Com. v. Walls
Decision Date | 23 March 2004 |
Citation | 2004 Pa. Super. 79,846 A.2d 152 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. William WALLS, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Robert H. Steinberg, Public Defender, Middleburg, for appellant.
Michael Hudock, Asst. Dist. Atty., Middleburg, for Com., appellee.
¶ 1 This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence imposed upon Appellant after he pled guilty to one count of rape of a victim less than thirteen years old, one count of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI) with a victim less than thirteen years old and one count of incest. Appellant raises one issue for our review: "Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in sentencing [A]ppellant above the aggravated range of the guidelines to the statutory maximum, failing to consider mitigating factors, while citing aggravating factors that were either subsumed elements of the offenses involved, or grossly mis-characterized Appellant's version, inconsistent with the court's acceptance of the pleas?" Appellants Brief at 3. We vacate and remand.
¶ 2 The following summary of relevant facts is derived from a variety of sources.1 On October 1, 2002, Appellant pled guilty to the above enumerated offenses. The charges stem from reports that Appellant had sexually molested his seven-year old granddaughter during overnight visits at the home Appellant shared with his wife, the grandmother of the child. According to an account contained in the pre-sentence investigation report, on overnight visits the victim would sleep on the floor of her grandparent's bedroom on a bed made of piled blankets. The victim's grandmother would often arise earliest. On some occasions when the grandmother had arisen first and had left the bedroom, Appellant would leave his bed and lie down next to the victim and sexually assault her. Typically, after lying next to the victim, Appellant would pull down the victim's pajamas and underpants and rub her vagina and anus. He would then place his erect penis between her legs and/or up against her vagina and anus and then often proceed to penetrate the victim either vaginally or anally until reaching sexual climax. Appellant may have also inappropriately touched the victim in his woodshop and in the car while Appellant's wife was in a store.
¶ 3 After a report of abuse was made to the police, an investigation was conducted during which Appellant purportedly admitted that he had sexually assaulted the victim several times. Appellant was subsequently charged with a variety of counts relating to sexual abuse of a minor under the age of thirteen. Appellant then entered into a negotiated plea agreement to the charges enumerated above. The plea was "open" to the count of rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and called for a standard range sentence on the charge of incest. After the completion of a pre-sentence investigation, Appellant was sentenced on March 24, 2003, to an aggregate term of twenty-one to sixty years' imprisonment. The rape and IDSI charges carried mandatory minimum sentences of five years' imprisonment and standard range sentences of 60-66 months' imprisonment and an aggravated range sentence of 66-78 months' imprisonment. Appellant received the statutory maximum for each offense, ten to twenty years' imprisonment. On the incest charge, Appellant received a sentence of one to ten years, which was within the standard range. All sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. Appellant filed a timely motion to modify sentence, which was denied on April 22, 2003. The present appeal followed.
¶ 4 We start our analysis by stating the obvious: as has been cogently articulated by the sentencing court, both at the time of sentencing and in its opinion to this Court, Appellant has done a very horrible thing. Nothing that follows in this opinion should be viewed as a trivialization of the gravity of Appellant's offenses. Nor should the fact that we engage here in an analysis that might seem to some as detached and coldly analytical be viewed as a lack of sensitivity for the wrong that was committed against the victim in the present case. However, just as the sentencing court has passionately displayed its contempt for Appellant in the present case, it has just as clearly evidenced a lack of appreciation for the interplay of the sentencing guidelines in imposing an appropriate sentence. In so doing, we believe the court has abused its sentencing discretion. It is our obligation as an appellate court to correct that error.2
¶ 5 It has been stated that "[s]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge," Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa.Super.2001), and that the "sentencing court has broad discretion in choosing the range of permissible confinements which best suits a particular defendant and the circumstances surrounding his crime." Commonwealth v. Moore, 420 Pa.Super. 484, 617 A.2d 8, 12 (1992). However, it has also been stated that "broad discretion" does not mean unfettered or unchecked discretion, Commonwealth v. Gause, 442 Pa.Super. 329, 659 A.2d 1014 (1995); rather the sentence must be "consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88, 546 A.2d 12, 13 (1988).
¶ 6 If the above two statements appear contradictory, it is helpful to examine sentencing discretion from a historical perspective. Prior to the late-1970's, the sentencing courts in Pennsylvania, as in most jurisdictions, did enjoy nearly unfettered discretion in imposing sentences. Our Supreme Court described the prevailing approach to sentencing in 1977 in the case of Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140, 143 (1977):
Pennsylvania has a system of indeterminate sentencing, which carries with it "an implicit adoption of the philosophy of individual sentencing." Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650 (1976). This system of indeterminate sentencing "necessitates the granting of broad discretion to the trial judge, who must determine, among the sentencing alternatives and the range of permissible penalties, the proper sentence to be imposed." Id. 466 Pa. at 130, 351 A.2d at 656.
Riggins includes a quote that puts the matter more bluntly:
We have ... granted the sentencer almost totally unlimited, unstructured and unreviewable discretion to impose punishment after conviction.
Id. at 144 (quoting Berger, Reducing Sentencing Disparity: Structured Discretion and the Sentencing Judge, 32 J.Miss.B. 414, 415 (1976)). Consistent with this approach to sentencing, appellate review was very limited. Riggins stated, "[t]raditionally, appellate courts have left sentences undisturbed on appeal because of the view that the trial court is in a far better position to weigh the factors involved in sentencing determinations." Id. at 144. However, as noted by the Court in Riggins "[i]ndeterminate sentencing has been the subject of much criticism on the grounds that it is inherently unfair." Id. at 143 n. 6. The following quote is illustrative of the criticism: Id. at 144 n. 8.
¶ 7 Moreover, the American Bar Association was on record as believing the granting of such discretion was inconsistent with the approach taken in most other areas of the criminal justice system:
Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences, Introduction at 1-2 (Approved Draft, 1968).
¶ 8 Even some highly regarded jurists were on record as opposing the granting of such broad discretion to the sentencing court. Our Supreme Court quoted future Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Judge Potter Stewart:
Justice is measured in many ways, but to a convicted criminal its surest measure lies in the fairness of the sentence he receives.... It is an anomaly that a judicial system which has developed so scrupulous a concern for the protection of a criminal defendant throughout every other stage of the proceedings against him should have so neglected this most important dimension of fundamental justice.
Shepard v. United States, 257 F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir.1958). Lastly, the Court further appeared to acknowledge the potential for abuse of sentencing discretion, "[t]he exercise of this discretion is `one of the most important, and most easily abused powers vested in the trial court.'" Riggins, 377 A.2d at 144 (quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650, 657 (1976)).
¶ 9 Amidst the above climate and a shifting of...
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