Com. v. Ward
Decision Date | 18 November 1978 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Bruce E. WARD, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Robert H. Chase, Dist. Atty., Frank J. Scutella, Asst. Dist. Atty., Erie, for appellee.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.
On September 12, 1977, appellant, Bruce E. Ward, pleaded guilty before the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County to a charge of murder. Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 352(a), the prosecution certified to the court that the degree of guilt of the homicide charge rose no higher than murder in the second degree. Additionally, the prosecution agreed, subject to court approval, to dismiss the information charging appellant with rape, and to nolle pros informations charging appellant with various counts of theft and criminal trespass.
On November 1 and 3, 1977, testimony as to the degree of guilt was heard, and on November 16, 1977, the court rendered a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree and imposed sentence of life imprisonment. Immediately following imposition of sentence, appellant's trial counsel presented a "Petition to Withdraw Guilty Plea/Reconsider Degree of Guilt" on appellant's behalf. That petition was refused by the Court without a hearing.
Two days later, on November 18, 1977, appellant's trial counsel was granted leave to withdraw and present counsel was appointed to represent appellant on appeal.
Appellant now argues, as he did in the petition filed with the court below, that the evidence adduced at the degree of guilt hearing was insufficient to sustain the trial court's finding of guilt of murder in the second degree, but was sufficient to convict only of murder in the third degree. Appellant now argues that the on-the-record guilty plea colloquy conducted prior to the court's acceptance of appellant's plea of guilty to the charge of murder was deficient for failing to demonstrate that appellant was aware of one of the elements on the right to a trial by jury, i. e.: the requirement of a unanimous verdict. Appellant's new counsel also raises several issues which were not raised below. Additionally, appellant argues that his guilty plea was invalid because it was induced by the improper conduct of his trial counsel who, it is alleged, advised appellant that if he pleaded not guilty and stood trial, he would be found guilty of murder in the first degree and would be sentenced to death.
We agree that the on-the-record colloquy conducted prior to the trial court's acceptance of the guilty plea failed to satisfy the requirements of Pa.R.Cr.P. 319. Because this issue is dispositive there is no need to discuss other issues raised. We therefore reverse the judgment of sentence and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 373, 312 A.2d 597, 600 (1973), we delineated the "essential ingredients of a jury trial which are necessary to understand the significance of (that) right . . . ." Williams held that before a purported waiver of the right to a trial by jury may be said to be valid, the record must show that the defendant understood that the jurors would be chosen from members of the community, that the accused would be able to participate in their selection, And that any verdict which the jury might render would have to be unanimous.
Appellant argues that by pleading guilty he gave up his right to a jury trial without having first been adequately made aware of the nature of that right. The prosecution on the other hand, contends that the record of the colloquy conducted prior to the trial court's acceptance of appellant's plea demonstrates that appellant was informed of the "essential ingredients" of a jury trial established by Williams, supra. In support of this position, the prosecution cites the following portion of the guilty plea colloquy:
The prosecution does not point to any other explanation of the right to a jury trial, and our examination of the record indicates that the portion of the colloquy quoted above contains all that was said to appellant regarding the elements of that right.
We do not agree. The language used by the court in this case is almost identical to the language held in Commonwealth v. Williams, supra, to be inadequate to convey to an accused the essential elements of the right to a trial by jury. In Williams, the prosecution had also contended that the court had adequately informed the accused of his right to a jury trial. The record in Williams revealed the following colloquy:
" 'Q. (By the Court) Now at...
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Com. v. Ward
...appeal. This Court held the plea colloquy inadequate, reversed the judgment of sentence and granted a new trial. Commonwealth v. Ward, 483 Pa. 53, 394 A.2d 535 (1978). Venue was transferred to Beaver County, where the appellant filed the instant motion, claiming that the Commonwealth's inte......
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Com. v. Egan
...(1978) (guilty plea not voluntary or knowing where trial court did not explain charges in understandable fashion); Commonwealth v. Ward, 483 Pa. 53, 394 A.2d 535 (1978) (guilty plea not voluntary or knowing where trial court did not explain requirement of unanimous Indeed, this case is a st......
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Com. v. Easley
...accused be allowed to participate in the selection of the jury panel." Id. at 373, 312 A.2d at 600. Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Ward, 483 Pa. 53, 394 A.2d 535 (1978), and Commonwealth v. Greene, 483 Pa. 195, 394 A.2d 978 (1978), because the trial court in those cases failed to inform t......
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Com. v. Weiss
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