Comm. for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court
Decision Date | 28 April 2020 |
Docket Number | SJC-12926 |
Citation | 484 Mass. 1029,143 N.E.3d 408 |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Parties | COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC COUNSEL SERVICES & another v. CHIEF JUSTICE OF the TRIAL COURT & others (No. 2). |
The case was submitted on briefs.
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Benjamin H. Keehn, Rebecca Kiley, & David Rassoul Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services.
Matthew R. Segal, Jessie J. Rossman, Laura K. McCready, Kristin M. Mulvey, Chauncey B. Wood, Boston, & Victoria Kelleher, Salem, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
David C. Kravitz, Deputy State Solicitor, for the Attorney General.
Daniel P. Sullivan, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Chief Justice of the Trial Court.
Charles W. Anderson, Jr., for Department of Correction.
Shara Benedetti for parole board.
Rachael Rollins, District Attorney, & Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for district attorney for the Suffolk district.
Thomas M. Quinn, III, District Attorney, Jonathan Blodgett, District Attorney, Anthony D. Gulluni, District Attorney, Joseph D. Early, District Attorney, Michael W. Morrissey, District Attorney, & Timothy J. Cruz, District Attorney, for the district attorney for the Bristol district & others.
Dan V. Bair, II, Special Assistant Attorney General, & Robert Harnais for fourteen sheriffs' departments.
The petitioners seek reconsideration or modification of our decision in this case, which was issued on April 3, 2020. Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court, 484 Mass. 431, 142 N.E.3d 525 (2020). Specifically, they ask us to reconsider our determination that neither our inherent judicial authority nor our superintendence authority permits a judge to stay a final sentence that is being served, absent a pending appeal or a motion for a new trial, without violating the separation of powers under art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. See id. at 436, 142 N.E.3d 525. The petitioners also assert violations of this court's order with respect to reporting requirements of information to be sent to the special master, and, in addition, ask this court to expand the reporting requirements so as to provide the petitioners with information that might be used to pursue other legal pathways by which the population of those held in custody serving sentences might be reduced.
We affirm our prior decision as to the extent of our constitutional authority to stay final sentences absent an ongoing challenge to the underlying conviction or a violation of constitutional rights. Notwithstanding the petitioners' assertion that our previous "misapprehension" of our authority was as a result of the speed with which the decision was issued after oral argument, the jurisprudence on this point is well-established. We do, however, conclude that some of the requested relief as to additional reporting requirements should be allowed, and, accordingly, issue a revised Appendix B, attached hereto.
As we stated in our decision, the executive branch has the authority, inter alia, to commute sentences, issue furloughs, and allow early parole. We urge the executive branch to contemplate how it best might exercise those constitutional powers to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in the Commonwealth's prison system.
Background. In our prior decision, we recognized that the unprecedented and urgent conditions created by the global COVID-19 pandemic necessitated judicial action to reduce the population of those held in custody. Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 484 Mass. at 445, 142 N.E.3d 525. Accordingly, we determined that the advent of the pandemic amounted to a changed condition as a matter of law, so that any individual who was being held pretrial could seek reconsideration of the bail decision which resulted in the pretrial detention. Id. at 435, 142 N.E.3d 525. For individuals not charged with specified offenses as enumerated in Appendix A, set forth in that decision, see id. at 454, 142 N.E.3d 525, we created a strong but rebuttable presumption of release, id. at 447, 142 N.E.3d 525 ().
At the same time, we determined that "[o]ur broad power of superintendence over the courts does not grant us the authority to authorize courts to revise or revoke defendants' custodial sentences, to stay the execution of sentence, or to order their temporary release unless a defendant (1) has moved under Mass. R. Crim. P. 29, [as appearing in 474 Mass. 1503 (2016),] within sixty days after imposition of sentence or the issuance of a decision on all pending appeals, to revise or revoke his or her sentence, (2) has appealed the conviction or sentence and the appeal remains pending, or (3) has moved for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 [ ]." Id. at 450, 142 N.E.3d 525.
