Com. v. Yount

Decision Date24 January 1974
Citation455 Pa. 303,314 A.2d 242
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Jon E. YOUNT, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

John K. Reilly, Dist. Atty., Clearfield, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J. and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

In October of 1966, a jury found appellant guilty of the crimes of murder in the first degree and rape. A sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. On appeal, this Court reversed the judgment of sentence and granted a new trial because appellant's rights, as mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), were violated. Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A.2d 464 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 918, 25 L.Ed.2d 104 (1970).

On retrial in November, 1970, a jury again found appellant guilty of murder in the first degree, 1 and the penalty was again fixed at life imprisonment. Post-trial motions were denied and this direct appeal followed. 2 We now affirm.

On April 28, 1966, the body of Pamela Sue Rimer, an eighteen year-old high school student, was discovered in a wooded area near her home in Luthersburg, Pennsylvania. One of her stockings was knotted and tied around her neck. An autopsy revealed that death was caused by strangulation. Further examination disclosed three slashes across the victim's throat and cuts of the fingers of her left hand, inflicted by a sharp instrument, and numerous wounds about her head, caused by a blunt instrument.

At approximately 5:45 a.m. on the morning of April 29, 1966, appellant, a teacher at the school the deceased had attended, voluntarily appeared at the state police substation in DuBois, Pennsylvania, and rang the doorbell. An officer opened the door and asked whether he could be of assistance. Appellant stated, 'I am the man you are looking for.' The officer asked whether he was referring to the 'incident in Luthersburg,' and appellant responded in the affirmative.

The officer then asked appellant to come into the police station and be seated. Leaving appellant unattended, the officer proceeded to a back bedroom where a detective and another police officer were sleeping, woke them, and informed them that 'there was a man in the front that said we are looking for him.' He then returned to the front office where appellant who had removed his coat, hat, and gloves, identified himself as Jon Yount.

After dressing, the detective and the second officer entered the front office. The detective was told by the first officer that appellant's name was Jon Yount. The detective then asked appellant to be seated inside a smaller office adjacent to the front office, where he asked, 'Why are we looking for you?' Appellant replied, 'I killed that girl.' Upon hearing that answer, the detective inquired, 'What girl?', and appellant responded, 'Pamela Rimer.'

In response to the detective's next question, 'How did you kill this girl?', appellant answered, 'I hit her with a wrench and I choked her.' At that point the detective gave appellant admittedly inadequate Miranda warnings, and began interrogation as to the details of the crime. A written confession was subsequently obtained.

Prior to appellant's second trial, the question 'How did you kill this girl?' and its answer, as well as the written confession were suppressed, on the authority of our prior decision, Commonwealth v. Yount, supra, as violative of Miranda. The admissibility of appellant's initial statements that the police were looking for him in connection with the Luthersburg incident is not challenged, nor could a challenge be successful. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 448 Pa. 114, 121 n.2, 290 A.2d 62, 65 n.2 (1972).

Appellant does contend, however, that the court erred in not suppressing his statement, 'I killed that girl,' and his identification of the victim as 'Pamela Rimer.' It is argued that these two admissions were the product of 'custodial interrogation' and therefore should have been preceded by Miranda warnings. Appellant argues that warnings were required Before the question 'Why are we looking for you?' was asked. 3 We are asked to determine the precise time when the need for Miranda warnings arose. It is now beyond question that "whenever an individual is questioned while in custody Or while the object of an investigation of which he is the focus, before Any questioning begins the individual must be given the warnings established in Miranda. . . ." Commonwealth v. D'Nicuola, 448 Pa. 54, 57, 292 A.2d 333, 335 (1972) (quoting Commonwealth v. Feldman, 432 Pa. 428, 432, 248 A.2d 1, 3 (1968)). Accord, Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 225, 252 A.2d 575, 578 (1969); see Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292, 285 A.2d 172 (1971).

