Com. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 18 November 1994
• Citation: 650 A.2d 420,539 Pa. 61
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Antoine Clayton WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 420

650 A.2d 420

539 Pa. 61

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Antoine Clayton WILLIAMS, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Jan. 25, 1994.

Decided Nov. 18, 1994.

[539 Pa. 66] W. Michael Trant, Chief Public Defender, Reading, for A. Williams.

Mark C. Baldwin, Dist. Atty., Iva C. Dougherty, Reading, for Com.

Robert A. Graci, Deputy Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, for Atty. Gen.

Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PAPADAKOS, Justice.

We are presently required to review the conviction of murder of the first degree and the death sentence of Antoine Clayton Williams (Appellant) pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(1). ¹ Appellant was arrested and charged with murder of the first degree, ² for the death of twenty-three year old Jacqueline Lugo, who was beaten and stabbed to death in the front seat of a garbage truck in the City of Reading, Berks County on September 17, 1989.

Appellant was tried in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, before a jury with the Honorable Calvin E. Smith, presiding. On January 23, 1991, the jury returned its verdicts of guilty of murder of the first degree, aggravated assault (serious bodily injury), ³ aggravated assault (deadly weapon), ⁴ criminal attempt (to commit rape), ⁵ indecent assault, ⁶ and possessing instruments of a crime. ⁷ A separate sentencing hearing was held where the same jury was asked to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances related to the victim's death and Appellant's character. Following this sentencing hearing, the jury determined that three aggravating circumstances were present, namely, 1) that Appellant committed the killing while in the perpetration of a felony; ⁸ 2) that the offense was committed by means of torture; ⁹ and that 3) Appellant has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person. ¹⁰ The jury also considered as relevant evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of Appellant and the circumstances of this killing and found this as a mitigating factor, ¹¹ but concluded that the aggravating circumstances present outweighed the mitigating factor and determined that Appellant be sentenced to death. Post-verdict motions were argued and denied, and the trial court sentenced Appellant to death on February 1, 1991 on the murder of the first degree conviction and to a consecutive term of 5-10 years imprisonment on the attempted rape conviction to be followed by a consecutive term of 1-5 years imprisonment on the possession of an instrument of crimes charge. The trial court also ruled that the aggravated assault convictions merged for sentencing purposes into the murder of the first degree conviction as lesser included offenses and that the indecent assault conviction merged for sentencing purposes into the attempted rape conviction as a lesser included offense. This automatic appeal followed.

As is our practice in death penalty cases, we begin our review of this matter by a discussion of whether the evidence submitted at trial was sufficient to support the verdict of murder of the first degree as returned by the jury. See Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983). The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence is whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the jury to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Reid, 533 Pa. 508, 626 A.2d 118 (1993); Commonwealth v. Rolan, 520 Pa. 1, 549 A.2d 553 (1988); Commonwealth v. Holcomb, 508 Pa. 425, 498 A.2d 833 (1985). This standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 519 Pa. 236, 546 A.2d 1101 (1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1169, 107 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1990); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 371 A.2d 468 (1977).

The evidence presented at trial, together with all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth, discloses the following. On Sunday morning, September 17, 1989, at approximately 2:55 a.m., Reading police officers were summoned to the 400 block of Gilson Alley in Reading, Pennsylvania, to investigate a report of an injured woman. Upon their arrival, Officer Hafner was met by Appellant and his father, Albert Norman. They took Officer Hafner to a place in the alley where a partially clothed woman was lying facedown next to two garbage trucks owned by Appellant's father. The officer saw a substantial amount of blood in the cab of one of the garbage trucks and a trail of blood could be detected from the truck to the body. Blood was also found on the doorway of the cab and in the seat area. The victim, twenty-three year old Jacqueline Lugo, was found with her panties pulled down around her thighs, her shirt pulled up under her arms and her bra ripped in the front. Both her eyes had been beaten closed and she had sustained at least five other blows to the face. Her neck showed signs of being choked and a stab wound to her neck pierced through to her throat and tongue. Numerous stab wounds were found on her torso and dirt and stones were found inside her panties.

Dr. Neil A. Hoffman, a forensic pathologist, who was also at the crime scene, observed the body and later determined that the cause of death was a stab wound through the heart. Similar stab wounds were detected on the left side of the victim's neck, in the middle of her chest and in her abdomen near her navel and police eventually retrieved a broken knife blade and another knife from the crime area which could have easily made the types of stab wounds observed on the victim's body.

Officer Albert D. Shade, Jr., who was dispatched to the crime scene with Officer Hafner, also found a yellow shirt stained with blood in a wooded area near the body. This shirt was later identified as having been worn by Appellant on the day of the murder and another witness was able to testify that Appellant was wearing the shirt just prior to the murder. When the officers arrived at Gilson Alley, Appellant was wearing a jacket without a shirt and his hands and forehead were covered in blood as was the inside of his jacket. Blood was also found on the inside of Appellant's waistband and underwear, suggesting that they got stained with blood when Appellant's pant's zipper was open and his pants were down.

There was evidence that yellow fibers were found in the victim's bra and panties and that these fibers originated from the bloody yellow shirt worn by Appellant on the night of the murder and a fiber consistent with the victim's clothing was found in Appellant's boxer shorts. Evidence was also introduced that pubic hairs with the same microscopic characteristics as that of the victim were recovered from Appellant.

The blood found on the inner lining of Appellant's jacket was the same blood type as that of the victim and expert testimony established that a blood stain on the yellow shirt was consistent with having been produced by wiping blood from a blood-bearing object or instrument, like a knife. In addition to this blood stain, there were other blood stains on Appellant's jacket and on the yellow shirt that were caused by "spatter stains." These stains consisted of small blood droplets aligned in a distinct pattern and were created when a blood source was punctured. The small pinpoint droplets found in Appellant's jacket indicated that they were caused by a puncture wound made with great force.

Taking all of these circumstances together, a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jacqueline Lugo's death was a homicide. From the nature of the injuries to her body, a jury could infer that the homicide was intentional, malicious and premeditated. Finally, the jury could conclude from the types of blood stains on Appellant's garments and the bloody yellow shirt that he was seen wearing during the day and prior to the murder that Appellant committed the crime. Accordingly, we are satisfied that sufficient evidence exists in this record to support the jury's verdict of murder of the first degree, and dismiss Appellant's sufficiency challenge. ^{12 12}

Appellant also argues that various statements he made to the police were made when he was subject to a custodial interrogation and that because he was not advised of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination (Miranda warnings), these statements should have been suppressed along with the tangible evidence collected in response to these statements. Appellant further argues that in light of this initial violation of his constitutional rights, the incriminating statements he made following his finally being advised of his constitutional rights were also tainted and should have been suppressed in accordance with the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Appellant raised these issues in a pre-trial suppression motion which Appellant argues was improperly denied by the trial court.

In reviewing a trial court's suppression ruling, our initial task is to determine whether the factual findings are supported by the record. In making this determination, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses, and so much evidence of the defense that remains uncontradicted when fairly read in the context of the record as a whole. When the evidence supports the factual findings, we are bound by such findings; we may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are erroneous. Commonwealth v. Medley, 531 Pa. 279, 612 A.2d 430 (1992); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 467 Pa. 146, 354 A.2d 886 (1976).

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