Discussion. 1. Stays or suspensions of sentences. As the petitioners point out, the bulk of our reasoning in the slip opinion focused on their argument seeking a suspension of the sixty-day time period in Mass. R. Crim. P. 29, within which a judge may revise or revoke a sentence. See Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 484 Mass. at 450, 142 N.E.3d 525. Having determined that the sixty-day time period exists to protect the separation of powers, we concluded that it was beyond our superintendence authority to eliminate the requirement of a time limit. Id. Moreover, as we noted, the conditions for which a revision may be sought must be something that existed at the time of conviction.3
The petitioners now ask for release, or stay, under our inherent authority to stay sentences. We conclude that the global stays of sentences that the petitioners request also would co-opt executive functions in ways that are not permitted by art. 30.
In Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63, 72, 992 N.E.2d 999 (2013), citing Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 506, 520, 729 N.E.2d 252 (2000), we said that "a judge has the inherent power to stay sentences for ‘exceptional reasons permitted by law.’ " We later explained the exceptional reasons more precisely in that case by answering the reported question, "In exceptional circumstances, a judge of the Superior Court does have the authority to allow a defendant's motion to stay the execution of his sentence, then being served, pending disposition of the defendant's motion for a new trial ...." Charles, supra at 79, 992 N.E.2d 999. "In the context of a pending appeal, the practice of granting a stay of execution of sentence ‘is grounded in rudimentary notions of justice’ because a ‘conviction may be reversible, but the time spent in prison is not.’ "4 Id. at 77, 992 N.E.2d 999, quoting Commonwealth v. Levin, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 501, 512-513, 388 N.E.2d 1207 (1979). See Charles, supra at 78, 992 N.E.2d 999 ( ).
Other than in circumstances where the validity of the underlying conviction is being questioned, however, the petitioners have not put forth anything to indicate that this court has inherent authority to stay, across the board, all sentences that are being executed for certain groups of incarcerated individuals, or to create a presumption of stay for those individuals. For even in the broadest formulation of our inherent power, any stay, even those granted in exceptional circumstances, must be "permitted by law." See Charles, 466 Mass. at 72, 992 N.E.2d 999 ; art. 30 ().
The power to stay sentences in the absence of a challenge to the underlying conviction after the time period of Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 has expired lies in the executive branch. "In Commonwealth v. O'Brien, [175 Mass. 37, 39, 55 N.E. 466 (1899) ], the court said that [ Commonwealth v. Hayes, 170 Mass. 16, 48 N.E. 779 (1897) ] implies that, under the statute," the power of the court after all appeals have been decided "to vacate the order staying the sentence, and to order the sentence executed, does not extend so far as to permit a further stay of the sentence on independent grounds not affecting the legality or propriety of the conviction." McLaughlin, 431 Mass. at 517, 729 N.E.2d 252. "That is a strong indication that trial judges lack authority to stay execution of sentence on independent grounds not affecting the legality or propriety of the conviction" (quotation omitted). Id., and cases cited. We follow this strong indication here. See Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597, 601–602, 29 N.E.2d 140 (1940), and cases cited; Jamnback v. Aamunkoitto Temperance Soc'y, Inc., 273 Mass. 45, 50, 172 N.E. 884 (1930).5
The petitioners contend that this court should consider the pending claims for declarative relief in another case, Foster vs. Commissioner of Correction, No. SJC-12935, as a challenge to all of the underlying convictions of all individuals serving sentences, so as to satisfy the requirements of Mass. R. Crim. P 29. This contention is unavailing. First, there is no challenge in that case to the underlying convictions of any individual; rather, the complaint seeks declaratory relief. Granting a stay without such a challenge essentially amounts to granting a furlough, which lies within the purview of the executive branch. Thus, if a judge were to suspend execution of a sentence that is being served, without any pending motion challenging the conviction or the validity of the sentence when it was imposed, there could be a significant issue with art. 30 and the separation of powers. Moreover, the parties, and the...
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