Com. v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 20 August 1998
• Citation: 553 Pa. 144,718 A.2d 743
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Paul Gamboa TAYLOR, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 743

718 A.2d 743

553 Pa. 144

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Paul Gamboa TAYLOR, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted May 26, 1998.

Decided Aug. 20, 1998.

Richard Robinson, Pittsburgh, for P. Taylor.

H. Stanley Rebert, York, Robert A. Graci, Office of Atty. Gen., for the Com.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

OPINION

SAYLOR, Justice.

In this capital case, Appellant, Paul Gamboa Taylor ("Taylor"), appeals from an order denying post-conviction relief in the form of a new penalty phase hearing.

The circumstances underlying Taylor's convictions of five counts of first degree murder and the subsequent imposition of a sentence of death are set forth at length in this Court's Opinion on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 535 Pa. 266, 634 A.2d 1106 (1993). Stated briefly, using a ball peen hammer and a kitchen knife, Taylor bludgeoned and stabbed to death his mother-in-law, her infant son, and two of his own three minor children. Eleven hours later, Taylor's wife arrived at home, and Taylor killed her in the same manner. Taylor then attempted to commit suicide. He subsequently confessed to the killings on multiple occasions, including in a detailed letter that he wrote to the district attorney.

On December 19, 1991, following full written and oral plea colloquies, Taylor entered a general plea to criminal homicide. On January 10, 1992, the trial court conducted a degree of guilt hearing, at the outset of which the court conducted a second colloquy concerning Taylor's decision not to present defenses. After the presentation of evidence by the Commonwealth, Taylor was found guilty as to each of five counts of first degree murder. In the penalty phase that followed, the trial court engaged in a third colloquy with Taylor concerning his decision not to present any evidence of mitigating circumstances or to otherwise oppose the imposition of a sentence of death. On January 23, 1992, Taylor was sentenced to death for each of four of the counts of first degree murder, and to life imprisonment for the remaining count. An automatic direct appeal followed, in which Taylor presented no claim of error. This Court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and satisfied its statutory obligations attendant to the review of a sentence of death, and, on December 9, 1993, affirmed the judgment of sentence. Id.

On January 13, 1997, Taylor, proceeding pro se, filed a petition seeking relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546 (the "PCRA"), and a supplemental PCRA petition was filed after the appointment of counsel. Taylor alleged, inter alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective for having failed to override Taylor's decisions as to trial strategy in the penalty phase, including the decision not to present mitigating evidence. The PCRA court conducted a hearing on June 24, 1997, at which Taylor and trial counsel testified, and at the conclusion of which the court denied the petition from the bench. The court found that trial counsel had properly advised Taylor concerning all aspects of the criminal proceedings and, in particular, that a death sentence would likely be imposed should Taylor pursue his chosen strategy of inaction. With specific reference to the penalty phase, the court found that trial counsel had discussed with Taylor the desirability of presenting mitigating evidence, and that Taylor rejected such advice and, in fact, made telephone calls to witnesses to advise them not to be present at trial. The court also found that Taylor failed to present any evidence that would support a finding that he was at any time incapable of making knowing and intelligent decisions. In this regard, the PCRA court noted that the trial court had required psychological and psychiatric evaluations prior to the entry of Taylor's guilty plea, which established that Taylor was able to make rational decisions throughout and was otherwise competent to stand trial.

The single legal issue presented in this appeal is whether trial counsel was ineffective for permitting Taylor to make decisions as to trial strategy and, in particular, the decision not to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase hearing. Taylor takes the position that trial counsel should have overridden his decisions in such matters, because he was under severe stress and was suffering from remorse.

This Court's review of the denial of post-conviction relief is limited to an examination of whether the PCRA court's determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free from legal error. Commonwealth v. Morales, 549 Pa. 400, 408, 701 A.2d 516, 520 (1997) (citing Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 117 n. 4, 661 A.2d 352, 356 n. 4 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121, 116 S.Ct. 931, 133 L.Ed.2d 858 (1996)). With respect to Taylor's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, he is required to establish that the claim has arguable merit; that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for proceeding as he did; and that the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii); see generally Commonwealth v. Collins, 546 Pa. 616, 619, 687 A.2d 1112, 1113 (1996).

This Court has stated generally that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to override the decisions of his client, see Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 525, 645 A.2d 189, 195 (1994), and, more specifically, that when counsel follows the defendant's strategy at a penalty phase hearing, he cannot be deemed ineffective for doing so. See Commonwealth v. Beasley, 544 Pa. 554, 566, 678 A.2d 773, 778 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1121, 117 S.Ct. 1257, 137 L.Ed.2d 337 (1997). For example, in Commonwealth v. Sam, 535 Pa. 350, 635 A.2d 603 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1115, 114 S.Ct. 2123, 128 L.Ed.2d 678 (1994), in the penalty phase of a capital case, the appellant instructed trial counsel not to introduce mitigating evidence or to argue mitigating circumstances. On appeal, however, the appellant argued that an attorney cannot abide by such direction, because a defendant does not have the right to choose to receive the death penalty. Upon review of the sentencing statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711, the associated case authorities and the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, this Court found that:

[a] criminal defendant has the right to decide whether mitigating evidence will be presented on his behalf. We will not remove that right and compel admission of such evidence. Defen...