Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner

• Decision Date: 13 April 1964
• Docket Number: No. 3128,3128
• Citation: 199 A.2d 606,98 R.I. 14
• Parties: , 10 A.L.R.3d 525 COMMERCE OIL REFINING CORPORATION v. William W. MINER et al. Eq.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 606

199 A.2d 606

98 R.I. 14, 10 A.L.R.3d 525

COMMERCE OIL REFINING CORPORATION v. William W. MINER et al.

Eq. No. 3128.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 13, 1964.

Letts & Quinn, Daniel J. Murray, Jerome B. Spunt, Providence, for petitioner.

Moore, Virgadamo, Boyle & Lynch, Cornelius C. Moore, Salvatore L. Virgadamo, Francis J. Boyle, Jeremiah C. Lynch, Jr., Newport, Higgins & Slattery, James A. Higgins, William C. Dorgan, Providence, for respondents.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This petition for a declaratory judgment was brought pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956, chap. 30 of title 9. The petitioner therein asked, first, whether an action for malicious use of process is an action for injury to the person within the meaning of G.L.1956, § 9-1-14, and is barred by the provisions of said statute if not brought within two years after the cause of action has accrued and, second, whether a cause of action for malicious use of process brought against it in the federal district court is barred by the provisions of said statute. The petition was heard by a justice of the superior court, who entered a decree answering each question in the negative, and from that decree the petitioner has prosecuted its appeal to this court.

It appears that petitioner in 1957 had instituted a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island against a group of residents of the town of Jamestown on the island of Conanicut, who are hereinafter referred to as the respondents. In this action petitioner sought damages for an alleged conspiracy to obstruct the erection of an oil refinery pursuant to a license to do so issued by the appropriate officers of the town of Jamestown and an injunction prohibiting respondents from interfering with the erection of such refinery. The respondents filed a counterclaim in that action for a declaration that said license was invalid and for an injunction against the erection of the refinery as a potential nuisance. When this action was reached for trial in the district court, petitioner abandoned its complaint, which was dismissed with prejudice, and trial proceeded on the counterclaim with a decision therein for the instant respondents. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit thereafter reversed the decision of the district court, and the counterclaim was dismissed. Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, D.C.R.I., 1959, 170 F.Supp. 396, rev'd 1 Cir., 1960, 281 F.2d 465, cert. den. 364 U.S. 910, 81 S.Ct. 274, 5 L.Ed.2d 225.

Immedicately after denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court respondents initiated an action in the federal district court on three counts, who of which were dismissed on petitioner's motion for failure to state a cause of action. The petitioner's motion to dismiss the remaining count on the ground that an action for malicious use of process is barred by the provisions of § 9-1-14 was denied by the district court. The petitioner thereupon filed the instant petition for declaratory judgment, and further proceedings ensued in the federal district court resulting in the issuance thereby of a decree enjoining petitioner from prosecuting this petition, which subsequently on appeal to the circuit court was vacated. Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 1 Cir., 303 F.2d 125.

The petitioner urges and respondents appear to concede that before this court is only the issue of whether the trial justice erred in concluding that an action for the malicious use of process is not an injury to the person within the meaning of that phrase as used in § 9-1-14 and, therefore, that the action of respondents in the federal district court is not barred because it was brought more than two years after the accrual of the cause of action set out therein. This issue is stated by the propounding of two questions. One inquires, 'Is a cause of action for malicious prosecution based upon malicious use of process within the meaning of 'actions for injuries to the person' of General Laws of Rhode Island, 1956, Sec. 9-1-14 and barred by said statutory provision if not brought within two years after said cause of action has accrued?' The second inquires, 'Is the cause of action set out in Count II of the Complaint in 'William W. Miner, et al v. Commerce Oil Refining Corporation, C.A. No. 2721,' (the 1960 case) barred by General Laws of Rhode Island, 1956, Sec. 9-1-14?'

The issue presented to us for decision clearly points up the ambiguity of the statutory language 'injuries to the person.' It leaves obscure the legislative intent as to what injuries are within that phrase. In short, did the legislature contemplate applying the two-year limitation to actions arising from bodily or physical injuries only or to apply it broadly to actions brought to recover damages arising out of the restriction, invasion, or impairment of rights and privileges which are personal to the suitor?

The statute under immediate consideration, § 9-1-14, reads: 'Actions for words spoken shall be commenced and sued within one (1) year next after the words spoken, and not after. Actions for injuries to the person shall be commenced and sued within two (2) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not after.' Similar statutory limitations on the institution of actions are prescribed in § 9-1-15, which provides that 'Actions of trespass, except for injuries to the person, shall be commenced and sued within four (4) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not after,' and in § 9-1-16, which, in pertinent part, reads: '* * * all actions of the case except for words spoken and for injuries to the person * * * shall be commenced and sued within six (6) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not after.'

It is clear from the statutory provision above quoted that the legislature intended that all actions containing a common element, that is, injury to the person, were to be subjected to a two-year period of limitation and this whether the action was brought in trespass or case. Prior to 1902 the legislature had based the period of limitation on the form of the action brought and not on the nature of the injury that resulted from the tortious conduct. Actions of trespass, that is, for injury resulting from direct or intentional tortious acts, were barred if not commenced within four years, while actions of the case for indirect or unintentional injury were barred if not commenced within a period of six years. G.L.1896, chap. 234, secs. 2 and 3. The legislature for the first time in 1902 undertook to limit the commencement of actions on the basis of the character of the injury that resulted rather than on the form of action. The pertinent legislation provided that actions for injuries to the person were barred unless brought within two years from the time of the accrual thereof whether in trespass or case. P.L.1902, chap. 976, secs. 1 and 2. In 1905, in enacting the Court and Practice Act, the legislature, continuing the two-year period of limitation upon all actions for injuries to the person without regard to whether the form of the action was in trespass or of the case, C.P.A.1905, sec. 248, put the statute in the form in which it appears now. G.L.1956, § 9-1-14 et seq.

The term 'injuries to the person' is not defined in the statute, nor has this court ever attempted to enumerate specifically what injuries other than physical might be held to be within the meaning of that term. It is true that in Griffin v. Woodhead, 30 R.I. 204, 74 A. 417, this court said that injuries other than physical could be included within the meaning of such language, referring to two prior decisions in so holding. An examination of the prior cases discloses, however, that the statutes construed therein differed so substantially from the instant statute that they have little value as precedent here. An...