Commercial Credit Co. v. Hazel

• Decision Date: 05 April 1932
• Docket Number: No. 41164.,41164.
• Citation: Commercial Credit Co. v. Hazel, 214 Iowa 213, 242 N.W. 47 (Iowa 1932)
• Parties: COMMERCIAL CREDIT CO. v. HAZEL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

214 Iowa 213

242 N.W. 47

COMMERCIAL CREDIT CO.

v.HAZEL.

No. 41164.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 5, 1932.

Appeal from District Court, Plymouth County; Homer A. Fuller, Judge.

Action in replevin of an automobile.The facts are stated in the opinion.From a verdict in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.Nelson Miller, of Le Mars, and Stinchfield, Mackall, Crounse, McNally & Moore, of Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant.

E. P. Murray, of Le Mars, for appellee.

STEVENS, J.

The appellant is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware with offices in Minneapolis, where it is engaged in the business of purchasing conditional sales contract notes and other forms of investments.One of its patrons in 1929 was the Harrington Motor Company, a distributor of Hupmobile automobiles in Minneapolis.On or about November 7, 1929, L. W. Arnoldy, an employee of the motor company, signed a blank conditional sales contract with his employer for the purchase of a Hupmobile.At the same time he signed a note for the purchase price.These instruments were sold, transferred, and assigned to appellant, and the purchase price paid by it to the motor company.The automobile described in the conditional sales contract was not delivered to Arnoldy, but was retained in the salesroom of the motor company and subsequently sold and delivered to appellee, a resident of Le Mars, Iowa.Later the Harrington Motor Company was adjudicated a bankrupt.Thereafter this action was commenced by appellant to replevin the automobile.The petition is in the usual form in such cases, and there is attached thereto a copy of the conditional sales contract signed by Arnoldy, together with the written assignment thereof to appellant.The defendant answered setting up the purchase of the automobile on the 18th day of December, 1929, the payment of the purchase price in cash and by the exchange of an old Hupmobile.

It is alleged that at the time of this transaction appellee had no notice or knowledge whatever of the conditional sales contract above referred to, of the assignment thereof to or of the claims now made by appellant.Appellant, by way of reply, also pleaded that it purchased the conditional sales contract and took the assignment thereof without notice or knowledge of any kind; that the sale and contract was not bona fide and in good faith.The conditional sales contract and the assignment to appellant were duly filed in the office of the city clerk of Minneapolis as required by the laws of Minnesota.This was done prior to the purchase of the car by appellee.

[1][2] I. The first question presented for decision is the overruling by the court of a motion interposed by appellant to transfer certain issues tendered by a reply to equity for trial.The relief sought in the pleading is a lien upon the car and is based upon the terms, provisions, and conditions of the written assignment of the conditional sales contract and also of such contract.Appellant sought and had an adequate remedy at law.Nothing could have been gained by transferring the cause to equity except the avoidance of a jury trial.This is urged as one of the reasons why the motion should have been sustained.Appellant's contention at this point is without merit.The motion was properly overruled.

[3] II.During the progress of the trial, appellant moved for a directed verdict based upon the statute and laws of Minnesota, which were introduced in evidence.The motion was overruled and not renewed at the conclusion of all the testimony.The error, if any, in the ruling was therefore waived.Stoner-McCray v. Manhattan Co., 176 Iowa, 630, 156 N. W. 683;Anthony v. O'Brien, 188 Iowa, 802, 175 N. W. 750.

[4][5] III.Principal reliance is placed by appellant upon the statutes and laws of Minnesota.The state of the record before us makes unnecessary the consideration of the laws of our sister state.If not conceded by appellant, it is indubitably established by the proof that the alleged conditional sales contract signed by Arnoldy was a sham.It was a pretended sale only.Arnoldy testified that he had no intention of purchasing the car, and that, as the contract was blank when signed by him, he was not aware that the automobile in controversy was the one described therein.Nothing was paid by him, and neither payment of the stipulated purchase price nor delivery of the automobile was contemplated by either party to the instrument.Exceptions were taken by appellant to paragraph 5 of the court's charge to the jury, but none were taken to the remaining instructions, and they therefore, right or wrong, became the law of the case.Troxel v. Vinton, 77 Iowa, 90, 41 N. W. 580;Beck v. German Klinik, 78 Iowa, 696, 43 N. W. 617, 7 L. R. A. 566;Greenlee Bros. v. Eggert, 137 Iowa, 120, 113 N. W. 849;Krauskopf v. Krauskopf, 82 Iowa, 535, 48 N. W. 932.

After stating the issues, the court instructed the jury that, to entitle the plaintiff to recover, five separate and distinct propositions of fact clearly and...