Commerce W. Ins. Co. v. Kane
| Decision Date | 23 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. C18-0662JLR |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
| Parties | COMMERCE WEST INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. MITCHELL KANE, et al., Defendants. |
Before the court is Plaintiff Commerce West Insurance Company's ("Commerce West") motion for summary judgment. (MSJ (Dkt. # 10).) Defendants Mitchell Kane, Kimberly Kane, and Thomas Kane1 (collectively, "the Kanes") oppose Commerce West's motion. 2 The court has reviewed the motion, all submissions filed in support of and opposition to the motion, the relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised,3 the court GRANTS Commerce West's motion for summary judgment for the reasons set forth herein.
In June 2010, Mitchell purchased a 2005 Yamaha moped. 4 In 2011, Mitchell purchased a 2005 Subaru Impreza. (Id. at 13:20-25.)
On or about October 23, 2013, Commerce West entered into an insurance contract with Kimberly and Thomas, who are Mitchell's parents. (See Roslaniec Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A.) Commerce West's Insurance Policy No. ACPA-001336700 ("the Policy") with
// Kimberly and Thomas is for automobile insurance.5 ( ).)
The Policy identifies Kimberly and Thomas as the "Named Insured(s)" and lists the following vehicles: (1) a 2009 Chevrolet Tahoe, (2) a 2006 BMW 750I, (3) a 2001 Volkswagen GTI GLS, and (4) a 2002 Subaru Impreza WRX. (Roslaniec Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A at 1.) The Policy does not list any motorcycle, moped, or motor-driven cycle. (See id.) Mitchell's siblings, Tyler and Steven, are also named on the Policy, but Mitchell is not. (See id. at 3.) Thomas specifically required Mitchell to obtain his own automobile insurance after Mitchell graduated from college, and Thomas removed Mitchell from the Policy. (Thomas Dep. at 14:18-21, 16:22-17:8.) Indeed, Thomas decided to take Mitchell off the Policy due to the expense and Thomas's belief that Mitchell needed to get his own insurance. (Id. at 34:3-16.)
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// In the spring of 2012, Mitchell obtained his own automobile insurance from State Farm for his 2005 Subaru Impreza. (Mitchell Dep. at 14:1-22.) He maintained his automobile insurance with State Farm through 2016. (Id. at 14:23-15:2.) However, he did not obtain insurance for his moped because he did not believe that he was required to do so. (Id. at 17:8-18:7.)6
On or about July 9 or 10, 2014, a drunk driver ran a stop sign and struck Mitchell while he was riding his moped ("the Accident"). (Roslaniec Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. B at 7.) Defendants assert that Mitchell incurred over $300,000.00 in medical bills as a result of the Accident. (Resp. at 2.) The drunk driver had only $25,000.00 in insurance coverage. (See Nichols Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B.)
//
// Following the Accident, Mitchell submitted claims to Commerce West for underinsured motorist ("UIM") and for personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits under the Policy. (Roslaniec Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. C.) On May 7, 2018, Commerce West filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment that the Policy does not provide coverage in the form of UIM or PIP benefits for the damages and injuries incurred by Mitchell from the Accident. Commerce West now moves for summary judgment on those same issues.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Galen v. Cty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that he or she is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets his or her burden, the nonmoving party "must make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the existence of the essential elements of his case." Galen, 477 F.3d at 658.
The court is "required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving] party." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). The court may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations in analyzing a motion for summary judgment because these are "jury functions, not those of a judge." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. Nevertheless, the nonmoving party Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Klickitat Cty. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 1020, 1025 (Wash. 1994). "Whether an insurance policy contains an ambiguity is properly a question of law to be resolved by the court." Baehmer v. Viking Ins. Co. of Wis., 827 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). If policy language is clear and unambiguous, the court must enforce it as written. Quadrant Corp. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 110 P.3d 733, 737 (Wash. 2005). If an insurance policy is unambiguous, summary judgment is proper even if the parties dispute the legal effect of a certain provision. See State v. Brown, 965 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
The Policy's PIP coverage contains the following provision:
A. Subject to the Limits of Liability, if you pay the premium for Personal Injury Protection Coverage, we will pay personal injury protection benefits to or for an "insured" who sustains "bodily injury". The "bodily injury" must be caused by an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a "motor vehicle" as a "motor vehicle".
// (Roslaniec Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A at 7.) In the definitions section for the Policy's PIP coverage, the following definition is added:
(Id. at 8.)
In his deposition, Mitchell admits that his moped is "motor driven" and requires "100 percent gasoline." (Mitchell Dep. at 18:8-16.) Likewise, Thomas also admits that Mitchell's moped "was motorized." (Thomas Dep. at 25:18-24.) In their amended response to Commerce West's motion, the Kanes repeatedly describe the 2005 Yamaha as a "moped." (Am. Resp. at 2 Regardless of whether the 2005 Yamaha is properly described as a "[m]oped" or a "[m]otor-driven cycle," the PIP definition of "motor vehicle" expressly and unambiguously excludes such vehicles. Thus, under the unambiguous terms of the Policy, there is no PIP coverage for the injuries that Mitchell sustained from the Accident.7 Consequently, Commerce West is entitled to summary judgment on this issue, and the court grants Commerce West's motion with respect to PIP coverage under the Policy.
The Policy's UIM coverage excludes coverage for owned but uninsured vehicles. (Roslaniec Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A at 11.) Specifically, the Policy provides in relevant part:
(Id.) The parties dispute whether Mitchell is an insured under the Policy. (See MSJ at 11-13; Am. Resp. at 8-11.) The court need not decide that issue, however, because even if Mitchell is an insured, his moped was "not insured for Liability Coverage" under the Policy. The moped is not listed as an insured vehicle on the Policy's declaration page. (Id. ¶ 4, Ex. A at 1 ().) Further, Mitchell admits that he purchased his own automobile insurance policy with State Farm in 2012, but did not insure the moped on either his policy or the Policy at issue here. (Mitchell Dep. at 14:9-22; 17:8-17.) Accordingly, the Policy did not provide UIM coverage for the
//
// Accident, which occurred while Mitchell was "operating" the uninsured moped.8 (See Roslaniec Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A at 11.)
The Kanes argue that this exclusion does not apply because "a moped is not a motor vehicle by policy definition." (Am. Resp. at 8.) Although the Kanes do not further explain their argument, they apparently rely upon the definition of "motor vehicle" contained in and exclusive to the Policy's PIP coverage. (See Roslaniec Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A at 8.) As noted above, the PIP section of the Policy excludes a moped from the definition of "motor vehicle." (See id.) That definition, however, is contained within a section of the Policy specifically entitled: "DEFINTIONS—PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION." (See id.) Further, the PIP definitions section specifically states: "The...
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