Comite De Jornaleros v. City of Redondo Beach

• Decision Date: 27 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. CV 04-9396 CBMPJWX.,CV 04-9396 CBMPJWX.
• Citation: 475 F.Supp.2d 952
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: COMITE DE JORNALEROS DE REDONDO BEACH, an unincorporated association; National Day Laborer Organizing Network, an unincorporated association, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF REDONDO BEACH, Defendant.

Page 952

475 F.Supp.2d 952

COMITE DE JORNALEROS DE REDONDO BEACH, an unincorporated association; National Day Laborer Organizing Network, an unincorporated association, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF REDONDO BEACH, Defendant.

No. CV 04-9396 CBMPJWX.

United States District Court, C.D. California, Western Division.

April 27, 2006.

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COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Belinda Anne Escobosa, John D. Trasvina, Shaheena Ahmad Simons, Mexican American Legal Defense & Education Fund, Los Angeles, CA, Philip Hwang, Robert Rubin, San Francisco Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Denise M. Caprioli, Eugene P. Ramirez, Manning & Marder Kass Ellrod Ramirez, Los Angeles, CA, Jerold A. Goddard, Redondo Beach City Attorney, Michael Webb, City of Redondo Beach, Redondo Beach, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER RE: PARTIES' CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PERMANENT INJUNCTION

MARSHALL, District Judge.

The matters before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case involves a facial First Amendment challenge to Redondo Beach Municipal Code § 3-7.1601 (hereinafter "the Ordinance"), which provides, in full:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to stand on a street or highway and solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment, business, or contributions from an occupant of any motor vehicle. For purposes of this section, `street or highway' shall mean all of that area dedicated to public use for public street purposes and shall include, but not be limited to, roadways, parkways, medians, alleys, sidewalks, curbs, and public ways.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to stop, park or stand a motor vehicle on a street or highway from which any occupant attempts to hire or hires for employment another person or persons.

Redondo Beach Municipal Code § 3-7.1601(a)-(b).

The City of Redondo Beach (hereinafter "the City") enacted the Ordinance into law on May 7, 1987. On February 16, 1989, it was amended to add subdivision (b). Violators have been punished through the imposition of fines, probation or both.

In October 2004, the City and its affiliated police department began to enforce the Ordinance aggressively at the intersections of Artesia Boulevard and Felton Lane and Manhattan Beach Boulevard and Inglewood Avenue, where individuals seeking temporary employment (i.e., "day laborers") frequently congregate. They dubbed this increased enforcement effort the "Day Labor Enforcement Project." The police force staged undercover sting operations in which officers, dressed in plain clothes and riding in unmarked cars, stopped to offer employment to day laborers, then detained and arrested them.

Plaintiffs, Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach ("Comite") and National Day Laborer Organizing Network ("NDLON"), are unincorporated organizations that represent the interests of day laborers and/or facilitate solidarity among local day laborer groups striving to advance the laborers' human, employment and civil rights. Specifically, Comite identifies itself as "an unincorporated association comprised of day laborers who seek to defend their rights and address the difficulties that they face in seeking lawful employment as day workers." NDLON identifies itself as "a nationwide coalition of day laborers and the agencies that work with day laborers." Its aims include "working for the repeal or invalidation of laws that restrict the right of day laborers to solicit lawful employment."

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on November 16, 2004, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On December 15, 2004, the Court issued a preliminary injunction restraining Defendants from enforcing the Ordinance and/or from enforcing or seeking to punish violations of probation imposed based on convictions obtained pursuant thereto. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the issuance of the injunction in an unpublished memorandum disposition on May 11, 2005.

Both Plaintiffs and the City now move for summary judgment. The City contends it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiffs lack Article III standing and/or because the Ordinance is a valid "time, place and manner" restriction. Plaintiffs maintain that they do have standing under the Constitution (and incident to the Court's previous orders addressing the issue) and that the Ordinance is facially unconstitutional, either as an improper content-based restriction of speech in a traditional public forum or as an overbroad content-neutral regulation.

STANDARD OF LAW

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, the movant can prevail merely by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See id. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must then set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec. Svc., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir.1987). The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. See Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir.1979).

ANALYSIS

I. Standing

The City asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiffs do not have individual or associational standing to bring their challenge. This Court has twice analyzed and ruled on the issue of Plaintiffs' standing to sue. First, in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support of its order issuing the preliminary injunction, filed on December 15, 2004, the Court determined that Plaintiff organizations have associational Article III and prudential standing to pursue this action on behalf of their largely unidentified day laborer members. Second, in its Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Magistrate Judge's Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for a Protective Order filed on October 4, 2005, the Court ruled that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Ordinance regardless of their members' immigration status or lack of authorization to work in the United States.

The City offers no cogent reason for the Court to depart from its earlier rulings. Although it contends, as it has in the past, that Plaintiff Comite does not actually exist, the previously filed Declaration of Chris Newman (attached as Exhibit 2 to the Perez Declaration accompanying Plaintiffs' present motion) refutes that contention. Newman, the Legal Programs Coordinator of co-Plaintiff NDLON, states that he meets with the Comite three to five times each week. Newman Decl. ¶ 2. His declaration also refutes the City's contention that NDLON has no day laborers as members. Id. at ¶ 4. In addition, Plaintiffs point out that Braulio Adalberto Gonzales testified at his deposition, taken on July 7, 2005, that he is both a day laborer seeking work and a member of Comite, and that, commencing in or around November 2004, the organization has held meetings and participated in various events and gatherings. Exhibit GGGG.¹

The City responds by insisting that Plaintiffs have offered no evidence that Gonzalez and others have a legal right to work in the United States. Thus, the City argues, their solicitation of employment is tantamount to solicitation of the commission of a crime, for which there is no First Amendment protection. However, as discussed above, the Court visited this precise issue in a recent order and explained that "although it is illegal to hire a person not authorized to work in the United States ... there does not appear to be any law that bars undocumented persons from seeking work. Therefore, Plaintiffs' members' speech is not illegal." See Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Magistrate Judge's Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for a Protective Order, October 4, 2005, at 7. In addition, the Court noted that, apart from the suppression of their First Amendment rights, Plaintiffs have alleged other injuries suffered by their members, including arrests, fines and prosecution, incident to the City's enforcement of the Ordinance and that "these types of independent harms can constitute an `injury-in-fact' under the First Amendment." Id. at 8 (citing Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975)); cf. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir.2006) ("It is undisputed, however, that Appellants have been and in the future will probably be fined, arrested, imprisoned, and/or prosecuted, as well as suffer the loss of their personal property, for involuntarily violating section...