Com. v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 24 February 1995
• Parties: , 63 USLW 2607 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James WILSON, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 557

655 A.2d 557

440 Pa.Super. 269, 63 USLW 2607

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James WILSON, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Jan. 11, 1995.

Filed Feb. 24, 1995.

Erica H. Koisling, Asst. Public Defender, Doylestown, for appellant.

T. Gary Gambardella, Asst. Dist. Atty., Doylestown, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before BECK, KELLY and HOFFMAN, JJ.

KELLY, Judge:

In this opinion, we are called upon to determine whether a suspect's acts of twice alighting from a vehicle in a neighborhood known for a high degree of drug-related activity constitutes sufficient facts to justify a subsequent warrantless investigative stop of the vehicle by police under Terry v. Ohio. ¹ We hold that the facts as found by the suppression court do not support the conclusion that the police had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to warrant the investigative stop. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of sentence entered by the trial court, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves a challenge to the suppression court's order denying appellant's motion to suppress evidence seized by police during an investigative stop of the motor vehicle that appellant occupied as a passenger. Accordingly, the facts of this case, as found by the suppression court, are as follows:

THE COURT: We will make the following findings: On or about April 16, 1993, Detective Timothy Carroll, as an officer and detective of Bensalem Township Police Department, Bucks County, Pennsylvania, was engaged in a narcotics and vice investigation and was engaged specifically in a BuxNet operation designed to locate Bucks County residents suspected to be engaged in the purchase of illegal drugs and paraphernalia in Philadelphia; that Detective Carroll, as an officer with the aforesaid department since April of 1977, has considerable experience in investigation of drug trafficking and has made numerous arrests and convictions.

That on the occasion of April 16, 1993, he proceeded into an area of known high drug activity, commonly identified as the Badlands, but specifically an area between Cambria and Somerset Streets on the 2800 block of North Hope Street; that during the course of his surveillance in the area in question, he not only observed suspicious behavior relating to suspected drug activity, but did in fact see and hear unnamed parties engaging in hawking of drugs and illegal drug paraphernalia; that on the date in question, Detective Carroll observed a 1982 Chevy Chevette operated by defendant Schrader and with defendant Wilson as a passenger enter into the area previously described; that the area described is a devastated, dilapidated neighborhood in which there are no commercial enterprises except that one makeshift auto repair center; that the detective observed passenger Wilson exit from the vehicle for a few minutes and return to the vehicle; that activity occurred at the approximate intersection of A Street and Somerset Street.

The detective again saw the defendant Wilson exit the vehicle at the intersection of Cambria Street and North Hope Street, and did observe the vehicle driven by defendant Schrader drive around the block; that Detective Carroll lost visual contact with defendant Wilson for a short period of time, but in following the vehicle operated by Schrader, observed defendant Wilson reunite and return to the vehicle operated by defendant Schrader; that the period of time which elapsed from the exit and return to the vehicle by Wilson was measured in terms of a few minutes; that during the time that Detective Carroll was in the vicinity of North Hope Street, he actively observed various unnamed persons engaging in transactions or seeking to engage in transactions for the sale of illegal drugs and paraphernalia; that the detective did not see a transaction between an unnamed person and defendant Wilson.

(N.T. 8/24/93 at 33-36).

The vehicle left the area and was followed by Detective Carroll as it headed north on Interstate 95. Detective Carroll radioed to a uniformed police cruiser assigned to the BuxNet detail and requested the officer to stop the vehicle when it entered Bucks County. (N.T. 8/24/93 at 15-17). After the car was stopped, Detective Carroll arrived, identified himself and advised the occupants of the stopped vehicle of the BuxNet operation and his observations of them in the Badlands. Detective Carroll then asked the occupants to surrender any controlled substance or paraphernalia. Appellant surrendered a syringe, and stated that he had done a bag [of heroin] already. Defendant Schrader ² turned over a packet of heroin and a bottle cap cooker. (N.T. 8/24/93 at 39-40). Appellant and co-defendant Schrader were then placed under arrest, and charged with possession of controlled substances and paraphernalia. Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized, which was denied following a suppression hearing.

Following a stipulated waiver trial, appellant was convicted of the aforementioned offenses. This timely appeal followed the entry of judgment of sentence.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S SUPPRESSION MOTION WHERE A VEHICLE WAS STOPPED BECAUSE WHILE APPELLANT WAS IN A HIGH DRUG ACTIVITY AREA, HE EXITED HIS COMPANION'S VEHICLE AND LEFT THE OFFICER'S VIEW FOR BRIEF PERIODS OF TIME ON TWO OCCASIONS AND DID NOT OUTWARDLY

OR OBVIOUSLY DISPLAY A LEGITIMATE PURPOSE FOR BEING THERE?

B. WHETHER BY CONCLUDING AND TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S SUPPRESSION MOTION THAT THE APPELLANT DISPLAYED NO LEGITIMATE PURPOSE FOR BEING IN A HIGH DRUG ACTIVITY AREA, THE TRIAL COURT SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE APPELLANT, THEREBY VIOLATING RULE 323(h) OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE?

Appellant's Brief at 4.

Our review of an order entered by the suppression court is governed by the following standards. We must first ascertain whether the record supports the factual findings of the suppression court, and then determine the reasonableness of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn therefrom. Commonwealth v. Burnside, 425 Pa.Super. 425, 625 A.2d 678 (1993). In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, "we consider only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses and so much of the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted." Commonwealth v. Reddix, 355 Pa.Super. 514, 513 A.2d 1041 (1986). When the evidence supports the suppression court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress, this Court may reverse only when the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are erroneous. Commonwealth v. Quiles, 422 Pa.Super. 153, 619 A.2d 291 (1993) (en banc ). However, we are bound by the trial court's findings of fact only to the extent that they are supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Martinez, 403 Pa.Super. 125, 588 A.2d 513 (1991).

Appellant asserts that the police did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to make a warrantless stop of the motor vehicle in which he was a passenger. Specifically, appellant avers that the mere fact that he twice alighted from a vehicle while it was located in an area of known drug-related activity was insufficient to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion in the minds of police that he was presently involved in criminal activity. Therefore, appellant concludes that the fruits of the ensuing unlawful stop by police should have been suppressed, as they were the result of an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We agree.

The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the State by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081] (1961), guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." Time and again, this Court has observed that searches and seizures " 'conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.' " Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 [105 S.Ct. 409, 410, 83 L.Ed.2d 246] (1984) (per curiam ) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 [88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576] (1967) (footnotes omitted)); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 [98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412, 57 L.Ed.2d 290] (1978); see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 [103 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 77 L.Ed.2d 110] (1983). One such exception was recognized in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889] (1968), which held that "where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot" the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make "reasonable inquiries" aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions. Id., at 30 ; see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-146 [92 S.Ct. 1921, 1922-23, 32 L.Ed.2d 612] (1972).

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 429 Pa.Super. 158, 163-64, 631 A.2d 1335, 1338 (1993).

In reviewing whether reasonable suspicion (or probable cause) exists, we must, of course, examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there exists a particularized and objective basis for suspecting an individual stopped of criminal activity.

Commonwealth v. Epps, 415 Pa.Super. 231, 233-34, 608 A.2d 1095, 1096 (1992) (citations omitted).

With these constitutional principles in mind, we turn to the findings and conclusions of the suppression court. The suppression court concluded that because appellant displayed no legitimate purpose for being in the neighborhood in question other than for the purchase of illegal drugs (N.T. 8/24/93 at 37), and...