Commercial Credit Co. v. Gaiser
| Decision Date | 30 January 1932 |
| Docket Number | 30248. |
| Parties | COMMERCIAL CREDIT CO. v. GAISER. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Notwithstanding statute making conditional sale void as to others than buyer if not recorded within ten days, belated recording protects rights of holder as against one acquiring interest after recordation (Rev. Code Ariz. 1928, §§ 2890, 2891).
Recording contract for conditional sale of automobile protected contract holder's rights against persons whose interest in title originated after belated recordation (Rev. Code Ariz. 1928, §§ 2890, 2891).
1. Under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act of Arizona (Revised Code Arizona,§§ 2890, 2891), which provides that a conditional sales contract is void as to all persons except the buyer unless such contract is filed for record within ten days after the making of the conditional sale, it is held that this provision does not render such contract nugatory for all time to come; when it has been recorded, it will protect the rights of its holder as against one whose interest in the chattel covered by the contract is acquired after such belated recordation.
2. In Arizona, the plaintiff's assignor sold an automobile under a conditional sales contract. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act, in force in that state, gave ten days in which the vendor could file his contract of record to protect his interest. The statute also declared that the contract would be void against all persons except the buyer unless recorded within that time. The instrument was recorded in fourteen days, four days late. Some time later the automobile was disposed of outside the state and eventually came into the possession of defendant in Wichita. In an action by the assignee of the conditional sales contract for possession of the automobile, it is held that, when the contract was in fact recorded, it protected the rights of its holder against one whose interest and those of his predecessors in title originated after such recordation, and plaintiff was entitled to judgment.
Appeal from District Court, Sedgwick County, Division No. 3; Grover Pierpont, Judge.
Replevin action by the Commercial Credit Company against Paul Gaiser. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded, with instructions.
W. D Jochems, J. Wirth Sargent, and C. Edward Murray, all of Wichita, for appellant.
B. F Alford, R. L. Nesmith, and Wm. Histed, all of Wichita, for appellee.
This was an action in replevin to recover possession of an automobile to which plaintiff laid claim by virtue of a conditional sales contract governed by the laws of Arizona.
The cause was tried on pleadings and agreed statement of facts supplemented by the depositions of two Arizona lawyers who had served as revisors of the Arizona statutes under legislative authority.
The facts were these:
On September 12, 1929, One Wm. A. Rivers, a dealer in automobiles in Maricopa county, Ariz., sold to his wife, Mrs. Bertha Rivers, a De Soto car. The consideration was $447.68 in cash, and balance of purchase price to be paid in 18 monthly installments of $54.32 each. A conditional sales contract dated September 12, 1929, was executed. It contained the usual recitals of such instruments--that title should not pass until all payments were made, that the chattel should not be removed from Arizona "(or from the county in which this contract may be filed)" without the written consent of the seller, and that the seller or his agent might take possession of the car for any default of the purchaser, and that the seller's rights under this contract were likewise vested in his assignee.
On the same day, September 12, 1929, this conditional sales contract was assigned to the plaintiff herein, and it was filed for record in Maricopa county, on September 26, 1929, fourteen days after its execution.
The payments were made on the contract. Mrs. Rivers was informed that it had been paid in full, and delivered the car to her husband, who disposed of it outside the state of Arizona.
In some way not shown, the car came into the hands of one Freeman, from whom this defendant acquired it on March 14, 1930, by an exchange of cars and payment of $575 to boot.
In this action, after a jury was impaneled, it developed that the issue was one of law merely; the jury was discharged; and judgment was entered in favor of defendant. The correctness of that decision depends upon the proper interpretation of the Arizona statute, pertinent parts of which read:
This statute as originally enacted in 1919 (Sess. Laws Ariz. c. 40) so far as here pertinent in title and text reads:
Under authority of the Arizona Legislature (1925 Sess. Laws Ariz. c. 35), the statutes of that state were codified. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act was rewritten; sections 4 and 5 being merged. The words which we have italicized in the present statute as quoted first above do not appear in the text of sections 4 and 5 of the act of 1919.
The legal question of present concern is whether the recording of the conditional sales contract is of any validity as against this defendant, since it was not recorded until fourteen days after the conditional sale was made and the contract executed. The statutory time given in which to record the instrument, and within which time the conditional vendor is or may be protected without recording, is ten days. This contract was recorded long before Rivers disposed of the automobile covered by its terms, and about six months before defendant acquired any interest in it. But appellee insists on the sweeping potency of that provision of the statute which declares that such a sales contract "is void as to all persons except the buyer" unless such contract or a copy is so filed (in the office of the proper county recorder) within ten days after the making of the conditional sale.
No Arizona decisions on this precise point are cited by counsel, and we have found none by our own research. All we can glean from a perusal of the Arizona cases is that the Supreme Court of that state invariable speaks of the statute as the "Uniform Conditional Sales Act." McArthur Bros. Mer. Co. v. Hagihara, 22 Ariz. 100, 107, 194 P. 336, 13 A.L.R. 1038; 0. S. Stapley Co. v. Rogers, 25 Ariz. 308, 216 P. 1072; Bradshaw v. Kleiber Motor Truck Co., 29 Ariz. 293, 241 P. 305. The depositions of two Arizona lawyers who served as Codifying Commissioners do not greatly assist. Commissioner Struckmeyer deposed:
But that purpose is obvious in the text of the act without the deposition of the learned commissioner. What we need to determine is whether the failure to record within ten days renders the instrument altogether nugatory so that even after it is recorded it cannot be the basis of a legal right against persons who afterwards acquire their interest in the chattel which is the subject-matter of the conditional sale. In other words, does this instrument, which the holder failed to have recorded within ten days, but which was recorded in fourteen days, have any legal potency whatsoever? Does it impart notice to parties who acquire an interest in the property covered by the instrument after the instrument is recorded?
Having no light on this question from the Arizona decisions which would govern this contract under the rule of lex loci contractu, we...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Talkington
...purchasers and creditors are concerned, until the contract is place on record.' 135 P. at 575. See also: Commercial Credit Co. v. Gaiser, 134 Kan. 552, 7 P.2d 527 (1932); Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U.S. 268, 36 S.Ct. 50, 60 L.Ed. 275 (1915); In re Bell Motor Co. (8th Cir.) 45 F.2d......
-
Castaneda v. National Cash Register Company
... ... creditors ... The ... Supreme Court of Kansas in Commercial Credit Co. v ... Gaiser, 134 Kan. 552, 7 P.2d 527, in construing our ... section 2890, decided ... ...
- Dwelle v. Home Realty & Investment Co.