Comer v. State
Decision Date | 23 November 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 3-181A27,3-181A27 |
Parties | Stella COMER, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Max Cohen and David Capp, Cohen & Thiros, Merrillville, for defendant-appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Palmer K. Ward, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.
Stella Comer was charged with and convicted of reckless homicide. She appeals that conviction and raises the following issues:
(1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to declare a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct; and
(2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses.
The record reveals that on November 4, 1979 Stella Comer and her husband Milton became involved in a heated argument. Stella asked Milton to leave the house and not return. Milton left but returned a short time later. As Milton attempted to enter the house, Stella fired a single shot from a revolver. The shot went through the door of the house, hit Milton in the chest and killed him. Stella ran to a neighbor's house to call for an ambulance and the police.
Stella asserts as prosecutorial misconduct certain statements made by the prosecutor in his rebuttal argument. The statements, objections and rulings are as follows:
THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WAS HELD AT THE BENCH OUTSIDE THE HEARING OF THE JURY AND WAS REPORTED AS FOLLOWS:
WHEREUPON THE PROCEEDINGS WERE TAKEN ONCE AGAIN BEFORE THE JURY.
THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WAS HELD AT THE BENCH OUTSIDE OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY, AND WAS REPORTED AS FOLLOWS:
WHEREUPON THE PROCEEDINGS WERE ONCE AGAIN BEFORE THE JURY.
Stella contends that the prosecutor was introducing a new theory of prosecution during rebuttal, the new theory being an intentional killing. This clearly is not the case as is evidenced by other statements made by the prosecutor in his closing argument.
Contrary to Stella's assertions that the prosecutor was attempting to prove intent, the prosecutor's statements before the jury, together with his arguments with regard to Stella's objections, show that he was trying to rebut Stella's claim of self-defense.
In his arguments before the judge, the prosecutor stated:
State's Exhibit No. 2 is a photograph of Milton Comer after he had been shot. There was testimony that the photograph was a true and accurate portrayal. The photograph was admitted into evidence without objection and without any limiting instruction. The photograph could therefore be used for whatever evidentiary purposes the State desired. Stella raised the issue of self-defense. She testified that Milton was pounding on the door, demanding to be let into the house. Mr. Cohen referred to Milton's bellicose mood and his threats during closing argument. The prosecutor properly attempted to rebut this testimony and argument by referring to evidence which had been admitted and raising a possible inference about the keys. Additionally, when Stella objected, the trial court admonished the jury that there was no evidence regarding the keys. Although it is improper to comment on facts not in evidence, Adler v. State (1961), 242 Ind. 9, 175 N.E.2d 358, arguments as to inferences to be drawn from the evidence are permissible. Craig v. State (1977), 267 Ind. 359, 370 N.E.2d 880, appeal after remand (1980) Ind., 398 N.E.2d 661. This is exactly what was done by the prosecutor. No prosecutorial misconduct has been demonstrated.
Stella refers this Court to IC 1971, 35-1-35-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.) which provides in pertinent part:
"But if the case be not so submitted without argument, the prosecuting attorney shall have the opening and closing of the argument; but he shall disclose in the opening all the points relied on in the case and if in the closing he refers to any new point or fact not disclosed in the opening the defendant or his counsel shall have the right of replying thereto, which reply shall close the argument of the case."
Stella, pursuant to the statute, had a right to make a reply. This right was not exercised inasmuch as Stella did not request an opportunity to reply. The issue is therefore waived.
Stella argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the...
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