Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel. Cortes v. Valentin

• Citation: 213 Conn.App. 635,278 A.3d 607
• Decision Date: 05 July 2022
• Docket Number: AC 43887
• Parties: COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES EX REL. Julissa CORTES v. Margaret VALENTIN
• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut

213 Conn.App. 635

278 A.3d 607

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES EX REL. Julissa CORTES

v.Margaret VALENTIN

AC 43887

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 28, 2022

Officially released July 5, 2022

Margaret Valentin, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Pamela A. Heller, with whom were Jeffrey Gentes, and, on the brief, Cullen W. Guilmartin, Glastonbury, and Nicholas M. Varney, for the appellee (intervening plaintiff).

Margaret J. Nurse-Goodison, human rights attorney, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Bright, C. J., and Elgo and DiPentima, Js.

DiPENTIMA, J.

The defendant, Margaret Valentin,¹ appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a trial to the court, in favor of the plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), and the intervening plaintiff, Julissa Cortes, in this action alleging housing discrimination in violation of General Statutes § 46a-64c (a). The defendant claims that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the court's conclusion that she had violated § 46a-64c (a) by engaging in discriminatory housing practices, (2) the court abused its discretion in awarding Cortes compensatory damages for emotional distress and (3) the court (a) improperly failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to denying her application for a writ of audita querela and (b) abused its discretion in denying her motion for reargument and reconsideration of that application. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court or as otherwise undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant. In July, 2016, Cortes’ landlord informed her that the property in which she then resided in East Hartford was being sold. In that same month, Cortes sent the defendant a message via the website Zillow to schedule a viewing of the defendant's rental property in East Hartford and inquired whether she would accept a voucher pursuant to section 8 of the National Housing Act (section 8), 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. After receiving no response, Cortes called the defendant to schedule a viewing and indicated that she intended to use a section 8 voucher. The defendant responded that the rental property "was not section 8 ready." Cortes had Victor Irizarry, the father of her three children, call the defendant regarding the rental property. The defendant told Irizarry that the rental property "wasn't section 8 ready," and that she "just didn't want to deal with the paperwork."

Cortes’ section 8 worker referred her to the Connecticut Fair Housing Center (center). Maria Cuerda, a fair housing specialist with the center, called the defendant regarding her refusal to allow Cortes to view the rental property. The defendant informed Cuerda that the rental property would not qualify for section 8, that she had the right to rent to whomever she wanted and that she was not interested in getting the rental property approved for prospective tenants with section 8 vouchers. Cuerda informed the defendant that it constituted a discriminatory housing practice to refuse to rent to prospective tenants on the basis of their intent to use a section 8 voucher. Cortes texted the defendant to request a viewing of the rental property. The defendant responded that, before she could schedule a viewing, she needed additional information, including Cortes’ credit score. Cortes replied that she had a "fair" credit score. The defendant told Cortes that her "[c]redit doesn't meet my requirements," and did not provide Cortes with an opportunity to view the rental property. On October 1, 2016, Cortes moved into a different rental property in East Hartford. The defendant rented her East Hartford property to another prospective tenant, Charles Stewart, who did not receive section 8 federal housing assistance and who moved into the rental property on October 1, 2016.

The commission brought an action on behalf of Cortes claiming that the defendant had violated subdivisions (1) and (3) of § 46a-64c (a) by discriminating against Cortes by denying her an opportunity to rent or view the rental property and by making discriminatory statements regarding Cortes’ ability to rent the property on the basis of a lawful source of income, her section 8 voucher.² Pursuant to Practice Book § 9-18, Cortes filed a motion to intervene as a plaintiff, and the motion was granted by the court.

Following trial, the court issued a memorandum of decision on January 30, 2020, in which it determined that the defendant had violated § 46a-64c (a) (1) and (3), awarded Cortes $7500 in noneconomic damages for emotional distress and ordered the defendant to pay a $5000 civil penalty to the commission. Specifically, as to § 46a-64c (a) (1), the court concluded that the defendant's failure to allow Cortes to rent or view the rental property was on account of Cortes’ status as a recipient of a section 8 voucher and therefore constituted a discriminatory housing practice. The court found that the defendant's proffered legitimate reason for not showing Cortes the rental property—that Cortes had not satisfied her credit score criteria—was "unavailing." The court determined that the defendant's reasoning that she would not rent to anyone with a credit score of less than 700 was belied by the fact that the defendant did not know Cortes’ actual credit score, but rather only knew that Cortes had described her credit score as being "fair." The court further reasoned that the defendant's "denial of Ms. Cortes is further undercut by her testimony that it was ‘irrelevant’ to her whether Ms. Cortes had the ability to pay, even if her section 8 voucher covered 100 percent of the rent, because she assumed Ms. Cortes’ credit was not up to her ‘criteria.’ ... Even if [the defendant] had a legitimate credit score policy, she applied it in a discriminatory fashion to ... Cortes because [the defendant] never asked her three prior tenants for their credit score prior to showing or accepting an application from them to rent the home."

The court also concluded that the defendant's statements to Cortes that the rental property "was not section 8 ready" conveyed to an ordinary listener a preference for tenants who did not receive section 8 vouchers in violation of § 46a-64c (a) (3). The court determined that the defendant's proffered reason for having made those statements—that no one could rent the property because the furnace needed repair—was "transparent." The court found that, during the same time period in which the defendant claimed the furnace needed repairs, she gave applications to, held open houses for and agreed to rent the property to prospective tenants who did not receive section 8 vouchers, and the defendant and Stewart both testified at trial that all repairs were completed prior to the move in date of October 1, 2016, that was proposed by Cortes. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the court's conclusion that she had violated subdivisions (1) and (3) of § 46a-64c (a) by engaging in discriminatory housing practices. In furtherance of her argument, she contends that some of the court's subordinate factual findings were clearly erroneous. We are not persuaded.

Section 46a-64c (a) provides in relevant part: "It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) ... to refuse to negotiate for the ... rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of ... lawful source of income .... (3) To make ... or cause to be made ... any ... statement ... with respect to the ... rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on ... lawful source of income ... or an intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination. ..."

We first set forth the standard of review. "[W]here the factual basis of the court's decision is challenged we must determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly erroneous. ... We also must determine whether those facts correctly found are, as a matter of law, sufficient to support the judgment. ... Although we give great deference to the findings of the trial court because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses ... we will not uphold a factual determination if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Briggs v. McWeeny , 260 Conn. 296, 322, 796 A.2d 516 (2002).

The law applicable to this claim is well established. The court stated that there was direct evidence of discrimination and employed the mixed-motive disparate treatment theory. "Used in this general sense, disparate treatment simply refers to those cases where certain individuals are treated differently than others. ... The principal inquiry of a disparate treatment case is whether the plaintiff was subjected to different treatment because of his or her protected status. Under the analysis of the disparate treatment theory of liability, there are two general methods to allocate the burdens of proof: (1) the mixed-motive/ Price Waterhouse model;³ Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins , 490 U.S. 228, 246, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989) ; and (2) the pretext/ McDonnell Douglas – Burdine model. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 252–56, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981) ; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973)." (Citation omitted; footnote in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , 236 Conn. 96, 104–105, 671 A.2d 349 (1996). "Under Price...