Com. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 27 November 1968
• Citation: 248 A.2d 301,432 Pa. 557
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Ronald WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 301

248 A.2d 301

432 Pa. 557

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Ronald WILLIAMS, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Nov. 27, 1968.

Herman I. Pollock, Defender, Melvin Dildine, Chief, Appeals Division, Benjamin Lerner, Defender Assn. of Philadelphia, for appellant.

Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., Michael J. Rotko, Chief, Appeals Div., David Creskoff, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before BELL, C.J., and MUSMANNO JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELL, Chief Justice.

The defendant, Ronald Williams, was indicted on bills of indictment charging him with rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated assault and battery, carrying a concealed deadly weapon and conspiracy. At the conclusion of his trial, on August 8 and 9, 1966, a jury convicted him of all charges. Defendant's motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were denied, and sentence was duly imposed. ¹

Defendant appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the judgment of sentence in a Per Curiam Order. ² We allowed an allocatur.

There is not the slightest merit to support defendant's motion in arrest of judgment. In is hornbook law that the test of the sufficiency of the evidence, irrespective of whether it is direct or circumstantial, is whether accepting as true all the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom upon which if believed the jury could properly have based its verdict, it is sufficient in law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged. Commonwealth v. Finnie, 415 Pa. 166, 202 A.2d 85; Commonwealth v. Burns, 409 Pa. 619, 187 A.2d 552; Commonwealth v. Kravitz, 400 Pa. 198, 161 A.2d 861; Commonwealth v. Melton, 406 Pa. 343, 178 A.2d 728.

On the evening of May 6, 1966, the prosecutrix, Mrs. Mary Benton, was visiting her friend, Mrs. Smith, at Mrs. Smith's home on North Eleventh Street in Philadelphia. Sometime after midnight, Mrs. Smith's son, Floyd Smith, came home and offered to accompany Mrs. Benton to her home. They left the Smith home together and proceeded to a bar at Eleventh and Norris Streets, where Smith telephoned for a taxi to take Mrs. Benton home. Smith was told that there would be about an hour's wait for a taxi. He and Mrs. Benton then had a drink in the bar and decided to walk the rest of the way to Mrs. Benton's home.

Mrs. Benton and Smith left the bar and began walking west on Norris Street. About two blocks from the bar, according to Mrs. Benton's testimony, defendant and another man approached them from the rear, held a knife to Smith's neck, and said, 'This is a stickup.' The two men robbed both Mrs. Benton and Smith of some money, and then defendant knocked Smith unconscious. Mrs. Benton testified that defendant and his companion then beat her severely about the face, forced her to walk with them for about a block and a half, and then dragged her into an alley where defendant raped her.

While defendant was having sexual intercourse with her, police officer Bennett arrived on the scene and arrested the defendant. Mrs. Benton was taken to the Philadelphia General Hospital, were she was examined by a doctor.

Floyd Smith testified that while he was walking with Mrs. Benton to her home, defendant and another man came up behind them and robbed them. He further testified that defendant held a knife to his throat and then knocked him unconscious, and when he regained consciousness, he went home and went to sleep, and made no complaint to the police.

Defendant, Ronald Williams, testified in his own behalf. His testimony may be thus summarized. He denied participating in any of the alleged crimes. He and his brother William met the prosecutrix in the bar at Eleventh and Norris Streets at about 12:30 A.M. on May 7. While he was talking to the bartender, his brother and Mrs. Benton left the bar together. Defendant followed them out to the street, where his brother told him to 'come on.' Defendant then followed his brother and Mrs. Benton to an alley. Mrs. Benton and his brother then went into the alley together while defendant waited outside. After about ten minutes, defendant started to go into the alley, when Officer Bennett suddenly appeared and arrested him. Defendant further testified that while following his brother and Mrs. Benton, he did not hear Mrs. Benton cry out or see her attempt to leave his brother at any time.

Defendant presses two contentions--(1) the Court's charge on 'reasonable doubt,' and (2) the admission of police testimony regarding defendant's conduct at the time of the arrest.

