Com. v. Wayne W.

• Citation: 606 N.E.2d 1323,414 Mass. 218
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. WAYNE W., a juvenile (and a companion case 1 ).
• Decision Date: 27 January 1993
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 1323

606 N.E.2d 1323

414 Mass. 218

COMMONWEALTH v. WAYNE W., a juvenile (and a companion case ¹ ).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Oct. 6, 1992.

Decided Jan. 27, 1993.

Geraldine S. Hines, Boston, for Wayne W., a juvenile.

Stephen Hrones, Boston (Murray A. Kohn, with him), for Vernon F., a juvenile.

Annemarie Relyea-Chew, Asst. Dist. Atty. (Philip T. Beauchesne, Boston, with her), for the Com.

Jane Larmon White, Boston, Anthony J. DeMarco, Lynn, John Reinstein, & John F. Palmer, Boston, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

The two juveniles (defendants) were each charged in complaints in the juvenile session of the Roxbury Division of the District Court Department (Juvenile Court) with two counts of delinquency by reason of murder in the first degree, conspiracy to commit murder, and illegal possession of a firearm. After a hearing held pursuant to G.L. c. 119, § 61, as appearing in St.1990, c. 267, § 3, the cases were transferred to the Superior Court where indictments charging each defendant with the same crimes were returned. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictments alleging that: (1) the new G.L. c. 119, § 61, under which the transfers were ordered, ² violates the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution; (2) the Juvenile Court judge erred in excluding the testimony of the defendants' expert psychiatric witnesses concerning their dangerousness and amenability to rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system because the defendants would not submit to psychiatric evaluations by an expert selected by the Commonwealth; and (3) the findings made by the Juvenile Court judge were insufficient to support his decision to transfer the cases to the Superior Court. A judge of the Superior Court indicated how he would rule on the defendants' motions to dismiss. The judge concluded, however, that the motions raised a "serious issue as to the constitutional validity of a newly enacted statute (as well as to various other aspects of the Juvenile Court proceedings)," and reported the issues raised by the motions to the Appeals Court. See Mass.R.Crim.P. 34, 378 Mass. 905 (1979). We transferred the case to this court on our own initiative. We conclude that G.L. c. 119, § 61, as appearing in St.1990, c. 267, § 3, is constitutional. We also conclude, however, that the issue of admission of expert psychiatric evidence concerning the defendants' dangerousness and amenability to rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system must be reconsidered.

The following provides pertinent background. Around 8 P.M. on April 20, 1991, the victims, a fifteen year old boy and an eleven year old boy, were near a group of youths gathered in front of an apartment building on Highland Avenue in the Roxbury section of Boston, when they were shot and killed. Later that night, the defendants and a third juvenile, D.B., were apprehended and charged in connection with the killings. There was evidence that the defendants were members of the "Orchard Park Trailblazers," and that several of the youths in front of the building were members of the "Highland Blackhawks." D.B. and the defendants went to the Highland Avenue section of Roxbury that evening because of a dispute between the gangs. The defendants knew that D.B. was carrying a loaded gun, and they accompanied D.B. when he shot and killed both victims.

Following a probable cause (Part A) hearing, the Juvenile Court judge found probable cause to believe that the defendants (and D.B.) had committed the offenses with which they were charged. Subsequently, the judge held three separate (Part B) hearings for the purpose of determining whether to dismiss the delinquency complaints against each defendant and D.B., and transfer their cases to the Superior Court. After the first Part B hearing, the judge concluded that D.B.'s case should be retained within the juvenile justice system. ³ At the close of the defendants' Part B hearings, the judge concluded that the cases against the defendants should be transferred to the Superior Court. He, therefore, ordered that the Juvenile Court complaints against the defendants be dismissed and that adult proceedings commence in the Superior Court.

