Com. v. Wrona

• Decision Date: 18 March 1971
• Docket Number: 339,No. 339,Nos. 321,No. 321,321,s. 321
• Citation: 275 A.2d 78,442 Pa. 201
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant at, v. Joseph F. WRONA, Jr., Appellant atSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 78

275 A.2d 78

442 Pa. 201

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant at No. 321, v. Joseph F. WRONA, Jr., Appellant at No. 339.

Nos. 321, 339.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 18, 1971.

Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, James D. Crawford, Deputy Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Jr., Philadelphia, for Wrona.

Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, and BARBIERI, JJ.

OPINION

EAGEN, Justice.

On April 23, 1969, Joseph F. Wrona, Jr., was convicted in Philadelphia of voluntary manslaughter after a trial before the Honorable Edward J. Bradley, sitting without a jury.

Wrona's motion for arrest of judgment or, in the alternative, a new trial was subsequently denied, and at the time fixed for sentence the trial judge directed that Wrona serve eight years' probation under the supervision of the State Parole Board.

Within thirty days, the district attorney filed a petition with the court for 'Reconsideration of Sentence' ¹ averring that placing Wrona on probation amounted to a 'release (which) gives rise to a sense of outrage for the extreme leniency shown defendant; and adds to the Community's problems concerning widespread illegal conduct of uncontrolled juveniles. * * *' A hearing was granted, after which the trial judge denied the petition on the merits, but expressed reservations as to whether or not it was constitutionally permissible to change the previous order of the court imposing probation, to a sentence of imprisonment as the district attorney requested. From the denial of the district attorney's petition, the Commonwealth filed an appeal. From the order of probation, Wrona filed an appeal. The appeals were consolidated for argument before this Court and will be disposed of in this one opinion.

WRONA APPEAL (No. 339)

The killing involved occurred during a street fight between Wrona, who was then sixteen years of age, and Samuel Harper, eighteen years of age. Wrona twice plunged a penknife into Harper's body inflicting wounds which resulted in death about two and one-half hours later.

Wrona contends that the trial testimony proved that he acted in self-defense, and, therefore, his guilt of voluntary manslaughter was not established beyond a reasonable doubt.

It is unquestionably correct that Wrona's conviction should not be sustained unless the evidence established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that if the evidence when read in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth established that Wrona acted justifiably under the circumstances, i.e., in self-defense, he would not be guilty of any crime. Cf. Commonwealth v. Garrett, 423 Pa. 8, 222 A.2d 902 (1966). But, in determining if the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction, the test is, whether accepting as true all of the evidence (be it direct or circumstantial) and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom, upon which the jury, or the trial court in a nonjury trial, could properly have reached its verdict, is it sufficient in law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime of which he has been convicted. Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 440 Pa. 143, 269 A.2d 886 (1970), and Commonwealth v. Commander, 436 Pa. 532, 260 A.2d 773 (1970). Applying this test to the testimony, we are satisfied that Wrona's appeal is without merit.

The testimony warranted the trial judge in finding the following facts:

The fight was initiated by Harper, and, during the course thereof, he struck Wrona with his fists and knocked him to the ground; then when Harper, who was unarmed, was backing away, Wrona pulled a knife, ran towards Harper and twice plunged the knife into his body. In one instance, the knife penetrated Harper's left chest to a depth of three inches cutting the upper portion of a lung. In the other instance, it penetrated the abdomen to a depth of five inches cutting the large bowel and the rear portion of the gall bladder.

Based on the above facts, the trial judge concluded that while Harper initiated the fight, Wrona 'over reacted' and, under the circumstances, was not justified in employing the use of a knife in the manner he did. These conclusions are supported by the evidence, hence, the verdict was well founded.

In order to justify the taking of another's life in self-defense, it is not only Necessary that the evidence establish the slayer had a reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of death, great bodily harm, or the commission of a felony, but it must also establish (1) that there was a necessity for the slayer to take the life of his assailant in order to save himself from the dangers mentioned; (2) that the slayer could not have avoided the apparent danger by any reasonably safe means other than killing his assailant; and, (3) that the slayer used no more force than was necessary or reasonably appeared to him to be necessary to save himself from death, great bodily harm or the commission of a felony. Cf. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 438 Pa. 485, 263 A.2d 376 (1970).

The motion in arrest of judgment was correctly overruled.

COMMONWEALTH'S APPEAL (No. 321)

After studying a presentence report prepared by the court's probation department, which included, inter alia, a psychiatric evaluation, the trial judge concluded that a long term of probation and mandatory psychotherapy was the wiser course to pursue with Wrona, rather than to impose a term of prison incarceration. In its appeal the Commonwealth maintains that, under the circumstances, this was an abuse of judicial discretion, and the order denying reconsideration of this discretion is an appealable order and should be reversed. It is not an appealable order, and our discussion need not extend beyond this question.

The...