokes attempted to fire a loaded gun at a person. However, absent the confession of Stokes, the Commonwealth had no evidence of attempt with intent to kill. Stokes argued that the Commonwealth failed to establish the corpus delicti of attempt with intent to kill, but the Superior Court determined that the statement could be introduced as evidence of that crime because:

The two crimes charged arose from a single transaction, and had in common the element of pointing a firearm at someone. Perhaps if the two crimes were distinct, in time or nature or both, the case would be different; whether it would need not be decided. As it is, by proving the crime of pointing a firearm, the Commonwealth provided sufficient protection against "the hasty and unguarded character ... often attached to confessions[,"] to entitle it to offer the confession of attempt with intent to kill.

Id. at 715-716 (quoting Turza, 16 A.2d at 404). Accord Commonwealth v. Steward, 263 Pa.Super. 191, 397 A.2d 812, 815 (1979)

(statement admitting to attempted robbery and aggravated assault admissible, where independent proof of both crimes did not exist, "because both charges arose out of the same criminal episode, and a conviction of either or both was consistent with the circumstances and the injury suffered"); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 281 Pa.Super. 334, 422 A.2d 196, 199 (1980) (closely related crimes exception applied because the crimes of possession and possession with intent to deliver "arose from the same transaction and contained a common element"); Commonwealth v. DiSabatino, 399 Pa.Super. 1, 581 A.2d 645, 648 (1990), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 527 Pa. 629, 592 A.2d 1297 (1991) (possession and possession with intent to deliver arising from the same criminal transaction are closely related crimes and implicate the exception).

In Commonwealth v. Rieland, 324 Pa.Super. 115, 471 A.2d 490 (1984), the Superior Court found that the crimes of burglary and conspiracy, arising "from a common transaction, albeit not exactly a singular transaction[,]" were sufficiently closely related that "admission of [Rieland's] statement that he was involved in a criminal conspiracy ... would in no way defeat the purposes of the corpus delicti rule[,]" even though the Commonwealth independently established only the existence of a burglary. Id. at 493. In Commonwealth v. Tessel, 347 Pa.Super. 37, 500 A.2d 144 (1985), the defendant gave police a statement in which he admitted that he had surreptitiously entered a motel room, removed the television set from that room, and left. The next day, the police searched Tessel's room and found the TV. The Commonwealth was able to establish the corpus delicti of only a theft charge because...