Comm'r of Envtl. Prot. v. Farricielli, 18596.
Decision Date | 19 February 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 18596.,18596. |
Citation | 59 A.3d 789,307 Conn. 787 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | COMMISSIONER OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION et al. v. Joseph J. FARRICIELLI et al. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Kenneth A. Votre, for the plaintiff in error (Modern Materials Corporation).
Kimberly P. Massicotte, assistant attorney general, with whom were Matthew I. Levine, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, and Krista E. Trousdale, assistant attorney general, for the defendant in error (commissioner of environmental protection).
ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH and HARPER, Js.*
This is the latest chapter in the efforts of the plaintiffs, including the named plaintiff and defendant in error, the commissioner of environmental protection (commissioner),1 to close and remediate an area commonly known as the “tire pond,” a solid waste disposal area straddling the Hamden and North Haven town boundaries that is on land owned by the defendants, Joseph Farricielli and various corporate entities that he owns or controls (corporations).2 The nonparty plaintiff in error, Modern Materials Corporation (Modern), which conducts its business on land leased from State Five Industrial Park, Inc. (State Five), that contains a portion of the tire pond, brings this writ of error 3 from the judgment of the trial court ordering it to vacate that land in order to effectuate the environmental remediation that the trial court had ordered in the action underlying this writ of error (underlying action). Modern contends that the trial court improperly ordered it to vacate because: (1) the trial court lacked the authority to enforce the injunctions ordered in the underlying action against Modern because it has never been a party to that action or acted in privity with a party thereto; (2) such an order was not necessary to effectuate the remediation; and (3) the trial court violated Modern's due process rights under the federal and state constitutions when it enforced the orders in the underlying action without first giving Modern the opportunity to contest the validity of those orders at a hearing. We disagree and, accordingly, dismiss the writ of error.
The record, as described in part by our previous opinions in various appeals concerning the tire pond, reveals the following background facts and procedural history. Farricielli Rocque v. Farricielli, 269 Conn. 187, 192, 848 A.2d 1206 (2004).
4
Id., at 192–94, 848 A.2d 1206.
The commissioner commenced the underlying action on July 9, 1999, by filing Id., at 191–92, 848 A.2d 1206.
6Id., at 194, 848 A.2d 1206. This court affirmed the underlying judgment in an opinion released on June 1, 2004. Id., at 190–91, 848 A.2d 1206.
With respect to the three specific parcels of the defendants' land at issue herein, known as parcels A, B and C, the tire pond is located on parcel B, which lies in both North Haven and Hamden, and which is bordered on the east by the Quinnipiac River and on the west by State Street. Parcel A lies south of parcel B and is entirely in Hamden. Parcel C, which is located between parcels A and B, is a narrow strip that lies entirely in Hamden. Parcel C is owned by State Five, who, in turn, received its interest in that parcel from its corporate predecessor, Look Investment Agency, Inc. (Look). In February, 2000, Farricielli, through one of his corporations, the defendant Tire Salvage, Inc. (Tire Salvage), conveyed a 6.8 acre strip of land in the southern portion of the tire pond on parcel B to Look, causing it to become part of parcel C. 7 Further, in June, 2003, Farriciellilicensed a three acre portion of the tire pond in parcel B to Look for the sum of $1 (license agreement).
Modern became involved with this property in June, 2003, while the appeal to this court in the underlying action was pending. Specifically, on June 11, 2003, State Five leased the 6.8 acre strip on parcel C to Modern for an initial five year plus seven month term, ending on February 28, 2009. The lease also included a five year renewal option, which Modern since has exercised. Modern subsequently recorded this lease on the Hamden land records pursuant to General Statutes § 47–19.8State Five also assigned to Modern a portion of the license agreement, thus permitting Modern to occupy the three acre strip of land on parcel B as a sublicensee. Modern currently uses its leased premises on parcel C and this small portion of parcel B to recycle, screen and resell construction materials such as gravel, concrete, asphalt and earth materials.
Subsequent to the execution of Modern's lease, the commissioner filed a motion for contempt in 2004, alleging that the defendants had failed to complete the remediation of the tire pond as required by the 2001 judgment and that Farricielli had engaged in personal conduct that directly had interfered with the commissioner's efforts to complete the remediation. Although the trial court denied the commissioner's motion for contempt, despite “evidence that [Farricielli] engaged in serious harassment” of the commissioner and two of its contractors engaged in remediation, the court also determined that “further clarification, guidance and strengthening of its injunction [was] required” and issued numerous supplemental orders as an amendment to the underlying judgment. These supplemental orders, issued by memorandum of decision on October 7, 2004 (2004 order), inter alia, “enjoin[ed] all persons who are given notice thereof, from preventing the commissioner, his agents, employees and contractors from having full and...
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State v. Dickson, SC 19385
...identification procedures. This is a question of law over which our review is plenary. Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Farricielli, 307 Conn. 787, 819, 59 A.3d 789 (2013) ("[w]hether [a party] was deprived of his due process rights is a question of law, to which we grant plenary......
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State v. Buhl, SC 19412
...an inadequately briefed claim constitutes an exercise of judicial discretion. See, e.g., Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Farricielli, 307 Conn. 787, 816 n.22, 59 A.3d 789 (2013) ("we exercise our discretion to review these [allegedly inadequately briefed] claims"); Northeast Ct.......
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State v. Buhl
...briefed claim constitutes an exercise of judicial discretion. See, e.g., Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Farricielli, 307 Conn. 787, 816 n. 22, 59 A.3d 789 (2013) (“we exercise our discretion to review these [allegedly inadequately briefed] claims”); Northeast Ct. Economic Allia......
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State v. Dickson
...procedures. This is a question of law over which our review is plenary. Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Farricielli, 307 Conn. 787, 819, 59 A.3d 789 (2013) (“[w]hether [a party] was deprived of his due process rights is a question of law, to which we grant plenary review” [inter......