Com. v. Veltre

• Decision Date: 03 December 1980
• Citation: 492 Pa. 237,424 A.2d 486
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. John VELTRE, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 486

424 A.2d 486

492 Pa. 237

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. John VELTRE, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Dec. 3, 1980.

Reargument Denied Feb. 3, 1981.

[492 Pa. 238] Alfred B. Bell, Asst. Public Defender, Greensburg, for appellant.

James J. Conte, Albert C. Gaudio, Asst. Dist. Attys., Greensburg, for appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The Court being equally divided, the order is affirmed.

LARSEN, J., filed an opinion in support of affirmance in which FLAHERTY and KAUFFMAN, JJ., joins.

ROBERTS, J., filed an opinion in support of reversal joined by O'BRIEN, C. J.

NIX, J., filed an opinion in support of reversal.

OPINION IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE

LARSEN, Justice.

On September 17, 1973, appellant John Veltre entered pleas of guilty to four indictments charging two counts of murder, rape, and assault with intent to kill. He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment on the indictments charging murder, a consecutive term of imprisonment of 5 to 20 years on the indictment charging rape, and received a suspended sentence on the indictment charging assault with intent to kill. Subsequently, on April 24, 1974, appellant filed a petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Following a hearing on the petition, a new trial was ordered. The Commonwealth appealed that order, and this Court affirmed. ¹

Appellant then proceeded to trial before a jury and was found guilty of two counts of murder of the first degree, rape, and assault with intent to kill. The same sentence set forth above was imposed, and appellant brought this appeal.

The sole issue presented by appellant is whether the courts below erred in not suppressing inculpatory statements he made to the police following his arrest. The events which lead up to those statements are as follows:

During the evening hours of February 14, 1973, appellant, who was sixteen years and eleven months of age, consumed three to four cans of beer and then went to the Manor Park Apartments in Monessen, Pennsylvania. He entered the apartment of Alys Morgan and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him by striking and choking her. Because Mrs. Morgan continued to scream after appellant had completed his sexual attack, appellant threw her against a wall, struck her in the head, "stomped" on her several times, and left her on the floor believing she was dead. Fearing that his victim's two-year-old daughter might identify him, he went into the child's bedroom, picked her up, threw her against a wall, and then "stomped" on her as well. Finally, appellant went into the bedroom of Mrs. Morgan's two-month-old daughter and threw her against a wall. He then heard a knock on the apartment door and climbed out the back window. The blows suffered by the children proved fatal but, miraculously, Mrs. Morgan survived.

Appellant fled to his own apartment, which was located in the same complex. He locked and barricaded the apartment door and told his mother not to open it if the police should come. Approximately one hour later, at 12:30 a. m. on February 15th, the police arrived. With the assistance of two other persons, appellant further fortified the front door, forcing the police to break one of the panels in an effort to gain admittance. Appellant then held the officers at bay by striking out at them with a large fork. One of the policemen sprayed mace in appellant's direction, entered the apartment, and three policemen subdued appellant and placed him in handcuffs. His mother was then advised that he was being taken to police headquarters and why. She indicated that she would come to the station later, as there was no extra room in the police vehicle.

Following their arrival at police headquarters, appellant calmed down and the handcuffs were removed. He was advised of his constitutional rights, after which, he indicated to the police that he did not wish to waive them without first seeing his probation officer, Claude Garry. The police telephoned Mr. Garry who had just received a telephone call from appellant's mother. Appellant's mother had informed Mr. Garry of what had happened, advised him that she was not going to police headquarters, and asked him to please go in her stead.

Mr. Garry, who had known appellant for approximately four years and counseled him and his mother on 25 to 30 occasions, arrived at approximately 1:40 a. m. and was taken to appellant. In Mr. Garry's presence, appellant was again advised of his constitutional rights, with one officer reading from a card and another reiterating the warnings in very simplistic language. Appellant agreed to waive these rights, and Mr. Garry asked appellant if he knew why he was under arrest. Appellant immediately began to relate the foregoing incidents. When he was done, appellant indicated that he had no remorse, and stated he would repeat his acts, as the victim's children are happier now because they were mistreated and the victim was "no good" and deserved to die.

