Comb v. Jacksonville Paper Co

Decision Date14 February 1949
Docket NumberNo. 110,110
Citation336 U.S. 187,69 S.Ct. 497,93 L.Ed. 599
PartiesMcCOMB, Adm'r v. JACKSONVILLE PAPER CO. et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Bessie Margolin, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. Louis Kurz, of Jacksonville, Fla., for respondents.

[Argument of Counsel from page 188 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a civil contempt proceeding arising out of Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 63 S.Ct. 332, 87 L.Ed. 460, which we decided January 18, 1943. The District Court had held that none of respondent's employees in specified classes were covered by Fair Labor Stand rds Act. 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. We sustained a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, Fleming v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 5 Cir., 128 F.2d 395, which reversed the District Court, modifying it slightly to include a larger class of employees than the United States Court of Appeals had held to be covered.

On remand the District Court, without a further hearing, entered a decree enjoining respondents from violating the Act in any of the following particulars: (1) by paying the designated classes of employees less than 30¢ an hour from the date of the judgment to October 24, 1945, or less than 40¢ an hour thereafter, except as permitted by orders of the Administrator under § 8 or § 14 of the Act; (2) by employing such employees for a workweek longer than 40 hours unless they receive compensation for employment in excess of 40 hours in the workweek at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which they are employed; and (3) by failing to keep and preserve records as prescribed by the Administrator, particularly records of the hours worked each workday and each workweek by each of the employees and of the total wages paid to each for each workweek.

Respondent took no appeal from this order. This was in 1943. In 1946 the Administrator instituted this contempt proceeding alleging that respondents had not complied with the minimum wage, overtime, and record-keeping provisions of the judgment in many specified respects. He prayed that respondents be required to ter- minate their continuing violations and in order to purge themselves of their contempts to make payment of the amounts of unpaid wages due the affected employees. The District Court found violations of the provisions of the decree. It found that (1) respondents had set up a completely false and fictitious method of computing compensation without regard to the hours actually worked which were unlawful under the Act; (2) respondents had adopted a plan which gave the employees a wage increase in the guise of a bonus and yet excluded that increase from the regular rate of pay for the purpose of computing overtime; (3) respondents had classified some employees as executive or administrative employees in plain violation of the regulations of the Administrator adopted under § 13(a)(1) of the Act; and (4) one of the respondents had employed piece-workers in excess of the maximum workweek without paying them overtime compensation.1

The District Court held that a civil contempt required a 'wilful' violation of a decree; and that there was in this case no showing of any 'wilful' violation of any 'specific' provision of the former decree 'prohibiting the doing of any specific thing.' The District Court further held that it had no power on the application of the Administrator to enforce compliance with its former decree by ordering the payment of unpaid statutory wages. It accordingly considered the application of the Administrator as an amended complaint seeking a broadening of the previous decree and entered such an injunction. 69 F.Supp. 599, 608.

All parties appealed. The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, 5 Cir., 167 F.2d 448. It ruled that respond- ents had violated the provisions of the decree couched in terms of the Act in the respects found by the District Court. It also held that the District Court was warranted in concluding that there was no 'wilful contempt' since neither the law nor the injunction specifically referred to or condemned the practices which were found to violate the Act.

The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the importance of the problem in the administration of the Act.

First. The absence of wilfulness does not relieve from civil contempt. Civil as distinguished from criminal contempt is a sanction to enforce compliance with an order of the court or to compensate for losses or damages sustained by reason of noncompliance. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303, 304, 67 S.Ct. 677, 701, 91 L.Ed. 884; Penfield Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 330 U.S. 585, 590, 67 S.Ct. 918, 921, 91 L.Ed. 1117; Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 68, 68 S.Ct. 401, 407. Since the purpose is remedial, it matters not with what intent the defendant did the prohibited act. 2 The decree was not fashioned so as to grant or withhold its benefits dependent on the state of mind of respondents. It laid on them a duty to obey specified provisions of the statute. An act does not cease to be a violation of a law and of a decree merely because it may have been done innocently. The force and vitality of judicial decrees derive from more robust sanctions. And the grant or withholding of remedial relief is not wholly discretionary with the judge, as Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote for a unanimous Court in Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 111, 112, 42 S.Ct. 427, 428, 429, 66 L.Ed. 848. The private or public rights that the decree sought to protect are an important measure of the remedy.

Second. As we have noted the decree directed respondents to obey the provisions of the Act dealing with mini- mum wages, overtime, and the keeping of records. There was no appeal from it. By its terms it enjoined any practices which were violations of those statutory provisions. Decrees of that generality are often necessary to prevent further violations where a proclivity for unlawful conduct has been shown. See May Stores Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 326 U.S. 376, 390, 391, 66 S.Ct. 203, 211, 212, 90 L.Ed. 145; United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 186, 65 S.Ct. 254, 260, 89 L.Ed. 160. Respondent's record of continuing and persistent violations of the Act would indicate that that kind of a decree was wholly warranted in this case. Yet if there were extenuating circumstances or if the decree was too burdensome in operation, there was a method of relief apart from an appeal. Respondents could have petitioned the District Court for a modification, clarification or construction of the order. See Regal Knitwear Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U.S. 9, 15, 65 S.Ct. 478, 481, 89 L.Ed. 661. But respondents did not take that course either. They undertook to make their own determination of what the decree meant. They knew they acted at their peril. For they were alerted by the decree against any violation of specified provisions of the Act.

It does not lie in their mouths to say that they have an immunity from civil contempt because the plan or scheme which they adopted was not specifically enjoined. Such a rule would give tremendous impetus to the program of experimentation with disobedience of the law which we condemned in Maggio v. Zeitz, supra, 333 U.S. at page 69, 68 S.Ct. at page 408. The instant case is an excellent illustration of how it could operate to prevent accountability for persistent contumacy. Civil contempt is avoided today by showing that the specific plan adopted by respondents was not enjoined. Hence a new decree is entered enjoining that particular plan. Thereafter the defendants work out a plan that was not specifically enjoined. Immunity is once more obtained because the new plan was not spe- cifically enjoined. And so a whole series of wrongs is perpetrated and a decree of enforcement goes for naught.

That result not only proclaims the necessity of decrees that are not so narrow as to invite easy evasion; it also emphasizes the danger in the attitude expressed by the courts below that the remedial benefits of a decree will be withheld where the precise arrangement worked out to discharge the duty to pay which both the statute and the decree imposed was not specifically enjoined.

We need not impeach the findings of the lower c urts that respondents had no purpose to evade the decree, in order to hold that their violations of it warrant the imposition of sanctions. They took a calculated risk when under the threat of contempt they adopted measures designed to avoid the legal consequences of the Act. Respondents are not unwitting victims of the law. Having been caught in its toils, they were endeavoring to extricate themselves. They knew full well the risk of crossing the forbidden line. Accordingly where as here the aim is remedial and not punitive, there can be no complaint that the burden of any uncertainty in the decree is on respondent's shoulders.

Third. We have no doubts concerning the power of the District Court to order respondents, in order to purge themselves of contempt, to pay the damages caused by their violations of the decree. We can lay to one side the question whether the Administrator, when suing to restrain violations of the Act, is entitled to a decree of restitution for unpaid wages. Cf. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 66 S.Ct. 1086, 90 L.Ed. 1332. We are dealing here with the power of a court to grant the relief that is necessary to effect compliance with its decree. The measure of the court's power in civil contempt proceedings is determined by the requirements of full remedial relief. They may entail the doing of a variety of acts, such as the produc- tion of books. Penfield Co. v....

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