Comm'n On Human Rights v. Edge Fitness, LLC

Citation342 Conn. 25,268 A.3d 630
Decision Date25 January 2022
Docket NumberSC 20538
Parties COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES v. EDGE FITNESS, LLC, et al.
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut

Michael E. Roberts, human rights attorney, for the appellant (plaintiff).

James F. Shea, Hartford, with whom was Allison P. Dearington, for the appellee (named defendant).

Mario R. Borelli, for the appellee (defendant Club Camel, Inc., Bloomfield).

Kenneth J. Bartschi, Hartford, filed a brief for the GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders et al. as amici curiae.

Kevin M. Barry, Hamden, filed a brief for the Quinnipiac University School of Law Legal Clinic as amicus curiae.

Erick M. Sandler, Hartford, filed a brief for the Jewish Federation of Greater Hartford et al. as amici curiae.

Dan Barrett filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut as amicus curiae.

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

ROBINSON, C. J.

This appeal presents a significant question of first impression with respect to whether the Public Accommodation Act, General Statutes § 46a-64,1 contains an implied customer gender privacy exception to its general prohibition against sex based discrimination.2 The plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), appeals3 from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its administrative appeal from the decision of the commission's human rights referee (referee), who found that the defendants Edge Fitness, LLC (Edge Fitness) and Club Camel, Inc., Bloomfield, doing business as Club Fitness (Club Fitness),4 did not engage in discriminatory public accommodations practices. On appeal, the commission claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that women's only workout areas in otherwise public gyms did not violate § 46a-64 because that statute contains an implied customer gender privacy exception. We conclude that the exceptions to the general prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex in public accommodations are limited to those expressly provided by the plain language of § 46a-64 and, therefore, that there is no implied customer gender privacy exception to the statute. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The complainants, Alex Chaplin and Daniel Brelsford, were members of the defendants’ gyms, Club Fitness and Edge Fitness, respectively. Both individuals identify as males and used the larger coed portions of the facilities. While using equipment in the main workout areas, the complainants experienced slight delays in completing their workouts because they had to wait for other members to finish using that equipment. This led the complainants to believe that the defendants, by providing separate women's only fitness areas in their facilities, had discriminated against them on the basis of sex, and they filed complaints with the commission challenging the practice. The referee concluded that the defendants did not violate § 46a-64 by maintaining women's only workout areas and dismissed the complaints.

The commission filed an administrative appeal from the decision of the referee with the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court first recognized that a women's only fitness area is neither a bathroom nor a locker room. The court then questioned whether " § 46a-64 (b) (1) allow[s] for exceptions to the sex based antidiscrimination prohibitions in cases other than bathrooms or locker rooms [in which] the same gender privacy interests that allowed for the exceptions for bathrooms and locker rooms are in play." The trial court observed that, "unless the statute is read to include a gender privacy exception similar to the express exception for bathrooms and locker rooms, it would be a violation to provide separate showers, dressing rooms and hospital rooms for men and women in public accommodations." The trial court further considered the burden that the elimination of women's only workout areas would place on women of certain religious practices. The trial court, therefore, concluded that "the provision of women's only exercise areas in fitness centers of public accommodation does not violate the sex based antidiscrimination provisions of ... § 46a-64." Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the commission's administrative appeal. This appeal followed.5 See footnote 3 of this opinion.

On appeal, the commission claims that the language of § 46a-64 (b) (1) is plain and unambiguous and does not contain a gender privacy exception to the general prohibition against sex discrimination. The commission asserts that a gender privacy exception is not a valid defense to an otherwise discriminatory sex based classification.6 In response, the defendants argue that, because antidiscrimination statutes are to be construed broadly to effectuate their beneficent purpose, the remedial purpose of § 46a-64 is advanced by the defendants’ provision of women's only workout areas. The defendants also contend that the commission's reading of the statute is so narrow that it would yield absurd results. We agree with the commission and conclude that the trial court's expansion of the exceptions in § 46a-64 (b) (1) to the general prohibition against sex discrimination was inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.

