Combs v. Blowes, 1561 C.D. 2013
| Decision Date | 17 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 1561 C.D. 2013,1561 C.D. 2013 |
| Parties | Joyce Combs v. Det. Linda Blowes, Badge No. 9107, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
This is an appeal from an August 1, 2013 order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (Trial Court) denying the motion of Detective Linda Blowes (Appellant) for judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict finding her liable for civil damages for malicious prosecution of Joyce Combs (Ms. Combs) and concluding that Appellant was not immune under the Tort Claims Act1 because her conduct amounted to willful misconduct. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the Trial Court.
Appellant filed an affidavit in support of probable cause and obtained a warrant for the arrest of Ms. Combs on kidnapping and related charges for the alleged abduction of Ms. Combs' four-month old twin granddaughters. All charges were subsequently dropped and Ms. Combs commenced a civil action against Appellant for malicious prosecution. The jury returned a verdict in Ms. Combs' favor, awarding Ms. Combs one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000.00) in compensatory damages and one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) in punitive damages. Appellant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the Trial Court denied. Appellant appealed to this Court. The Trial Court issued a 1925(a) opinion in November 2013 in support of its denial of Appellant's Motion for Post-Trial Relief, in which the Trial Court concluded that the jury could reasonably have found that Appellant's testimony was not credible, that Appellant lacked probable cause to arrest Ms. Combs, that Appellant had recklessly disregarded Ms. Combs' rights, and that Appellant was liable for malicious prosecution.
Before this Court, Appellant argues that she relied upon the credible statement of a single witness, which was sufficient to establish the probable cause necessary to arrest Ms. Combs. Appellant argues that she had no duty to continue to investigate or to disprove a complainant that appeared credible and that the Trial Court erred by equating a negligent or inadequate investigation with a lack of probable cause. Appellant further argues that even if she lacked probable cause to arrest Ms. Combs she is immune under the Tort Claims Act because a reasonable jury could not conclude that she knew she was disregarding Ms. Combs' rights and acted despite that knowledge.
Ms. Combs argues that the evidence supports the jury's verdict. Ms. Combs contends that Appellant made knowing misrepresentations in obtaining the arrest warrant, fabricated documents and information in order to make it appear to her supervisors as though she was conducting an investigation, failed to follow basic police directives, and disregarded exculpatory evidence. Ms. Combs also argues that the evidence was more than sufficient to satisfy the heightened standard necessary to overcome Tort Claims Act immunity and that the jury did not err in concluding that Appellant's conduct was willful and outrageous rather than merely negligent.
Overturning a jury's verdict is an extreme remedy that should not be done casually. Burkholz v. Department of Transportation, 667 A.2d 513, 516 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). Judgment notwithstanding the verdict is appropriate where a movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and where the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the verdict should have been rendered in favor of the movant. Rohm and Hass Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 781 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Pa. 2001). To grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict because a movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we must review the record and conclude that "even with all the factual inferences decided adverse to the movant the law nonetheless requires a verdict" in her favor. Id. (internal citations omitted). To grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict because no two reasonable minds could disagree that the verdict should have been entered in favor of the movant, our review of the evidence must lead inextricably to the conclusion that a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure. Id.
In each instance, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, the verdict winner must be given every reasonable inference of fact arising from the evidence, and any conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the verdict winner. Moure v. Raeuchle, 604 A.2d 1003, 1007 (Pa. 1992). Judgment notwithstanding the verdict must only be entered in a clear case that is free from doubt. Id. Appellate review of the evidence may not be based on how the court would have voted if it had been the jury, but "on the facts as they come through the sieve of the jury's deliberations." Brown v. Shirks Motor Express, 143 A.2d 374 (Pa. 1958). It is axiomatic that "in our system of justice, the jury is sacrosanct and its importance is unquestioned." Boscia v. Massaro, 529 A.2d 504 (Pa. Super. 1987). Our review must be mindful that the Id. However, despite our trust in the jury, its wisdom cannot go unchecked, and where our review demands it, we will reverse a verdict that runs contrary to the evidence and the law.
Malicious prosecution is a tort disfavored by the courts; the law favors encouraging proceedings where there is a good faith belief that an accused may be guilty and allowing the criminal justice system to stand as the final arbiter of the question. Miller v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 89 A.2d 809, 810 (Pa. 1952); Corrigan v. Central Tax Bureau of Pennsylvania, Inc., 828 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). For this reason, the plaintiff bears a heavy burden when bringing a claim for malicious prosecution and must demonstrate: (i) that the defendant initiated the prosecution without probable cause; (ii) with malice; and (iii) that the proceedings terminated in the plaintiff's favor. Simpson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 46 A.2d 674, 678-679 (Pa. 1946); Manley v. Fitzgerald, 997 A.2d 1235, 1241 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); La Frankie v. Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145, 1148 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992).
Probable cause does not require an actual showing of criminal activity; rather, probable cause requires only a substantial chance of criminal activity or "a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant that an ordinary prudent person in the same situation could believe a party is guilty of the offense charged." Turano v. Hunt, 631 A.2d 822, 825 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 & 244 n.13 (1983); Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921, 926 (Pa. 1985) ().2 The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a claim of malicious prosecution. Turano, 631 A.2d at 824; La Frankie, 618 A.2d at 1148. The want of probable cause is traditionally a question for the court; however, where facts material to the issue of probable cause are in controversy, the question is for the jury to resolve. Kelley v. General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local Union 249, 544 A.2d 940 at 941 (Pa. 1988); Miller, 89 A.2d at 809; Turano, 631 A.2d at 825; Wainauskis v. Howard Johnson Co., 488 A.2d 1117, 1122 (Pa. Super. 1985).
In order to demonstrate malice, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "the primary purpose for which the proceedings were initiated was not to bring an offender to justice." Neczypor v. Jacobs, 169 A.2d 528, 531 (Pa. 1961) (quoting Simpson, 46 A.2d at 678). "Legal malice is not limited to motives of hatred or ill will, but may consist of defendant's reckless and oppressive disregard of plaintiff's rights." Hugee v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 101 A.2d 740, 743 (Pa. 1954). The existence of malice is always a question for the jury and "may be inferred from the absence of probable cause." Kelley, 544 A.2d at 941; Hugee, 101 A.2d at 743.
This case presents two issues for our review: the first is whether Appellant lacked probable cause for the warrant she sought for Ms. Combs' arrest; and the second issue is whether Appellant is immune from liability under the Tort Claims Act.
The circumstances giving rise to the instant matter began on April 14, 2008, when Danielle Morales (Ms. Morales)3 and Lamar Beamer (Mr. Beamer)4 reported to Philadelphia Police Department Officers Lee and Harper that their four-month old twin daughters, Imani and Izhane Beamer, were taken without permission by Ms. Morales' mother, Ms. Combs. (Plaintiff's Exhibits (P Ex.) 2 and 3, Initial Police Reports, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 355a, 357a.) The police reports described both Imani and Izhane as female, 6 pounds 3 ounces, and 21 inches long. (Id.) Imani was reported as having a mole on her right foot between her toes and a doughnut-shaped birthmark on her right inner thigh; Izhane was reported as having a mole on her left foot between her toes and a doughnut-shaped birthmark on her right inner thigh. (Id.) The reports state that the twin babies were born at Crozer-Chester Medical Center on February 10, 2008, and that there was no custody dispute with Ms. Combs. (Id.) The reports state that both parents reported that the twins were "last seen with grandmother who stated that she was taking [them] to Delaware." (Id.) Ms. Combs was identified in the reports as "Joyce Marable" with an address of 5960 L-w Street and a...
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