It is, however, only that questioning which is interrogation initiated by law enforcement officers which calls for Miranda warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, supra at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. As this Court held in Commonwealth v. Simala, supra at 226, 252 A.2d at 578:

"(I)t is not simply custody plus 'questioning,' as such, which calls for the Miranda safeguards but custody plus police Conduct . . . calculated to, expected to, or likely to, evoke admissions."

The rationale behind this holding is found in Miranda, where the Court stated:

'Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. . . . The fundamental import of the privilege . . . is not whether (an individual) is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, But whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that the police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime . . .. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment . . ..'

Miranda v. Arizona, supra at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630 (emphasis added).

Clearly, 'any question likely to or expected to elicit a confession constitutes 'interrogation' under Miranda. . . .' Commonwealth v. Simala, supra at 227, 252 A.2d at 579. Accord, Commonwealth v. Mercier, 451 Pa. 211, 214, 302 A.2d 337, 339 (1973). But '(a)ny statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.' Miranda v. Arizona, supra at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.

On this record it cannot be said that the two police inquiries here challenged constitute conduct calculated to, expected to, or likely to elicit an incriminating response, or that they were asked with an intent to extract or an expectation of eliciting an incriminating statement. All this record establishes is that the detective knew only that a man named Jon Yount--a name which the detective had never heard before--voluntarily came to the police station early in the morning and volunteered that the police were looking for him. In response to this information, the detective extemporaneously asked, 'Why are we looking for you?' Appellant was not coerced, prompted, or urged to incriminate himself. To the contrary, the detective's inquiry, made in response to information volunteered by appellant, was of a neutral character and not interrogative.

Appellant's answer, 'I killed that girl,' was given freely and without compelling influence. It was therefore volunteered in the constitutional sense. That the answer was in fact incriminating does not alter its volunteered character nor preclude its use. Miranda v. Arizona, supra at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.

Similarly, we are of the opinion that the statement identifying 'that girl' as 'Pamela Rimer' was volunteered. Appellant, without any compulsion, went to the substation and volunteered that he had killed 'that girl.' As we indicated in Commonwealth v. Simala, supra at 226 n.2, 252 A.2d at 579 n.2, after an incriminating, but ambiguous, statement is volunteered, as was done here, a question which does not do 'anything more than clarify statements already made,' in the absence of any coercion or prompting, subtle or overt, is permissible. See also Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation' Within the Meaning of Miranda,' in Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Criminal Law and the Constitution--Sources and Commentaries 335, 354 (1968).

Here, immediately upon hearing appellant's volunteered statement, 'I killed that girl,' the detective spontaneously asked, 'What girl?' By this he sought only to clarify appellant's prior statement. Appellant responded, 'Pamela Rimer.' Such a clarifying inquiry, made in response to a statement volunteered by appellant during an interview which he initiated, is proper. The identification must be deemed constitutionally volunteered. Accord, State v. Perry, 14 Ohio St.2d 256, 237 N.E.2d 891 (1968); People v. Mercer, 257 Cal.App.2d 244, 64 Cal.Rptr. 861 (1967); see Hicks v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 209, 382 F.2d 158 (1967).

As already indicated, appellant volunteered both that he had killed someone and the victim's identity. Because '(v)olunteered statements . . . are not barred by the Fifth Amendment,' Miranda v. Arizona, supra at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, their use as evidence was constitutionally permissible.

However, after these statements were given, Miranda warnings became necessary. Commonwealth v. Yount, supra at 280, 256 A.2d at 466; see Commonwealth v. Feldman, 432 Pa. 428, 248 A.2d 1 (1968); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A.2d 765 (1967). Appellant's initial admission and identification created the critical moment after which interrogation without Miranda warnings was impermissible. It was the absence of warnings at that moment, and not before, that required our prior reversal. The earlier, volunteered statements, however, were not the product of interrogation initiated by the police. 4

On this record, therefore, it must be concluded that the Commonwealth satisfied its burden of proving by a preponderence of the credible...

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