Com. v. Williams
| Decision Date | 30 June 1999 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Donald Francis WILLIAMS, Appellee. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Donald Francis Williams, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Joseph P. Conti, Elvage G. Murphy, Marshall J. Piccinini, Erie, for Commonwealth.
Andrea F. McKenna, Intervenor Commonwealth.
Joseph Burt, Keith Clelland, Erie, for Donald Williams.
Kari Baker, for Defender Assoc. of Philadelphia.
Stefan Presser, American Civil Liberties Union.
Gary Neil Asteak, Public Defender Assoc. of PA, Amicus Curiae.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.
This matter is before us on direct appeal from the order of the Erie County Common Pleas Court dated September 23, 1997, granting Donald Francis Williams' motion for extraordinary relief, which challenged the constitutionality of the sexually violent predator provisions of Title 42, Sections 9791-9799.6, Subchapter H, entitled, Registration of Sexual Offenders, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9791-9799.6, commonly known as Pennsylvania's Megan's Law (hereinafter Act).1 The factual history of this case is as follows. On February 2, 1997, Appellee Williams was arrested and charged with numerous sexual offenses. On May 23, 1997, a criminal information was filed, charging Williams with two counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, 18 Pa. C.S. § 3123(a)(6), two counts of indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7), and one count of corruption of minors, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a). The charges stemmed from an allegation that Williams performed fellatio upon a nine year old male victim during the period between May 19, 1996 through December 23, 1996 and December 24, 1996 through December 31, 1996.
Williams filed a motion for extraordinary relief raising numerous federal and state constitutional challenges to the sexually violent predator provisions of the Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9794-9799.6. Among the challenges made, Williams asserted that the Act violates his procedural due process rights pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, because the Act impermissibly shifts the burden of persuasion to the offender by establishing a presumption that he is a sexually violent predator and requiring that he rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Section 9794(b) provides:
An offender convicted of any offense set forth in section 9793(b) shall be presumed by the board and the court to be a sexually violent predator. This presumption may be rebutted by the offender by clear and convincing evidence at a hearing held in accordance with subsection (e).
Slip op. at 19.2 Accordingly, the common pleas court refused to proceed with an assessment of whether Williams is a sexually violent predator in accordance with the Act and sentenced Williams in conformity with the sentencing guidelines applicable to his convictions.3 The common pleas court noted that the effect of its decision was to leave intact only the purpose, definition, registration and some administrative provisions of the Act. Slip op. at 20, n. 11.
The Commonwealth filed a direct appeal from the order of the common pleas court to this Court,4 complaining that the common pleas court improperly declared the applicable provisions of the Act to be unconstitutional.5 Before specifically addressing the arguments made by the Commonwealth regarding the constitutionality of the Act, a brief outline of its provisions and the statutory scheme set forth therein by the Legislature is instructive.
The Act is basically divided into two parts. Section 9794 of the Act and certain provisions that follow apply to those "offenders" who are designated "sexually violent predators." Section 9793 of the Act applies to "offenders" who are not classified as sexually violent predators. A person is an "offender" for purposes of the Act if he or she has been convicted of any of the offenses specified in Section 9793(b). Subsection (1) of Section 9793(b) lists applicable predicate offenses where the victim is a minor. The offenses specified include the crimes of kidnapping (except by a parent), rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault, promoting prostitution, and crimes relating to obscene and other sexual materials and performances involving minors. Subsection (2) sets forth predicate offenses involving victims of any age and includes rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault and spousal sexual abuse. Indecent assault is also a predicate crime when the offense is a misdemeanor of the first degree. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9793(b)(3).
There is a distinct difference under the Act between the requirements and sanctions applicable to those persons who are classified as sexually violent predators and those who are not. Those offenders who are not classified as sexually violent predators are subject to the registration requirements set forth at Section 9793 of the Act. This provision requires that an offender register a current address with the Pennsylvania State Police upon release from incarceration, being placed on parole, the commencement of a sentence of intermediate punishment or probation, or under the parole board's supervision. The State Police must be notified of an offender's change of address and a current address must be registered. The period of registration under this provision is ten years and failure to comply with the provision is a felony of the third degree.6
If a person is classified as a sexually violent predator under the Act, he or she is subjected to much broader registration and notification requirements. Specifically, Section 9795(a) of the Act requires potentially lifetime registration of a current address with the State Police "unless the court determines the person is no longer a sexually violent predator." Verification of a current address is required every 90 days. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9796(a).
Section 9797(b) of the Act specifies that the crime victim of a sexually violent predator shall be given written notice when an offender registers an address initially, and when a change of address is provided. Section 9798(a) provides for extensive public notification of the name, address, offense, designation and photograph of sexually violent predators. Subsection (b) specifies that notification of the foregoing information is to be given to the neighbors of sexually violent predators, the director of county child and youth services where the sexually violent predator resides, the superintendent of each school district in the area, including private and parochial schools, the director of licensed day care facilities in the municipality where the sexually violent predator resides and the president of any college, university and community college located within 1,000 feet of a sexually violent predator's residence.
The issue here involves the constitutionality of the method by which offenders are designated sexually violent predators. As noted, once a person is convicted of one of the predicate offenses specified in Section 9793(b) of the Act, he or she shall be presumed to be a sexually violent predator. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9794(b). Despite the fact that this presumption attaches upon conviction, the Act requires that after conviction, but before sentencing, the State Board to Assess Sexually Violent Predators conduct an assessment to determine...
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