In a series of decisions beginning with Commonwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 329 A.2d 286 (1974), a majority of this Court ² has held that no person under 18 years of age may effectively waive his constitutional rights without: 1) an opportunity to consult with an adult, 2) who was interested in the welfare of the juvenile, and 3) who was aware of the rights of the accused. Appellant argues that Mr. Garry, his probation officer, was not the "interested adult" required by these decisions, and that the court below, therefore, erred in not suppressing his statements. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, asserts the court below correctly found that appellant's waiver of constitutional rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and that appellant's incriminating statements were not illegally obtained. While appellant's characterization of Mr. Garry may be correct, ³ I agree with the Commonwealth.

The rationale for this Court's per se rule regarding juvenile confessions was enunciated in Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 372 A.2d 797 (1977):

"... The new rule appreciates that the inexperience of the minor affects not only his or her ability to understand the full implication and consequences of the predicament but also renders the judgment inadequate to assess the spectrum of considerations encompassed in the waiver decision. It was therefore reasoned that the impediment of immaturity can only be overcome where the record establishes that the youth had access to the advice of an attorney, parent, or other interested adult and that the consulted adult was informed as to the constitutional rights available to the minor and aware of the consequences that might follow the election to be made."

Id. at 498-99, 372 A.2d at 800 (footnotes and citations omitted).

and, also, in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 486 Pa. 568, 406 A.2d 1037 (1979):

"... This Court's 'interested adult' cases rest upon a concern that juvenile immaturity may preclude self-protection from overbearing police interrogation. The rule intends that overbearance may be avoided by consultation, with individuals such as a 'lawyer, adult relative or friend,' who can provide a juvenile with 'the protection which his own immaturity could not.' "

Id. at 571, 406 A.2d at 1038 (footnotes and citations omitted).

The rule, as these passages explain, was thus designed to insure that constitutional protections would not be lost as a result of the innocence and inexperience of youth being taken advantage of by overbearing interrogation.

In the instant case, appellant was 13 months short of 18 years. He had experienced prior encounters with the law, had been detained in a juvenile facility at New Castle, and was on probation at the time of his arrest for the heinous crimes in question. Appellant was described as "street wise", was in the lower spectrum of the adult normal range of intellectual functioning, and at all times appeared to comprehend his rights. In fact, appellant demonstrated his understanding of the import and effect of those rights by exercising them, and refusing to speak to the police without the presence of Mr. Garry. He was then afforded the opportunity to speak with Mr. Garry, and confessed to his crimes immediately and without interrogation.

These circumstances disclose that appellant is not the youthful inexperienced juvenile contemplated in Roane and its progeny, and that his waiver of constitutional rights was not brought about by overbearing interrogation. Appellant had previous first-hand experience with the criminal justice system and was no more (and probably much less) in need of the assistance of an "interested adult" than a criminal 18 years of age (i. e., 13 months older than appellant) who never had an encounter with the police. Also, appellant who had already exercised his constitutional rights and had an opportunity to reflect on the situation, expressly waived those rights and confessed without any police interrogation whatsoever. To apply the per se rule in this case would, therefore, not advance its purposes but, rather, would result in the senseless exclusion of reliable evidence, and needless repetition of a fair trial.

Consequently, rigid adherence to this per se rule would be overly paternalistic, unnecessarily protective, and would sacrifice too much of the interests of justice. I thus reject the per se rule in favor of a more flexible approach which will reflect a concern for the interests of society, as well as the rights of juvenile defendants. Accordingly, I find that the presence of an interested adult is not necessary in all cases for an effective waiver of constitutional protections by a person under 18 years of age. I hasten to point out, however, that a person's youth, inexperience, and comprehension of the situation, along with the conduct of the police, are factors to be weighed in determining whether under the totality of the...