Com. v. Williams
| Decision Date | 21 April 1997 |
| Citation | 692 A.2d 1031,547 Pa. 577 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Eric WILLIAMS, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Patrick J. Connors, Media, for Eric Williams.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ.
The issue on appeal is whether evidence seized from appellee's bedroom after a warrantless search by his parole officer should be suppressed where appellee signed a form giving an agent of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole ("Parole Board") consent to search his premises as a condition of his parole. Because we find that the evidence should not be suppressed under the facts of this case, we reverse the order of the Superior Court and reinstate the judgment of sentence entered by the trial court.
The relevant facts are that appellee was convicted in 1989 of possessing 1,012 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. On March 7, 1990, appellee was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two (2) to six (6) years. On April 8, 1992, appellee was paroled from prison and his case was assigned to Parole Agent Schuler of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole for supervision. Before being released from prison, appellee signed a form entitled "Conditions Governing Parole/Reparole." As a condition of his parole, appellee listed his residence as being on West Sixth Street in Chester, Delaware County, Pennsylvania and he agreed to abstain from the unlawful possession or sale of narcotics. The form also included the following condition:
I expressly consent to the search of my person, property and residence without a warrant by agents of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. Any items in the possession of which constitutes a violation of parole/reparole shall be subject to seizure, and may be used as evidence in the parole revocation process.
On June 30, 1993, appellee's case was transferred to Parole Agent Bray for supervision. Agent Bray was instructed by his supervisor to visit appellee at his residence. However, prior to visiting appellee, Agent Bray received information from a person he regarded as a reliable confidential informant that appellee was once again involved in dealing drugs. Agent Bray's inquiry to the local police also confirmed his confidential informant's information since the local police informed Agent Bray that one of their confidential informants also reported that appellee was involved in dealing drugs.
On July 1, 1993 at approximately 9:00 p.m., Agent Bray went to appellee's residence at West Sixth Street in Chester. Agent Bray was met at the door by appellee's mother and was informed that appellee was not present. Agent Bray asked appellee's mother if he could look around and appellee's mother initially consented. However, when Agent Bray reached appellee's bedroom, appellee's mother changed her mind and revoked her consent to the search. Agent Bray informed appellee's mother that he was entitled to conduct the search because he believed that appellee may be engaging in actions which would violate the terms of his parole. Appellee's mother did not respond to Agent Bray's comments and Agent Bray proceeded to search appellee's bedroom.
During the search, Agent Bray found 182.2 grams of cocaine, some of which was packaged in individual plastic bags, along with an Accu-lab pocket scale and five (5) .380 caliber rounds of live ammunition. Agent Bray telephoned the Chester police and notified them of his discovery of these items. The Chester police responded to Agent Bray's telephone call by going to the residence, seizing the items in question found in appellee's bedroom and obtaining a warrant for appellee's arrest.
On July 14, 1993, a criminal complaint 1 was filed charging appellee with possession On July 19, 1994, after a one day jury trial, appellee was convicted. On August 2, 1994, appellee was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years on the possession with intent to deliver charge and a concurrent term of imprisonment of one (1) to two (2) years on the drug paraphernalia charge.
of cocaine with intent to deliver 2 and illegal possession of drug paraphernalia. 3 Prior to trial on these charges, appellee filed an omnibus motion to suppress the evidence seized from his bedroom based on the assertion that the search violated his constitutional rights since it was performed without a warrant, lacked probable cause and violated the knock and announce rule. On May 12, 1994, the trial court conducted a hearing on appellee's motion. At the hearing, the Commonwealth introduced the parole form signed by appellee granting consent to the Parole Board to search his residence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied appellee's motion to suppress
Appellee timely appealed to the Superior Court where he asserted that the trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence seized from his bedroom. On July 13, 1995, the Superior Court, in an unpublished opinion, reversed the trial court and remanded for a new trial basing its decision on the court's belief that appellee's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated, thereby mandating suppression of the evidence seized from appellee's bedroom.
The Commonwealth filed a timely petition for appeal. We granted allocatur in order to determine whether the evidence seized from appellee's bedroom by his parole officer should be suppressed.
Initially, the Commonwealth contends that we need not reach the issue concerning the adequacy of appellee's consent because appellee did not comply with Rule 323(d) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure 4 by failing to specifically address the consent issue with particularity in his omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress. This contention is meritless. Appellee's pre-trial suppression motion first described the facts surrounding the search and then sought to suppress the cocaine seized after the search by the parole agent on the grounds that the search was performed without a warrant, that no probable cause existed for the search and the failure to comply with the "knock and announce" rule. Such a motion complies with the requirements of Rule 323(d). Accordingly, this claim must fail.
Turning to the validity of the search of appellee's bedroom, we begin our analysis with matters not in controversy between the parties. When reviewing a trial court's decision to suppress evidence, we are bound by the facts found by the suppression court, and we may reverse that court only if the legal conclusions drawn from the facts are erroneous. Commonwealth v. Lagana, 517 Pa. 371, 375, 537 A.2d 1351, 1353-54 (1988). Under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 5 and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 6 warrantless searches and seizures are
unreasonable and therefore prohibited except for a few established exceptions. E.g. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152, 615 A.2d 308 (1992). We shall examine each constitutional provision separately.
A parolee and a probationer have limited Fourth Amendment rights because of a diminished expectation of privacy. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3168-69, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). 7 As the United States Supreme Court stated in Griffin, "a probationer's home like anyone else's, is protected by the Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches be 'reasonable.' " Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873, 107 S.Ct. at 3168. However, the requirement that a parole officer obtain a warrant based upon probable cause before conducting a search does not apply to a parolee because parole is a form of criminal punishment imposed after a guilty verdict and the states must have the necessary power over parolees in order to successfully administer a parole system as a controlled passageway between prison and freedom. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-875, 107 S.Ct. at 3168-69.
In Commonwealth v. Pickron, 535 Pa. 241, 634 A.2d 1093 (1993), this Court recognized that a parolee has limited Fourth Amendment rights. In that case, Pickron, a parolee, was arrested after controlled substances and other evidence were seized from his apartment following a warrantless search by parole officers. Pickron moved to suppress the evidence alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the warrantless search. The trial court granted Pickron's motion and this Court affirmed because it found that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the warrantless search of a probationer or a parolee's residence based upon reasonable suspicion without either the consent of the parolee or a statutory or regulatory framework governing this kind of search. 8 This Court, however, limited its holding to the facts of the case and specifically reserved the question of whether an agreement signed by a parolee giving consent to a warrantless search by a parole officer or a statute authorizing such searches could survive constitutional scrutiny. 9 In a question of first impression for this Court, we now address the effect appellee's signing of the parole form giving a parole agent consent to search his residence has on such a situation.
In deciding this issue, we must balance the governmental interests involved in granting parole and supervising parolees with that interest of the private individual, i.e. the parolee, which has been affected by the governmental action. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). In assessing the governmental interest in allowing a warrantless search of a parolee's residence, we must look to the purpose of parole in this Commonwealth. The public...
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