Com. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 29 April 1993
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Ernest WILLIAMS, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 171

624 A.2d 171

425 Pa.Super. 113

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Ernest WILLIAMS, Appellee.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Feb. 9, 1993.

Filed April 29, 1993.

Stuart B. Suss, Asst. Dist. Atty., West Chester, for Com., appellant.

William A. Ehrlich, Asst. Public Defender, Wyomissing, for appellee.

Before OLSZEWSKI, TAMILIA and FORD ELLIOTT, JJ.

OLSZEWSKI, Judge:

This is an appeal from the order entered by the Honorable Thomas G. Gavin on July 31, 1992, in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court granted defendant Ernest Williams' ["Williams"], petition for habeas corpus relief because it found that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case against Williams. Accordingly, the charges against Williams were dismissed and he was released from custody.

Early in the evening of July 21, 1992, Officer Wilson ["Wilson"] of the East Whiteland Township police witnessed Williams purchase a six-pack of beer, get into his tractor trailer cab, drive it to a parking lot and park. The officer then continued on his patrol. Later, Wilson returned to the parking lot and witnessed Williams drink two bottles of beer. Wilson again left the area and continued on his patrol. At approximately 8:00 p.m., Wilson saw Williams driving his cab on Malin Road approaching Route 30 and stopped him. After administering an Alca Sensor test which revealed Williams' blood alcohol level to be 0.07%, Wilson arrested Williams for driving a commercial motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(i). Thereafter, Williams was transported to Paoli Memorial Hospital where blood was taken which again registered an alcohol content of 0.07%.

A criminal complaint was filed charging Williams with violating § 3731(i), 75 Pa.C.S.A., as well as the summary offense of operating a commercial motor vehicle with alcohol in his system in contravention of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1612. Following a preliminary hearing, the district magistrate found that a prima facie case existed for the charges. Thereafter, Williams filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging the magistrate's finding of a prima facie case. Following a stipulated fact hearing held on Williams' petition, the trial court entered the July 31st order, dismissing the charges against Williams. The Commonwealth filed this timely appeal.

On appeal, the Commonwealth presents one issue for our review: whether it established a prima facie case against Williams for violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(i). Section 3731(i) states:

A person shall not drive, operate or be in physical control of the movement of any commercial vehicle while:

(1) under the influence of alcohol;

(2) under the influence of any controlled substance as defined in section 1603 (relating to definitions);

(3) under the combined influence of alcohol and any controlled substance; or

(4) the amount of alcohol by weight in the person's blood is 0.04% or more.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(i). Because Williams was driving his tractor trailer cab with a blood alcohol content level of .07%, the district magistrate found that the Commonwealth established a prima facie case for a § 3731(i)(4) violation. The trial court, however found that Williams' tractor trailer cab did not come within the purview of the statute and therefore granted Williams' petition. We disagree.

The title of § 3731(i) refers to driving a commercial motor vehicle. The text of the statute, however, only refers to driving a commercial vehicle. While the legislature defined "commercial motor vehicle," they did not define "commercial vehicle." Therefore, we are presented with a question of statutory construction. Specifically, we must determine the intended meaning of "commercial vehicle," and whether Williams' tractor trailer cab falls within that meaning.

Section 3731 is a penal statute. The standards which we are to employ in this situation are well-settled.

An Act of Assembly which imposes penal sanctions for violation of its provisions must be strictly construed. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928; Commonwealth v. Hill, 481 Pa. 37, 391 A.2d 1303 (1978). "However, strict construction does not require that the words of a criminal statute be given their narrowest meaning or that the legislature's evident intent be disregarded." Commonwealth v. Gordon, 511 Pa. 481, 486-88, 515 A.2d 558, 561 (1986). In attempting to ascertain the meaning of the statute, we are required to consider the intent of the legislature and are permitted to examine the practical consequences of a particular interpretation. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 375 Pa.Super. 585, 544 A.2d 1384 (1988). We are to presume the legislature did not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable. Commonwealth v. Martorano, 387 Pa.Super. 151, 563 A.2d 1229 (1989).

Commonwealth v. Nernberg, 402 Pa.Super. 411, 413, 587 A.2d 317, 318 (1991). We find that to give commercial vehicle any other meaning than commercial motor vehicle, as defined by the legislature, would disregard the legislature's intent and would work an absurd result.

The Commonwealth argues that the legislature intended "commercial vehicle" to have the same meaning as that of commercial motor vehicle because: (1) the statute preceding 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(i) used the term commercial vehicle and defined it virtually the same way as commercial motor vehicle and (2) the title of the section uses the term commercial motor vehicle. We agree. Section 1921(c)(5) of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A., provides that we may consider former laws on similar subjects in ascertaining legislative intent. We can also use section headings as an aid in construction. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1924.

In Chapter 16 of the Vehicles Code, Commercial Drivers, the legislature defines the term commercial motor vehicle.

"Commercial Motor Vehicle." A motor vehicle designed or used to transport passengers or property:

(1) if the vehicle has a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 or more pounds or such lesser rating as the department shall adopt under the provisions of section 6103(c) (relating to promulgation of rules and regulations by department), as determined by Federal regulation and published by the department as a notice in the Pennsylvania Bulletin;

(2) if the vehicle is designed to transport 16 or more passengers, including the driver;

(3) if the vehicle is a school bus; or

(4) if the vehicle is transporting hazardous materials and is required to be placarded in accordance with department regulations.

The term does not include an implement of husbandry, or any motor home or recreational trailer operated solely for personal use, or motorized construction equipment, including, but not limited to, motorscrapers, backhoes, motorgraders, compactors, excavators, tractors, trenchers and bulldozers.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1603. A virtually identical meaning was given to the statutory predecessor of § 3731(i). Section 3731.1, "Operators of commercial vehicles," prohibited commercial drivers from operating their vehicles if they had a blood alcohol content of 0.04% or greater. The former section defined commercial vehicle as:

(1) A vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 or more pounds.

(2) A combination of vehicles with a gross combination weight rating of 26,001 or more pounds, including the gross vehicle weight rating of the towed unit or units.

(3) A vehicle which is designed to transport 16 or more passengers, including the driver.

(4) A vehicle which is transporting hazardous material and which is required to be placarded for hazardous materials.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731.1 (repealed May 30, 1990).

The only difference between the two definitions is that § 3731.1 omits school bus and the note excluding certain vehicles. Although § 3731.1 used the term "commercial vehicle," the legislature defined it the same as "commercial motor vehicle" in § 1603. Given the similarity of...