The hearings involving the defendants were held under the new § 61, see note 2, supra, which requires that the Juvenile Court first hold a Part A hearing and, if probable cause is found, a Part B hearing in every case involving a charge of murder. ⁴ At the Part B hearing, the statutory presumption of dangerousness and nonamenability to rehabilitation places on the juvenile the initial burden of producing evidence showing that he does not present a significant danger to the public and is amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system. ⁵ If the juvenile meets this initial burden, transfer may still be ordered should the Commonwealth establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the juvenile is dangerous and not a suitable candidate for rehabilitation. Prior to the 1990 version of § 61, a juvenile charged with murder could have his case transferred to Superior Court after a finding of probable cause only if the Juvenile Court judge found, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the juvenile presented a significant danger to the public and was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system.

1. Constitutional challenges to the statute. (a) Due process. We first address whether Federal due process requirements preclude: (1) requiring the defendants, who are charged with murder, to assume the initial burden of producing evidence on the issues of dangerousness and amenability to rehabilitation identified in § 61; and (2) permitting the transfer of their cases to the Superior Court based on findings reached under a preponderance of the evidence standard.

There is "no [Federal] constitutional right to any preferred treatment as a juvenile offender." Stokes v. Fair, 581 F.2d 287, 289 (1st Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1078, 99 S.Ct. 858, 59 L.Ed.2d 47 (1979). Had it wanted, the Legislature could have lawfully chosen to abolish Juvenile Court jurisdiction over certain violent crimes without infringing on a juvenile's constitutional rights. A State which elects to commit to its judiciary the responsibility of determining whether a youthful offender will be tried as a juvenile or an adult (as the Commonwealth presently does by means of G.L. c. 119, § 61) must observe only the constitutional due process requirement of essential fairness. Id. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1055, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). "The [United States Supreme Court] has never attempted to prescribe criteria for, or the nature and quantum of evidence that must support, a decision to transfer a juvenile for trial in adult court." Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1789, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). ⁶ Under the new § 61, the Juvenile Court judge must determine that there is probable cause to believe that murder has occurred, and that the juvenile who has been charged has committed the murder. In this context, a determination of probable cause means a determination that there exists sufficient credible evidence to warrant a conclusion by a fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. See Commonwealth v. Matthews, 406 Mass. 380, 388, 548 N.E.2d 843 (1990) (directed verdict standard governs probable cause determination at the transfer hearing); Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 849-850, 298 N.E.2d 819 (1973). See also A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 375 Mass. 104, 107, 374 N.E.2d 1351 (1978). The defendants do not challenge the propriety of the judge's findings of probable cause.

Where there is evidence warranting a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a juvenile has committed murder, it is entirely reasonable to assume that the juvenile presents a significant danger to the public and may not be amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system. See Breed v. Jones, supra 421 U.S. at 535, 95 S.Ct. at 1788-89 ("there appears to be widely shared agreement that not all juveniles can benefit from the special features and programs of the juvenile-court system.... [T]ransfer provisions represent an attempt to impart to the juvenile-court system the flexibility needed to deal with youthful offenders who cannot benefit from the specialized guidance and treatment contemplated by the system"). The juvenile is the party in the best position to produce evidence to the contrary, which, most often, will include lay testimony by family members, teachers, or other adult acquaintances, and expert psychological or psychiatric testimony. Federal due process guarantees are not impinged on where the Legislature requires, by way of a rebuttable presumption of the type in § 61, see note 5, supra, that the juvenile assume the initial burden of producing evidence that he is not dangerous and should have his case remain within the juvenile justice system.

The preponderance of the evidence standard in the new amended § 61 also represents an acceptable balance between the various interests at stake in the transfer hearing, and as such is not in violation of Federal due process guarantees. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (in considering whether challenged action satisfies due process, courts must balance private interest affected, risk of an erroneous deprivation and value of additional or substitute safeguards, and the government's interest). See also Care & Protection of Robert, 408 Mass. 52, 58-59, 556 N.E.2d 993 (1990); Commonwealth v. Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, 112, 438 N.E.2d 1064, ...