Comm'r Safety v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 15 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 19047.,19047.
• Citation: 312 Conn. 513,93 A.3d 1142
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

312 Conn. 513

93 A.3d 1142

COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY

v.FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

No. 19047.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 9, 2014.

Decided July 15, 2014.

Victor R. Perpetua, principal attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Colleen Murphy, general counsel, for the appellant (named defendant).

Terrence M. O'Neill, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Holly Hutton, certified legal intern, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Daniel J. Klau, supervising attorney, and Maxwell Mishkin, James Shih and Joshua Weinger, legal interns, filed a brief for the Connecticut Council on Freedom of Information et al. as amici curiae.

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.

ROBINSON, J.

This certified appeal raises significant questions about the breadth and extent of a law enforcement agency's disclosure obligations under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1–200 et seq., ¹ with respect to a pending criminal prosecution. In 1993, this court held in Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 641, 653–61, 631 A.2d 252 (1993), that during a pending criminal prosecution, a law enforcement agency's disclosure obligations under the act were exclusively governed by the statutory predecessor to General Statutes § 1–215,² which required the agency to release, at that time, only what is commonly known as the police blotter information, namely, “the ‘name and address of the person arrested, the date, time and place of the arrest and the offense for which the person was arrested.’ ” Id., at 658, 631 A.2d 252. The legislature responded to Gifford by enacting Public Acts 1994, No. 94–246, § 13,³ which amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 1–20b, the statutory predecessor to § 1–215, to require the police to designate for release, in addition to the police blotter information, “at least one of the following ... the arrest report, incident report, news release or other similar report of the arrest of a person.” See footnote 2 of this opinion. In this appeal, we must determine whether the enactment of Public Act 94–246 legislatively overruled this court's temporal conclusion in Gifford, namely, that during pending criminal prosecutions, law enforcement agencies' disclosure obligations under the act are exclusivelygoverned by § 1–215, rendering the act's broader disclosure requirement and law enforcement exception, set forth in General Statutes (Supp.2014) § 1–210(a) and (b)(3) respectively,⁴ inapplicable from the time of arrest to the conclusion of the prosecution.

The defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (commission), appeals, upon our grant of its petition for certification,⁵ from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment sustaining the administrative appeal of the plaintiff, the Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety (department),⁶ from the commission's decision finding that the department had violated the act by failing to disclose to the complainants ⁷ certain records from a pending criminal case. Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 137 Conn.App. 307, 308–309, 48 A.3d 694 (2012). Supported by the amici curiae, ⁸ the commission claims that the AppellateCourt improperly concluded that the enactment of Public Act 94–246 did not affect aspects of this court's decision in Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 227 Conn. at 641, 631 A.2d 252, holding that § 1–215 exclusively governed law enforcement agencies' disclosure obligations under the act during pending criminal prosecutions, because: (1) that construction is contrary to the plain language and legislative history of the statute, particularly the reference in § 1–215(a) providing that “disclosure of data or information other than [the police blotter information] set forth in [ § 1–215(b)(1) ] ... shall be subject to the provisions of [ § 1–210(b)(3) ]”; and (2) the commission's interpretation of the act to the contrary is time-tested and reasonable and, therefore, entitled to deference from the courts. We conclude that Public Act 94–246 responded to Gifford by increasing law enforcement agencies' disclosure obligations under § 1–215, but did not disturb the holding in Gifford that § 1–215 exclusively governs law enforcement agencies' disclosure obligations under the act during pending criminal prosecutions, to the exclusion of the act's broader disclosure obligations set forth in § 1–210(a), as cabined by the law enforcement exception, set forth in § 1–210(b)(3). On the basis of the ample extratextual evidence of the meaning of the otherwise ambiguous § 1–215, we further conclude that the commission's construction of the statute to the contrary is not reasonable and, therefore, is not entitled to judicial deference. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court's opinion aptly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history. “On March 18, 2008, the complainants requested, pursuant to the [act] ... that the department provide them with access to the police report of an incident that occurred on March 15, 2008, in Derby. The request concerned the arrest of an individual who ... was charged with assault in the first degree of an elderly person and attempt to commit murder. On April 29, 2008, the department responded by letter indicating that the entire report was exempt from disclosure pursuant to § 1–215; however, the department provided the complainants with a copy of the official department ... press release pertaining to the incident that was the subject of their inquiry. The press release contained the following information: the accused's name was Toai T. Nguyen, he lived at 59 Grove Street, Shelton, and was born on March 4, 1973; the date, time and location of the incident was March 15, 2008, at 1:01 p.m. on Route 8, northbound, exit seventeen off ramp in Derby; and the charges upon which the accused had been arrested were: assault in the first degree of an elderly person in violation of General Statutes § 53a–59a, attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–49 and 53a–54a, and failure to respond/plea in violation of General Statutes § 51–164r (a). The press release also contained a two paragraph narrative that included additional information about the arrest.

“On May 2, 2008, the complainants appealed from the decision of the department to the commission pursuant to General Statutes § 1–206(b)(1). On March 6, 2009, following a hearing, a decision by a hearing officer, and a proceeding before the full commission, the commission issued a final decision. In that decision, the commission concluded, among other things, that § 1–215 ‘does not exempt records from public disclosure under the [act], but rather mandates that, at a minimum, certain arrest records must be disclosed. In instances where a public agency seeks to withhold other records not mandated to be disclosed pursuant to § 1–215 ... such public agency must prove that an exemption applies to such other records.’ The commission also found ‘that the [department] did make available to the [complainants] a press release concerning the arrest of [Nguyen], which included the name and address of [Nguyen], the date, time and place of his arrest and the offense for which he was arrested.’ The commission then concluded ‘that the [department] provided the ‘record of arrest’ within the meaning of § 1–215....'

“The commission issued the following orders: ‘Forthwith the [department] shall provide to the [complainants] copies of the in camera records other than the portions described in paragraphs 16, 25, 38 and 39 of the findings, above.... Consistent with [the commission's] precedent, the [department] may redact social security numbers from the records ordered released.’

“On March 12, 2009, the department filed an appeal with the trial court. On March 12, 2010, the commission informed the court that the criminal defendant had entered a guilty plea and the criminal matter therefore had concluded. The department then made all relevant documents available to the complainants. The court issued its memorandum of decision on April 21, 2010. The court agreed with both parties that the issue of the availability of the exception to the act provided by § 1–215 was moot, but because it was capable of repetition, yet evading review, the case could still go forward. The court also concluded that there was more than one reasonable interpretation of § 1–215, and therefore it consulted legislative history. The court stated that its conclusion from reviewing the legislative history ‘agrees with the [department's] position—that while Gifford [v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 227 Conn. at 641, 631 A.2d 252] had restricted disclosure to mere nominal information, the legislative revision had compromised on increasing the mandatory disclosure by police departments of arrest information by requiring the police department to disclose at least one of the four items listed in § 1–215(b)(2). Thus, [the department] here satisfied the act by choosing to provide the complainants with the news release, and was not obligated to make either a full or redacted police report available.’ ” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 137 Conn.App. at 309–11, 48 A.3d 694.

The commission appealed from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the department's administrative appeal to the Appellate Court. Id., at 311, 48 A.3d 694. In a unanimous opinion, the Appellate Court concluded that, when § 1–215 is considered in light of this court's interpretation of that statute in Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 227 Conn. at 641, 631 A.2d 252, and other related statutes, “there is only one plausible meaning of the statutory language. Therefore, we...