Com. v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 21 June 2005
• Citation: 583 Pa. 170,876 A.2d 916
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Ronald TAYLOR, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

876 A.2d 916

583 Pa. 170

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Ronald TAYLOR, Appellant.

No. 367 CAP.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 1, 2004.

Decided June 21, 2005.

John L. Elash, Esq., for Ronald Taylor.

Michael Wayne Streily, Esq., Robert A. Willig, Amy Zapp, Esq., Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and BAER, JJ.

OPINION

Justice CASTILLE.

This is a direct appeal from the sentence of death imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Appellant's convictions in the instant case stem from his rampage on March 1, 2000, which began with the arson of his apartment building; resulted in the killing of three people and the maiming of two others; and culminated in a standoff with police at a medical care facility.

Appellant was arrested and charged in connection with his crimes, and he was initially adjudicated incompetent to stand trial by order of the Honorable Jeffrey A. Manning, Jr., dated April 25, 2000. The order directed that appellant be committed to Mayview State Hospital for treatment and evaluation and that he be appropriately medicated until becoming competent.¹

On June 28, 2000, the Commonwealth petitioned the court to permit its psychiatric expert, Dr. Michael Welner, to have access to appellant's Mayview medical records and also to have access and opportunity to interview appellant and any Mayview professional or para-professional staff. The trial court granted that motion on June 30, 2000, and in the following days, Dr. Welner interviewed a variety of medical personnel from both Mayview Hospital and St. Francis Hospital, where appellant had received medical treatment from 1990 to 1999. In addition, Dr. Welner reviewed appellant's medical records from Mayview Hospital and interviewed appellant on July 4, 2000. In a letter to the trial court dated July 6, 2000, Dr. Welner informed the court, in detail, that in his opinion appellant was competent to stand to trial. On July 28, 2000, the trial court issued an order directing the Department of Corrections and Mayview Hospital to produce appellant for trial.²

The matter was transferred to the Honorable Lawrence J. O'Toole, and present counsel, John Elash, Esq., was appointed in November of 2000 to represent appellant at trial. Public Defender Lisa Middleman, Esq., assisted in appellant's representation. On April 19, 2001, counsel filed a Notice of Intent to Pursue an Insanity Defense. On May 7, 2001, the trial court granted the Commonwealth's petition to allow Dr. Welner access to appellant in order to conduct a psychiatric evaluation regarding appellant's state of mind at the time of the crime.

Dr. Welner attempted to interview appellant on May 19 and 20, 2001, but appellant refused to cooperate. Consequently, on May 21, 2001, the Commonwealth filed a motion with the trial court ordering appellant to cooperate with the interviewing process, in which the Commonwealth requested that the court "conduct a colloquy with [appellant] to advise him to cooperate and participate in the interviewing process in a meaningful manner," and that the court "advise [appellant] that his failure to cooperate in a meaningful manner will result in excluding evidence of any mental infirmity defense or mitigation at any stage of these proceedings." Commonwealth Motion, 5/21/01, at ¶¶ 6-7. The trial court held a hearing on that same date, at which the court heard testimony from Dr. Welner, who stated that although appellant's medical history records were available for review, it was necessary for him to interview appellant in order to form an opinion on his mental status at the time of the crime. Following the testimony, the court issued an order directing that appellant cooperate with the interview process.

On the morning of May 22, 2001, Dr. Welner interviewed appellant for several hours, but appellant refused to continue the interview session in the afternoon. At a hearing held that afternoon, Dr. Welner testified that he needed approximately 15 hours of total interview time and still needed a "considerable amount of time" with appellant. N.T., 5/22/01, at 5, 8. The court directed the interview process to continue that evening and the next day if necessary.

