Com. v. Weiss

Citation776 A.2d 958,565 Pa. 504
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Ronald Lee WEISS, Appellant.
Decision Date24 July 2001
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Robert S. Doughtery, Donald R. Marsh, Donald L. McKee, for Ronald Lee Weiss.

J. Scott Robinette, Robert A. Graci, Christy, H. Fawcett, for Commonwealth.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

OPINION

NEWMAN, Justice.

Ronald Lee Weiss (Weiss) has filed a direct appeal1 from the judgment of sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County that sentenced him to death following his conviction for first-degree murder.2 We affirm the judgment of sentence.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sixteen-year-old Barbara Bruzda (Bruzda) was last seen alive on October 23, 1978. Hikers found her body on March 20, 1979, in a remote area of Indiana County. Bruzda died of massive skull fractures. It was determined that the manner of her death was homicide. Weiss was arrested on February 20, 1997, and charged with criminal homicide.3 His jury trial began on July 7, 1997, and he was found guilty of the charge on July 9, 1997. The same jury determined that he be sentenced to death.

The evidence at trial established that on October 23, 1978 Bruzda was seen playing pool with Weiss at her family's tavern. Weiss left the tavern between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. and Bruzda left shortly after that. Bruzda and Weiss arrived together at a party at Henry Hobart's house between 7:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. later that same evening. The couple appeared comfortable together and then left the party for approximately an hour. When they returned to the party, Bruzda's appearance was messed and she appeared to be upset. Later, Bruzda and Weiss left the party again and they did not return. Before he left the party, Weiss borrowed a jack and a tire iron from Mr. Hobart. Bruzda was never again seen alive and five months later, on March 20, 1979, the body of Bruzda, wrapped in a quilt, was found near a road in a remote area of Indiana County.

The former wife of Weiss, Sharon Pearson, testified against him at trial. Ms. Pearson testified that in October of 1978, she and Weiss shared a car, a four-door Buick. The day after Bruzda disappeared, Ms. Pearson went to the car, and found blood smeared on the back of the front seats, the interior roof spattered with blood and blood smudged on the back seat. Ms. Pearson also testified that a distinctive homemade quilt was missing from the back seat of the car. Finally, Ms. Pearson testified that the quilt in which Bruzda's body had been found was the same quilt that had been kept in the back of the car used by Weiss on the night that Bruzda disappeared.

Isadore Mihalakis, a forensic pathologist, testified that Bruzda died of massive skull fractures with associated brain injury, with the manner of her death being homicide. Dr. Mihalakis testified that the injuries inflicted on Bruzda were done with an object such as a pry bar, pipe, or tire iron, and that Bruzda was hit at least twice, and possibly three times with the instrument.

Kerm Wright, a witness, testified that Weiss confessed to him in 1985 that he had killed Bruzda. Samuel Tribuiani, a witness, testified that in 1993 Weiss confessed to him that he had killed a young girl some years before.

Weiss testified on his own behalf and denied any involvement in the death of Bruzda. However, the jury credited the Commonwealth's evidence and found Weiss guilty of first-degree murder. After a penalty hearing, the jury found the aggravating circumstance that Weiss had a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence,4 found no mitigating circumstances, and sentenced him to death. Weiss filed post-trial motions that the trial court denied on October 16, 1997. This direct appeal followed.

