Com. v. Walls

• Decision Date: 17 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. 57 MAP 2005.,57 MAP 2005.
• Citation: 926 A.2d 957
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. William Theodore WALLS, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

926 A.2d 957

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. William Theodore WALLS, Appellee.

No. 57 MAP 2005.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 8, 2006.

Decided July 17, 2007.

Michael Harve Sholley, Esq., Peter Carr, Esq., Michael T. Hudock, Esq., Middleburg, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

John Henry Reed, Esq., Robert H. Steinberg, Esq., Middleburg, for William Walls.

David R. Crowley, Esq., Bellefonte, for amicus curiae Public Defenders Association of PA and PA Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and BAER, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice CAPPY.

In this appeal we are asked to consider whether the Superior Court erred in making certain legal determinations leading it to vacate the judgment of sentence imposed by the sentencing court with respect to Appellee William Theodore Walls. For the reasons that follow, we find that the Superior Court did err. In addressing the nature of these errors, we clarify the proper standard of appellate review of a sentencing court's imposition of sentence. Ultimately, we remand this matter to the Superior Court for a re-examination of the judgment of sentence in light of our decision today.

The facts upon which the lower tribunals based their decisions follow.¹ Appellant sexually molested his seven-year-old granddaughter during overnight visits by the victim at her grandparents' home. Specifically, Walls' granddaughter would sleep on the floor of her grandparents' bedroom on a bed made of piled blankets. On certain occasions when the victim's grandmother awoke and left the bedroom, Walls would leave his bed and lie down next to his granddaughter and sexually assault her. Typically after lying next to his granddaughter, Walls would pull down his pajamas and underpants and rub her vagina and anus. He would then place his erect penis between her legs and/or up against her vagina and anus and then often proceed to penetrate his granddaughter either vaginally or anally until reaching climax. Walls may have also improperly touched his granddaughter in his woodshop and in his automobile while his wife was in a store. After a report of abuse was made to the police, an investigation ensued during which Walls purportedly admitted that he had sexually assaulted his granddaughter several times. Walls was charged with a variety of counts relating to sexual abuse of a minor.

Walls pled guilty to one count of rape of a victim less than thirteen years old, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(6); one count of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI) with a victim less than thirteen years old, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(6); and one count of incest. 18 Pa.C.S. § 4302. The plea was "open" to the count of rape and IDSI, but called for a standard range sentence on the charge of incest.

After a pre-sentence investigation, Walls was sentenced on March 24, 2003 to an aggregate term of twenty-one to fifty years of imprisonment. The rape and IDSI counts carried mandatory minimum sentences of five years of imprisonment and standard range sentences of sixty to sixty-six months of imprisonment and an aggravated range sentence of sixty-six to seventy-eight months of imprisonment. Walls received the statutory maximum for each offense, which was ten to twenty years of imprisonment. Thus, the sentencing court imposed a sentence outside of the sentencing guidelines. With respect to the incest count, Walls received a sentence of one to ten years of imprisonment, a sentence within the standard range. All sentences were ordered to run consecutively. Walls filed a motion to modify sentence which was denied on April 22, 2003. Walls then appealed to the Superior Court.

In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the sentencing court explained the reasons for Walls' sentence: (1) Walls was in a position of trust and responsibility in caring for the victim; (2) the tender and young age of the victim, who was seven years old at the time of the rape and assaults; (3) that the victim was Walls' granddaughter; and (4) Walls perceived his acts to be "accidents" as opposed to deliberate conduct. The sentencing court found that the factors which led to the maximum sentences were legal, that the reasons for the sentence were stated on the record, and that this statement of reasons on the record reflected consideration of the nature of the sentence.

On appeal a three-member panel of the Superior Court vacated Walls' judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Walls, 846 A.2d 152 (Pa.Super.2004). The Superior Court first engaged in a historical review of sentencing discretion, noting that the prevailing approach to sentencing until the late 1970's was largely unfettered discretion of the sentencing court in imposing sentences. At that time, sentencing guidelines were formulated which, according to the Superior Court, restricted sentencing discretion and increased appellate review of sentences. In reviewing the considerations in sentencing, the Superior Court offered, inter alia, that "[t]he sentence should be based on the minimum confinement consistent with the gravity of the offense, the need for public protection, and the defendant's need for rehabilitation." Walls, 846 A.2d at 157-58 (citation omitted).

Finding that the guidelines created a "norm" for comparison to achieve the goal of greater consistency and rationality in sentencing, the Superior Court offered that the norm "strongly implies that deviation from the norm should be correlated with facts about the crime that also deviate from the norm for the offense, or facts relating to the offender's character or criminal history that deviates [sic] from the norm and must be regarded as not within the guidelines [sic] contemplation." Id. at 158. Thus, the sentencing court must, if it imposes a sentence that deviates significantly from the guideline recommendation, demonstrate that the case is "compellingly different from the `typical' case of the same offense...." Id. In the Superior Court's view, the sentencing court "is not free to reject the Sentencing Commission's assessment of an appropriate sentence and simply interpose its own sense of just punishment." Id. at 160.

In applying these articulations of the legal standards to the facts, the Superior Court believed that in imposing Walls' sentence, the sentencing court concentrated too greatly on the principle of revenge and protection of the public. The Superior Court proceeded to reject the factors which led the sentencing court to deviate from the guidelines. Specifically, the Superior Court found that the fact that Walls held a position of trust and was responsible for caring for the victim, are factors not uncommon in cases of this type. With respect to the tender age of the victim, the Superior Court noted that the crime itself made a distinction with respect to certain classes of victims, such as minors and the elderly, and thus, the sentencing guidelines reflect the Crimes Code's provision of greater punishment of certain crimes committed against certain victims. The Superior Court found that neither this factor, nor any other factor cited by the sentencing court, justified the imposition of the maximum sentence permitted by law.

We granted allocatur to clarify the proper standard of review an appellate court should employ when considering a challenge to a sentence that falls outside of the sentencing guidelines and to determine whether the Superior Court erred in making certain legal determinations which led it to vacate Walls' sentence.

The standard of review typically refers to the level of deference to be accorded a lower tribunal's decision. Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. Appellate Prac. & Process 47 (2000). Our Court has stated that the proper standard of review when considering whether to affirm the sentencing court's determination is an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Smith, 543 Pa. 566, 673 A.2d 893, 895 (1996)("Imposition of a sentence is vested in the discretion of the sentencing court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion."). As stated in Smith, an abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its discretion unless "the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will." Id.² In more expansive terms, our Court recently offered: "An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous." Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 576 Pa. 546, 839 A.2d 1038, 1046 (2003).

The rationale behind such broad discretion and the concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the sentencing court is "in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances before it." Commonwealth v. Ward, 524 Pa. 48, 568 A.2d 1242, 1243 (1990); see also Commonwealth v. Jones, 418 Pa.Super. 93, 613 A.2d 587, 591 (1992)(en banc)(offering that the sentencing court is in a superior position to "view the defendant's character, displays of remorse, defiance or indifference and the overall effect and nature of the crime."). Simply stated, the sentencing court sentences flesh-and-blood defendants and the nuances of sentencing decisions are difficult to gauge from the cold transcript used upon appellate review. Moreover, the sentencing court enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate review, bringing to its decisions an expertise, experience, and judgment that should not be lightly disturbed. Even with the advent of the sentencing guidelines,³ the power of sentencing is a function to be performed by the sentencing court. Ward, 568 A.2d at 1243. Thus, rather...