Com. v. Taylor, 51

Decision Date15 October 1987
Docket NumberNo. 51,51
Citation531 A.2d 1111,516 Pa. 21
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Gus TAYLOR, III, Appellee. W.D. Appeal 1986.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Michael J. Veshecco, Dist. Atty., Michael R. Cauley, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Erie, LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Graci, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Andrea F. McKenna, Deputy Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, for appellant.

Jay S. Nedell, Catlett & Associates, Houston, Tex., for appellee.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.

ORDER OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

The Commonwealth challenges Superior Court's affirmance of the judgment of sentence which was imposed outside the sentencing guidelines, 204 PA. CODE § 303 et seq. In view of our recent invalidation of the guideline which the sentencing court refused to apply in the matter sub judice, Commonwealth v. Sessoms, --- Pa. ---, 532 A.2d 775 (1987), we affirm.

LARSEN and HUTCHINSON, JJ., filed a dissenting opinion.

LARSEN, Justice, dissenting.

The trial court's refusal to impose an additional 12 months to 24 months imprisonment as mandated by the deadly weapons enhancement provision of the sentencing guidelines 1 was error. I would reverse the Superior Court order that affirmed the trial court, and remand this case for resentencing in accordance with the sentencing guidelines and the deadly weapons enhancement provision.

In affirming the judgment of sentence, the Superior Court appears to have confused the elements of the crimes for which the appellee was convicted, with the guidelines a court is required to consider in imposing sentence. The Superior Court said that since the criminal information filed against the appellee did not allege possession of a deadly weapon, the Commonwealth "is bound by its charge and cannot go beyond the allegation in the information and proceed to offer proof of the use of a deadly weapon at sentencing." Commonwealth v. Taylor, 346 Pa.Super. 599 at 608, 500 A.2d 110 at 115 (1985). This is plainly error. There is no requirement that before the deadly weapons enhancement can be imposed, it must be shown that possession of a deadly weapon in committing the crime was charged in the information or indictment.

The Sentencing Guidelines set forth various matters that are to be considered by the trial judge in determining a proper sentence. (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721) One of the guidelines is the fact of possession of a deadly weapon during the perpetration of the crime. This fact is to be considered by the court only after conviction and at the time of sentencing. Additionally, it is only to be considered when possession of a deadly weapon is not itself an element of the crime charged. The Act provides:

There shall be no such enhancement for convictions: under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4) (relating to aggravated assault); of violations of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6120; under 18 Pa.C.S. § 907 (relating to possessing instruments of crime); under 18 Pa.C.S. § 908 (relating to prohibited offensive weapons); or of any other offense for which possession of a deadly weapon is an element of the statutory definition.

204 Pa.Code 303.4(b), incorporated in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721.

In purpose and intended effect, the deadly weapons enhancement provision of the sentencing guidelines is similar to the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712. We upheld the constitutionality of that Act in Commonwealth v. Wright, 508 Pa. 25, 494 A.2d 354 (1985). In discussing the intended effect of the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act in my Concurring Opinion in Wright, which was joined by the majority, I said:

It is intended, and it is reasonable to believe, that application of the Mandatory Sentencing Act will deter the dangerous and intimidating use of firearms by felons in the perpetration of crimes. A lengthened...

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8 cases
  • Com. v. Brown
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • October 19, 1999
    ...241-42, 428 A.2d 661, 662 (1981). See also Commonwealth v. Taylor, 346 Pa.Super. 599, 604-06, 500 A.2d 110, 113 (1985), aff'd, 516 Pa. 21, 531 A.2d 1111 (1987) ("It is clear, however, that the sentencing process is subject to the due process ¶ 15 Although both the Pennsylvania Constitution ......
  • Com. v. Walls
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • April 7, 2010
    ...were listed in the complaint. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 346 Pa.Super. 599, 500 A.2d 110, 114 (1985) (en banc), affirmed, 516 Pa. 21, 531 A.2d 1111 (1987) ("the District Attorney's office has the power to modify the information as it relates to the complaint (so long as the offense is subs......
  • Com. v. Pickford
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • February 5, 1988
    ...code as a whole; or 2) be outside guidelines and be unreasonable, considering the sentencing code as a whole. In Commonwealth v. Taylor, 516 Pa. 21, 531 A.2d 1111 (1987), decided the same day as Sessoms and Samuels, our Supreme Court dismissed as moot an appeal by the Commonwealth from a ju......
  • Com. v. Felix
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • March 14, 1988
    ...or provisions thereof. Succinctly, no prejudice could result from the refusal to apply invalid guidelines. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 516 Pa. 21, 531 A.2d 1111 (1987); see also Commonwealth v. Pickford, supra, 536 A.2d at 1355 & n. 3, citing Commonwealth v. Terry, 513 Pa. 381, 402, 521 A.2......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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