Whether the trial court correctly determined that there is an implied customer gender privacy exception encompassed within § 46a-64 (b) (1) is a question of statutory construction that presents a question of law, over which we exercise plenary review. See, e.g., Boisvert v. Gavis , 332 Conn. 115, 141, 210 A.3d 1 (2019). It is well settled that we follow the plain meaning rule in General Statutes § 1-2z in construing statutes "to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sena v. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. , 333 Conn. 30, 45, 213 A.3d 1110 (2019) ; see, e.g., id., at 45–46, 213 A.3d 1110 (setting forth plain meaning rule).

In interpreting statutes, words and phrases not otherwise defined by the statutory scheme are construed according to their "commonly approved usage ...." General Statutes § 1-1 (a) ; see, e.g., State v. Panek , 328 Conn. 219, 227–28, 177 A.3d 1113 (2018). In determining the commonly approved usage of the statutory language at issue, we consult dictionary definitions. See, e.g., id., at 229, 177 A.3d 1113. It is well established that a statute is considered plain and unambiguous when "the meaning ... is so strongly indicated or suggested by the [statutory] language ... that ... it appears to be the meaning and appears to preclude any other likely meaning. ... [I]f the text of the statute at issue ... would permit more than one likely or plausible meaning, its meaning cannot be said to be plain and unambiguous." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc. , 338 Conn. 687, 698 n.6, 258 A.3d 1268 (2021).

As required by § 1-2z, we first determine whether the statutory language is ambiguous. Section 46a-64 (a) provides in relevant part that it "shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) [t]o deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of ... sex ... [or] (2) to discriminate, segregate or separate on account of ... sex ...." Section 46a-64 (b) (1) then sets forth the exceptions to the statute's general prohibition against discrimination based on sex, which it limits to "the rental of sleeping accommodations provided by associates and organizations which rent all such sleeping accommodations on a temporary or permanent basis for the exclusive use of persons of the same sex or ... separate bathrooms or locker rooms based on sex." See footnote 1 of this opinion.

It is undisputed that the defendants’ gyms are "place[s] of public accommodation" within the meaning of § 46a-64 (a) (1). It is also undisputed that the defendants’ provision of women's only workout areas constitutes a "discriminatory practice"7 in violation of that subsection unless it is subject to a statutory exception, which is the focus of our analysis in this appeal.

The legislature enacted the bathroom and locker room exceptions set forth in § 46a-64 (b) (1) as No. 94-238, § 4, of the 1994 Public Acts (P.A. 94-238). In determining the commonly approved usage of the terms "bathroom" and "locker room," we look to their dictionary definitions. See, e.g., State v. Panek , supra, 328 Conn. at 229, 177 A.3d 1113. Contemporary to the passage of the 1994 amendment to § 46a-64, "bathroom" was defined as "a room equipped for taking a bath or shower ... toilet ...." Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2d Ed. 1993) p. 177. "Locker room" was defined as "a room containing lockers, as in a gymnasium, factory, or school, for changing clothes and for the storage and safekeeping of personal belongings." Id., p. 1128. The parties do not proffer alternative meanings for these terms or suggest that the women's only workout areas fit within the plain meaning of those definitions as a factual matter.8 Accordingly, we conclude that the exceptions set forth in § 46a-64 (b) (1) plainly and unambiguously do not encompass the women's only workout areas for purposes of the § 1-2z analysis.

Because the women's only workout spaces do not fall under an express exception, the defendants ask us to interpret § 46a-64 (b) (1) to include a third, implicit exception to the prohibition against sex based discrimination, namely, a broad gender privacy exception. The defendants argue that such an exception is implied by the bodily privacy interests that the enumerated exceptions protect and that the inclusion of a third exception would be consistent with other portions of the statutory...

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