Com. v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket S. S. Authority
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
| Writing for the Court | Before WILKINS; SPIEGEL |
| Citation | 227 N.E.2d 357,352 Mass. 617 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. WOODS HOLE, MARTHA'S VINEYARD AND NANTUCKET STEAMSHIP AUTHORITY. |
| Decision Date | 06 June 1967 |
Page 357
v.
WOODS HOLE, MARTHA'S VINEYARD AND NANTUCKET STEAMSHIP AUTHORITY.
Decided June 6, 1967.
Richard Wait, Boston, for defendant.
Samuel W. Gaffer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, KIRK, SPIEGEL, and REARDON, JJ.
SPIEGEL, Justice.
This is an action of contract to recover the cost of certain annual audits made by the State auditor. The case was heard in the Superior Court by a judge without a jury, on the pleadings and a stipulation. The case is here on the defendant's exception to the judge ordering judgment for the Commonwealth in the sum of $13,113.13.
[352 Mass. 618] The only issue before us is whether, under St.1948, c. 544, § 14, and St.1960, c. 701, §§ 13 and 16, the defendant is liable to the Commonwealth for the cost of the State audits.
The predecessor of the defendant was created by St.1948, c. 544. Section 14 of that statute provided in material part: 'The Authority shall cause an audit of its books to be made at least once in each year by the state auditor, and the cost thereof may be treated as part of the operation of the project.' By St.1960, c. 701, § 16, the defendant took over the assets of its predecessor and assumed all its liabilities. Section 13 thereof makes no material change in St.1948, c. 544, § 14.
In St.1966, c. 411, a major appropriations statute, item 0701-02 appropriated funds '(f)or the office of the auditor * * * provided, that any expense incurred in the audit of the * * * (defendant) shall be reimbursed by said authority, as provided
Page 358
by law.' Similar statements are found in prior appropriations statutes. 1It is a well established principle of statutory interpretation that '(n)one of the words of a statute is to be regarded as superfluous, but each is to be given its ordinary meaning without overemphasizing its effect upon the other terms appearing in the statute, so that the enactment considered as a whole shall constitute a consistent and harmonious statutory provision capable of effectuating the presumed intention of the Legislature.' Bolster v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn., 319 Mass. 81, 84-85, 64 N.E.2d 645; Town of Milton v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm., 342 Mass. 222, 225, 172 N.E.2d 696. If the Legislature had not intended that the defendant reimburse the Commonwealth for the cost of the State audits it would not have been...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Thurdin v. Sei Boston, LLC, SJC-10123
...would seem to render the enumerated right to "sue" superfluous.26 Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 352 Mass. 617, 618, 227 N.E.2d 357 (1967), quoting Bolster v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 319 Mass. 81, 84-85, 64 N.E.2d 645 (1946) ("None of the wo......
-
Com. v. Gove
...No portion of the statutory language may be deemed superfluous. Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S. S. Authy., 352 Mass. 617, 618, 227 N.E.2d 357 (1967). When the statutory language is plain, the words must receive their 'usual and natural meaning.' Commonwealth v. ......
-
Commonwealth v. Wilbur W., SJC–12351
...every word in a statute should be given meaning"); 95 N.E.3d 276 Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 352 Mass. 617, 618, 227 N.E.2d 357 (1967) ("[n]one of the words of a statute is to be regarded as superfluous, but each [word] is to be given its ordinary m......
-
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris, SJC-13191
...at § 15 (b ) (2) as a whole does not resolve this ambiguity. See Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 352 Mass. 617, 618, 227 N.E.2d 357 (1967) ("It is a well established principle of statutory interpretation that none of the words of a statute is to be rega......
-
Thurdin v. Sei Boston, LLC, SJC-10123
...would seem to render the enumerated right to "sue" superfluous.26 Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 352 Mass. 617, 618, 227 N.E.2d 357 (1967), quoting Bolster v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 319 Mass. 81, 84-85, 64 N.E.2d 645 (1946) ("None of the wo......
-
Com. v. Gove
...No portion of the statutory language may be deemed superfluous. Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S. S. Authy., 352 Mass. 617, 618, 227 N.E.2d 357 (1967). When the statutory language is plain, the words must receive their 'usual and natural meaning.' Commonwealth v. ......
-
Commonwealth v. Wilbur W., SJC–12351
...every word in a statute should be given meaning"); 95 N.E.3d 276 Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 352 Mass. 617, 618, 227 N.E.2d 357 (1967) ("[n]one of the words of a statute is to be regarded as superfluous, but each [word] is to be given its ordinary m......
-
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris, SJC-13191
...at § 15 (b ) (2) as a whole does not resolve this ambiguity. See Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 352 Mass. 617, 618, 227 N.E.2d 357 (1967) ("It is a well established principle of statutory interpretation that none of the words of a statute is to be rega......