II. ISSUES

1. Was the evidence sufficient to support the conviction of Weiss?

2. Did the trial court err in denying the motion for a change of venue?

3. Did the trial court err in failing to excuse Juror No. 3?

4. Did the trial court err in admitting the testimony of David Townsend?

5. Did the trial court err in admitting the testimony of Sharon Pearson?

6. Did the closing argument of the prosecutor prejudice Weiss and require reversal of his conviction?

III. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of Evidence

This Court is required to review the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder in every case in which the death penalty has been imposed. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), reh'g. denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S.Ct. 31, 77 L.Ed.2d 1452 (1983). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether the evidence, and all reasonable inferences deducible from that, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are sufficient to establish all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Hall, 549 Pa. 269, 280, 701 A.2d 190, 195 (1997). To sustain a conviction for first-degree murder,5 the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant acted with a specific intent to kill, that a human being was unlawfully killed, that the accused did the killing, and that the killing was done with deliberation. Id. at 281-82, 701 A.2d at 196. It is the specific intent to kill which distinguishes murder in the first degree from lesser grades of murder. Commonwealth v. Smith, 548 Pa. 65, 70, 694 A.2d 1086, 1088 (1997). Moreover, we have held that the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of a human body is sufficient to establish the specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Walker, 540 Pa. 80, 90, 656 A.2d 90, 95, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 854, 116 S.Ct. 156, 133 L.Ed.2d 100 (1995). Finally, the Commonwealth can prove the specific intent to kill through circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Brown, 551 Pa. 465, 477, 711 A.2d 444, 449 (1998).

In the instant matter Weiss claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for first degree murder because the Commonwealth did not prove that he acted with a specific intent to kill, and that the Commonwealth did not prove that the killing was done with deliberation. Our review of the record compels us to disagree.

Evidence at trial provided by Dr. Isadore Mihalakis, a forensic pathologist, established that the victim, Bruzda, was forcefully struck on the head either two or three times with an object such as a pry bar, pipe or tire iron. He further testified the causes of her death were massive skull fractures with associated brain injury. Bruzda was last seen in the company of Weiss, who borrowed a tire iron and jack from Henry Hobart the night Bruzda disappeared. The tire iron was never returned to Mr. Hobart. The former wife of Weiss testified to having found the car he had driven on the night Bruzda disappeared splattered with blood the following day. Bruzda's body was found wrapped in a quilt last seen in the automobile of Weiss. Further, Weiss confessed to Kerm Wright in 1985 that he had killed Bruzda and to Samuel Tribuiani in 1993 that he had killed a young girl some years previously. Finally, David Townsend testified that, in 1989, Weiss told him that he had killed a girl named Barb.

The evidence listed above, and all reasonable inferences deducible from that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth is more than sufficient to establish all of the elements of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. From the evidence presented the jury could have concluded that Bruzda was unlawfully killed, that Weiss killed her, that he acted with the specific intent to kill and that the killing was done with deliberation. Accordingly, we find, as a matter of law, that the evidence upon which Weiss was convicted was sufficient to sustain the conviction.

B. Change of Venue

Weiss next claims that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion for a change of venue. Weiss claims that given the nature of the case and the extensive media attention the case was given, it was virtually impossible for the jury venire not to be tainted by the pretrial publicity.

The determination of whether to grant a change of venue rests within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 549 Pa. 352, 375, 701 A.2d 492, 503 (1997). This is so because it is the trial court that is in the best position to assess the atmosphere of the community, and to judge the necessity of the requested change. Commonwealth v. Karenbauer, 552 Pa. 420, 433, 715 A.2d 1086, 1092 (1998). A change of venue becomes necessary when the trial court determines that a fair and impartial jury cannot be selected in the county in which the crime occurred. Id.

Normally, one who claims that he has been denied a fair trial because of pretrial publicity must show actual prejudice in the empanelling of the jury. Commonwealth v. Carter, 537 Pa. 233, 249, 643 A.2d 61, 69 (1994). In certain cases however, pretrial publicity can be so pervasive or inflammatory that the defendant need not prove actual juror prejudice. Id. Pretrial prejudice is presumed if: (1) the publicity is sensational, inflammatory, and slanted toward conviction rather than factual and objective; (2) the publicity reveals the defendant's prior criminal record, or if it refers to confessions, admissions or reenactments of the crime by the accused; and (3) the publicity is derived from police and prosecuting officer reports. Commonwealth v. Pursell, 508 Pa. 212, 221, 495 A.2d 183, 187 (1985).

Weiss makes no claim that any of the factors that compel the presumption of pretrial prejudice were present in the instant matter. Therefore, Weiss would have had to establish actual prejudice. However, the entire argument of Weiss to this Court...

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