Com. v. Webster

• Decision Date: 13 May 1975
• Citation: 337 A.2d 914,462 Pa. 125
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Alfred Earl WEBSTER, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 914

337 A.2d 914

462 Pa. 125

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Alfred Earl WEBSTER, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 13, 1975.

[462 Pa. 126] Charles C. Brown, Jr., Dist. Atty., Bellfonte, for appellant.

Robert L. Martin, Public Defender, Bellfonte, for appellee.

Before EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

Prior to 1973, the Pennsylvania Constitution provided, with minor exceptions, that 'No person shall, for any indictable offense, be proceeded against criminally by information . . ..' Article I, section 10, P.S. On November 6, 1973, the voters of the Commonwealth approved an amendment to section 10. It now reads:

'Except as hereinafter provided no person shall, for any indictable offense, be proceeded against criminally by information . . .. Each of the several courts of common pleas may, with the approval of the Supreme Court, provide for the initiation of criminal proceedings therein by information filed in the manner provided by law.'

The Legislature and this Court have adopted legislation and rules implementing amended section 10. Act of October 10, 1974, P.L. ---, No. 238, §§ 1--6 (to be codified as 17 P.S. §§ 271--276); Pa.R.Crim.P. 3, 225--32, 240, 19 P.S. Appendix. Section 5 of the Act provides that no grand jury shall be impaneled for the consideration of indictments in those judicial districts which have received the approval of this Court to substitute informations ¹ for indictments ² as the method for the initiation of criminal proceedings. ³ In those districts, criminal proceedings are henceforth to be initiated by an information prepared by the attorney for the Commonwealth and filed with the court of common pleas. Pa.R.Crim.P. 225.

On November 13, 1973, the Court of Common Pleas for the Forty-ninth Judicial District (Centre County) promulgated an order providing that in that district 'criminal proceedings shall be instituted by information filed in the manner provided by law without the necessity of an indicting grand jury.' This Court approved the order on January 6, 1975.

Meanwhile, Alfred Webster was charged by complaint on December 2, 1974, with escaping from the Centre County prison in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 5121 (1973) while being held in lieu of bail on charges of robbery and conspiracy. He waived a preliminary hearing. On January 6, 1975, Webster was arraigned, at which time he entered a plea of not guilty and requested that a bill of indictment be submitted to a grand jury for its consideration. He was informed by the attorney for the Commonwealth that it intended to proceed against him by information prepared and filed in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 225 & 226. ⁴

On January 25, 1975, Webster filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He contended that requiring him to stand trial on a criminal charge without having first been indicted by a grand jury violated the rights guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. He demanded that, unless a bill of indictment were submitted to a grand jury, he be discharged. The court of common pleas denied relief on January 27, 1975. Webster and the Commonwealth jointly petitioned this Court to assume plenary jurisdiction, ⁵ which we did by per curiam order on February 17, 1975. We now affirm.

Webster is foreclosed from contending that article I, section 10 violates any rights guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution. Because permission to substitute informations for indictments is granted by the amended Constitution, any other provision of the Constitution that heretofore would have prohibited initiation of criminal proceedings in the manner permitted by article I, section 10 is pro tanto modified to permit it. Furthermore, Webster concedes that initiation of proceedings by indictment is not required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 111, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884); ⁶ see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2660 n. 25, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 1226--27, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972).

His sole contention is that the difference in treatment of criminal defendants in judicial districts which have substituted informations for indictments and defendants in districts which have not is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We disagree.

The starting point of equal-protection analysis is a determination whether the State has created a classification for the unequal distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens. See American Party of Texas v. White,415 U.S. 767, 781, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 1306, 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974); see generally Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, --- U.S. ---, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 1225 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920); Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif.L.Rev. 341 (1949); Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065 (1969). Webster's contention flounders on this preliminary point. Because, in our view, initiation of proceedings by indictment affords a defendant no protection of his interests and substitution of information for indictment does not adversely affect him, it follows that initiation by indictment is no benefit and substitution of information is no burden. Therefore, there is no unequal distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens.

The traditional view is that an indicting grand jury is a bulwark of liberty and a guardian of the innocent from oppression by the State. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 1373, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962):

'Historically, (the grand jury) has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual, minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will.' (footnote omitted)

Whether the indicting grand jury has in fact performed this function in the past is a question for historians. See generally Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 701 (1972). We can say with confidence, however, that in Pennsylvania today the indicting grand jury affords no comparative advantages to those accused of crime. Our conclusion rests on two distinct propositions.

First, no aspect of the operation and procedures of an indicting grand jury works to the advantage or protection of an accused. The presentation of evidence before the grand jury is wholly ex parte. Even if in theory the grand jury's decisions are reached independently of the prosecution, the prosecutor is in fact the grand jury's only source of information and legal instruction. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 209. Its proceedings are secret, cf. Rule 206(b) & (c), and the testimony presented to it cannot be discovered by a defendant because the transcription or reproduction of that testimony is prohibited. Rule 208. It has been said that the grand jury must ascertain whether the Commonwealth's evidence makes out a prima facie case of the defendant's guilt. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 34 Pa.D. & C. 237, 241 (Q.S. Delaware County, 1937) (dictum); Commonwealth v. McIlvaine, 28 Pa.D. & C. 133, 135 (Q.S. Delaware County, 1936) (dictum). However, the inadequacy, incompetency, or even illegality of the evidence presented to the grand jury do not constitute grounds for the quashing of an indictment returned on the basis of such evidence. See United States v. Calandra 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974); ⁷ Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 78 S.Ct. 311, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 (1958); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956); Commonwealth v. Dessus, 423 Pa. 177, 181--85, 224 A.2d 188, 190--93 (1966); ⁸ Commonwealth v. Hirsch, 225 Pa.Super. 494, 499--500, 311 A.2d 679, 682 (1973). Even if a grand jury refused to return an indictment, the prosecutor may, with leave of court, resubmit the bill to the same or a subsequent grand jury. Rule 217. Realistically the grand jury does not serve a protective screening function for '(a)ny experienced prosecutor will admit that he can indict anybody at any time for almost anything before any grand jury.' Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972). We conclude that the operation of an indicting grand jury affords no protection to an accused. See Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, supra; Rosenberg, The Indicting Function of the Grand Jury Should Be Abolished, 42 Pa.Bar Q. 31 (1970); Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153 (1965).

Second, the substantial rights of an accused are equally protected regardless of the method used to initiate the proceeding. Irrespective of how a proceeding is commenced, no final judgment can result except after a trial in which procedural and substantive rights are accorded equally to all defendants. Neither an indictment nor an information may be filed against a defendant unless the Commonwealth has first established a prima facie case of the defendant's guilt to the satisfaction of a neutral judicial officer at a preliminary hearing. See ...