REASONABLE DOUBT

We have never adopted and Required a standard charge or a definition of reasonable doubt. In Commonwealth v. Burns, 409 Pa. 619, at page 635, 187 A.2d 552, at page 560, the Court said:

'The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt as defined by the Court in Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 51, 52, 103 A.2d 694 (1954) is as follows: 'A variety of definitions of 'reasonable doubt,' all expressing substantially the same thought, have been approved by the appellate Courts--See Commonwealth v. Kluska, 333 Pa. 65, 3 A.2d 398. A standard and approved form of charge on this point would be: 'The defendant comes before you presumed to be innocent and the burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt cannot be a doubt fancied or conjured up in the minds of the jury to escape an unpleasant verdict; it must be an honest doubt arising out of the evidence itself, the kind of a doubt that would restrain a reasonable man (or woman) from acting in a matter of importance to himself (or herself)."'

Defendant took No exception to the Court's charge and the question before us is therefore whether the trial Judge's charge on this important point constituted basic fundamental error.

The Commonwealth contends that the Court's charge, which included elements from both Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 103 A.2d 694, and Commonwealth v. Kluska, 333 Pa. 65, 3 A.2d 398, was both fair and adequate. The trial Judge charged on this point as follows:

'You have heard a lot about the term reasonable doubt, and that is to be considered as something that would make a mature person pause before jumping at a conclusion. It has to be something that cannot be pulled out of thin air or the blue sky, but it must be found on the evidence and nothing else.

'It cannot be based on any peculiarity or idiosyncrasy, because we all have some of those, but don't bring them into this case.

'Reasonable doubt is a doubt that can arise when you feel, as a responsible, mature person, that you can go no further with a conviction. The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant walks in here presumed innocent, and the burden is on the Commonwealth to establish his guilt in the commission of this crime. That is their burden.

'If you feel that their testimony does not substantially do that, based on the credibility of the witnesses, Then you are not required to bring in a conviction. ³ On the other hand, if you have a real doubt as to the guilt of this defendant, a substantive doubt, that a reasonable man or woman might have, then you can stop there.'

In other words, the jury could have found defendant guilty if they had any doubt--guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was not required.

The Commonwealth contends that appellant's failure to take an exception to the charge prevents our consideration of any errors therein. Because of fairness to all the parties to the litigation and the speedy administration of trials and of Court business, it is a well established General rule that an appellate Court will not reverse (1) on a point (a) Where no exception was taken by appellant (Commonwealth v. Stowers, 363 Pa. 435, 437, 70 A.2d 226; Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 312 Pa. 543, 546, 168 A. 244; Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. page 53, 103 A.2d 694, supra; Leech v. Jones, 421 Pa. 1, 2, 218 A.2d 722; Millili v. Alan Wood, 418 Pa. 154, 156, 162, 166, 209 A.2d 817; Patterson v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 322 Pa. 125, 185 A. 283; Commonwealth v. Scott, 284 Pa. 159, 162, 130 A. 317); or (b) to which Only a general exception was taken (Commonwealth v. Smith, 374 Pa. 220, 225, 97 A.2d 25; Enfield v. Stout, 400 Pa. 6, 14, 161 A.2d 22; Spitzer v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 348 Pa. 548, 550, 36 A.2d 503; Ellsworth v. Lauth, 311 Pa. 286, 290, 166 A. 855; Medvidovich v. Schultz, 309 Pa. 450, 453, 164 A. 338); or (2) On a ground not raised in or by the Court below (Commonwealth v. Robinson, 317 Pa. 321, 323, 176 A. 908; White v. Moore, 288 Pa. 411, 416--417, 136 A. 218).

However, this general rule will not be applied where there is basic and fundamental error which affects the merits or justice of the case, or, as some cases express it, offends against the fundamentals of a fair and impartial trial (see cases infra, and particularly Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 312 Pa. 543, 168 A. 244, supra, and Commonwealth v. Corrie, 302 Pa. 431, 436, 153 A. 743), or deprives a defendant of "that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice,' and, hence, denied him due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment': Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567, 78 S.Ct. 844 850, 2 L.Ed.2d 975; Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 191, 72 S.Ct. 599, 96 L.Ed. 872; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166; United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 80 L.Ed. 555; Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 718, 82 S.Ct. 1287, 8 L.Ed.2d 798; ⁴ Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605, 64 S.Ct. 1208, 88 L.Ed. 1481; Commonwealth v. Smith, 374 Pa. 220, 97 A.2d 25, supra; Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 103 A.2d 694, supra; Commonwealth v. Robinson, 317 Pa. 321, 176 A. 908, supra; Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 312 Pa. 543, 168 A. 244, supra; Commonwealth v. Stowers, 363 Pa. 435, 70...