During the afternoon of the next day, May 23, the court held yet another hearing, at which the Commonwealth complained that appellant had refused to cooperate on the evening prior and had been only "superficially cooperative" that morning, providing answers such as "[n]o comment," and "[t]hat's a stupid question." N.T., 5/23/01, at 20. Defense counsel countered that appellant, in fact, had been complying with the court's order. After hearing testimony from Dr. Welner in support of the Commonwealth's position, the court conducted a record colloquy of appellant to ensure that he understood his duty to comply in order to be able to pursue an insanity defense. Appellant evidenced his understanding, and the court thereafter permitted Dr. Welner to continue the interview process.

On May 24, 2001, the court held another hearing, making record note of the fact that Dr. Welner had ceased the interview process at around 5 p.m. on May 23, and that the Commonwealth sought additional interview time for May 25. The court again agreed to oversee the interview process, but defense counsel informed the court that he would instruct appellant not to answer any further questions. At a hearing on the following morning, May 25, 2001, defense counsel reiterated his position that appellant had been cooperative up to that point and that he would instruct appellant not to answer any further questions. Later that same day, the court issued an order, in which it noted that it had compelled appellant to participate in a psychiatric examination; that Dr. Welner had, in fact, examined appellant for a total of six to eight hours; and that appellant had substantially complied with the examination process. Thus, the order denied the Commonwealth's request to bar appellant from raising the defense of insanity.

On May 31, 2001, the court issued an order directing that all proceedings in the matter be stayed pending disposition of the Commonwealth's request for permission to appeal the trial court's order. Thereafter, the Superior Court denied the Commonwealth's Petition for Permission to Appeal on August 8, 2001, and this Court denied a Petition for Permission to Appeal on October 4, 2001.

Appellant's trial commenced on November 1, 2001 and the jury convicted appellant of, inter alia, three counts of first-degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).³ On November 11, 2001, after a penalty phase hearing at which appellant continued to be represented by Attorneys Elash and Middleman, the jury found one aggravating circumstance as to each murder, and one or more jurors found the existence of one mitigating circumstance as to each murder.⁴ The jury unanimously concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, and accordingly, returned three sentences of death. On January 11, 2002, the trial court formally imposed the sentences of death and also imposed an aggregate, consecutive sentence of 115 to 230 years of imprisonment on the remaining convictions. Notice of automatic appeal was filed on February 8, 2002.

Pursuant to the trial court's order, appellant filed a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. On January 23, 2003, the trial court filed an opinion addressing the claims raised by appellant on appeal.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We turn first, as we do in all capital direct appeals, to our review of the evidence to ensure that it is sufficient to support appellant's convictions for first-degree murder. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937, 942 n. 3 (1982),cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983). We do so notwithstanding that appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Freeman, 573 Pa. 532, 827 A.2d 385 (2003). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must determine whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are sufficient to establish each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Bridges, 563 Pa. 1, 757 A.2d 859, 864 (2000). A person is guilty of first-degree murder where the Commonwealth proves that (1) a human being was unlawfully killed; (2) the person accused is responsible for the killing; and (3) the accused acted with specific intent to kill. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(d); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 563 Pa. 269, 759 A.2d 1280, 1283 (2000). An intentional killing is a "[k]illing by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing." 18 Pa. C.S. § 2502(d). Specific intent to kill can be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim's body. Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 561 Pa. 266, 750 A.2d 261, 267 (2000).

The evidence adduced at trial established the following. On March 1, 2000, two white maintenance workers, John Kroll and John DeWitt, were replacing the door to appellant's apartment in a building located at 1208 Wood Street, Wilkinsburg, which is in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Appellant, who is black, grew angry because he thought that Kroll and DeWitt were taking too long. Appellant called DeWitt a "racist white pig" and "dirty white trash," and DeWitt replied by stating that people like appellant are the cause of racial tension. N.T., 11/1/01, at 88. As DeWitt kneeled, picking up his tools from the floor in the hallway outside appellant's apartment, appellant stood directly over him. Because appellant looked angry, DeWitt rose to his feet with a hammer held at his side. Appellant asked: "You think you're pretty tough?" Appellant walked away but then returned and stated to DeWitt, "You're a dead...