Com. v. Warfield
Citation | 227 A.2d 177,424 Pa. 555 |
Decision Date | 14 March 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 135,No. 133,133,135 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant in, v. Barbara WARFIELD, Appellant in |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
H. David Rothman, Robert N. Peirce, Jr., Pittsburgh for Barbara Warfield.
Before BELL, C.J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.
Barbara Warfield was indicted in Allegheny County for murder and voluntary manslaughter. Defendant's counsel filed a pretrial motion to suppress her written statement given to police following her arrest, wherein she had admitted robbing and killing the victim. A hearing was held on September 11, 1964, before The Honorable Ralph H. Smith, who denied defendant's motion to suppress her written confession.
Defendant was then arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty, and on November 16, 1964, came on for trial before the Honorable Edwin M. Clark, and a jury. After the jury had been empaneled and sworn, the trial judge entertained a second application to suppress Barbara Warfield's confession. The jury was excused and a hearing held concerning the circumstances under which the confession had been obtained. Following this hearing, at which no objection to the procedure followed was voiced by either side, the trial court found that the written and oral statements made by Barbara Warfield for the police were secured in violation of her constitutional rights and entered an Order that the evidence thus obtained would not be admitted as evidence in the case.
Following the ruling to suppress the confession by the trial judge, the trial began, and the District Attorney, in his opening statement to the jury, stated that defendant had made a confession to the police, admitting her guilt. It is undisputed by all concerned that this statement by the District Attorney was made for the specific purpose of causing a mistrial so that a ruling might be obtained from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upon the correctness of the trial judge's suppression of the confession. The defendant, immediately after the District Attorney's remarks concerning the confession, moved for a mistrial which the court granted. The Commonwealth appealed to this Court at No. 77 March Term, 1965, and, on June 30, 1965, we, speaking through Mr. Justice Eagen, quashed the appeal. Com. v. Warfield, 418 Pa. 301, 211 A.2d 452 (1965).
The record was remanded for trial and the instant motion was then filed raising the questions of former jeopardy and estoppel. A hearing was held before a court en banc to determine what transpired among the trial court, counsel, and defendant, before the mistrial took place. The hearing consisted solely of the statements of counsel for both sides, with no material disputes as to what had previously transpired.
At the hearing below, the Commonwealth contended, as it does here, that Barbara Warfield should stand trial for murder, without limitation as to the degree of murder of which she might be convicted. Barbara Warfield, now represented by counsel other than represented her at the abortive trial, contended, and still contends, that she should not be required to stand trial for murder at all, on the theory that jeopardy had attached at the first trial. The court below quashed the indictment for murder in the first degree but refusal to quash the indictment in so far as it charged murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter and directed the defendant to stand trial accordingly. Both the Commonwealth and the defendant have appealed, the Commonwealth from the order of the lower court sustaining defendant's plea of double jeopardy as to murder in the first degree, and the defendant from the failure to quash the indictment in toto.
Article I, Section 10, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, P.S., reads as follows: 'No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.' In Com. v. Simpson, 310 Pa. 380, 386, 387, 388, 165 A. 498, 499, 500 (1933), when faced with substantially the same question, we stated that: 'Moreover, the language of the constitutional provisions is clear and unambiguous. 'No person shall, for the same offense, be twice but in jeopardy of life or limb,' can only mean that no one shall be tried a second time for an offense the punishment of which may result in the taking of his life or injury to his limbs. Plainly, the language itself compels this conclusion; abnormality in its used is required any other can be reached. * * *
'Some of our cases give color to the thought that the court, in much earlier decades, had reached the conclusion only that he could not again be tried for first degree murder; and that there was no reason for the rule that the prisoner should be completely discharged when he had once been put upon trial under an indictment for murder and upon a second arraignment pleaded former jeopardy. Thus, in McCreary v. Com. (29 Pa. 323), supra, the defendants were being tried for burglary. When it appeared the jury was unable to agree on a verdict, it was discharged; subsequently the accused were again put on trial. Their defense was former jeopardy. The plea was overruled, and they were convicted. We affirm the sentence, in the opinion making it clear that the constitutional provisions applied only to capital offenses, saying: * * *'
See also Com. ex rel. Papy v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 368, 207 A.2d 814 (1965); Commonwealth v. Baker, 413 Pa. 105, 196 A.2d 295 (1964).
Further, in Com. v. Simpson, supra, 310 Pa. at page 384, 165 A. at page 499, we stated:
Accordingly, we must agree with the court en banc that Barbara Warfield, defendant, could not be tried for any crime higher than murder in the second degree and reject defendant's contention that she could not be tried for either murder in the second degree or voluntary manslaughter. A careful review of the record, the hearing before the court en banc and its opinion, leads us to conclude that jeopardy did attach because the mistrial was deliberately caused by the Commonwealth and was not (even though the idea might have been suggested by defendant's attorney) caused by the voluntary act of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Eagen for this court stated, in Com. v. Warfield, supra: 'Certainly, no one could reasonably assert that after an adverse ruling (even if the Commonwealth is the affected party), that a mistrial could be deliberately caused, and an appeal properly filed from the order holding the evidence inadmissible.'
Barbara Warfield's counsel also raised before the court en banc the contention that the Commonwealth is estopped from trying her for more than murder in the second degree, basing his contention on the theory that the reliance given to the opinion of the assistant district attorney, even if that opinion were erroneous, was in fact relied upon, and thus became the theory of the case. The court en banc said: ...
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