Commercial Credit Corp. v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank
| Decision Date | 21 November 1942 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 29710, 29764.,s. 29710, 29764. |
| Citation | 23 S.E.2d 198 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION. v. CITIZENS & SOUTHERN NAT. BANK. CITIZENS & SOUTHERN NAT. BANK. v. COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION. |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. "A privy in estate is a successor to the same estate, not to a different estate in the same property."
2. Where one sells goods on a contract of conditional sale to a person whom he knows is a dealer in articles of the character of the subject of the sale, or where the seller knows the property is to be resold by the buyer, he can not assert his title as against an innocent party who acquires title from the buyer in the regular course of trade.
o. Before this rule can apply the one assuming to occupy the relationship of buyer (vendee) of the owner must, in truth and in fact, be the buyer from the owner. "Paper transfers of title are of no consequence, where corresponding facts do not exist, nor will apparent momentary ownership, for the purpose of an instantaneous resale, suffice." Southern Finance Co. v. Mercantile Discount Corp., 80 Ind.App. 436, 141 N.E. 250, 251.
4. In the application of the rule stated in headnote 2 mere form will not be allowed to overshadow substance, and hence a constructive sale or resale will be disregarded if, in fact, only the relation of debtor and creditor existed, and the paper transfers of title were for the purpose only of securing debt.
Error from City Court of Springfield; Paul D. Shearouse, Judge.
Suit by Citizens & Southern National Bank against one Grumbine, doing business as Guyton Motor Company, to foreclose a bill of sale to an automobile which had been subsequently sold to a bona fide purchaser under a conditional sales contract. The Commercial Credit Corporation, as assignee of the conditional sales contract, filed a claim. To review the judgment on trial of the claim, Commercial Credit Corporation, by main bill of exceptions, brings error and the bank brings a cross-bill.
Affirmed.
Grumbine, a merchant doing business as the Guyton Motor Company, in order to secure a debt executed to the Citizens & Southern Bank a bill of sale to the automobile in question. The paper was duly recorded. The bank knew Guyton was a dealer in automobiles and that the automobile would be sold in the regular course of trade. Thereafter Archer, a bona fide purchaser, bought the automobile from Grumbine in due course of trade, paid part of the purchase price down and gave a conditional bill of sale to secure the balance. Grumbine transferred this conditional-sale contract to the Commercial Credit Corporation, on the same date, with notice that the car had been thus bought from Grumbine in due course of trade. The bank foreclosed its paper and levied on the automobile, which was in the possession of Archer. Archer filed a claim, on the trial of which the jury found against him. He moved for a new trial which was overruled "and the case went no further." As to that claim the ruling became the law of the case, irrespective of what the law of the State might be. The Commercial Credit Corporation then filed a claim to the automobile; the bank filed a plea of res judicata, which the judge overruled; the case went to trial and the jury found in favor of the bank. The Commercial Credit Corporation excepted by main bill to the overruling of its motion for new trial and the bank excepted by cross-bill to the overruling of the plea of res judicata.
Vance Dasher, of Springfield, and Kennedy, McWhorter & Jenkins, of Savannah, for plaintiff in error.
Hinton Booth, of Statesboro, and' Lee, Congdon & Fulcher, of Augusta, for defendant in error.
1. We will first take up the exception to the overruling of the plea of res judicata raised by the cross-bill. Code, § 110-501 provides: "A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue, or which under the rules of law might havebeen put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered, until such judgment shall be reversed or set aside." The parties to the present claim case are unquestionably not the same parties who were before the court in the Archer claim case, and if the Commercial Credit Corporation was not a privy with Archer, within the meaning of the Code section quoted, the court did not err in overruling the plea. "Privity in estate denotes * * * mutual or successive relation to the same right of property; identity of title to an estate." 50 C. J. 407, § 3. ." Blake-wood v. Yellow Cab Company, 61 Ga.App. 149, 6 S.E.2d 126. "A privy in estate is a successor to the same estate, not to a different estate in the same property." Pool v. Morris, 29 Ga. 374, 382, 74 Am.Dec. 68. Thus, in the instant case, while there was a transmission of the title of Grumbine to the plaintiff in error, there was no transmission to it by Archer of his equitable title, and, in so far as the status of the Commercial Credit Corporation at the time of the former suit is concerned, it was in fact merely that of a creditor with security for debt, and so far as its interest in the claim of Archer was concerned, its legal status was that of an outsider, with no opportunity to offer evidence, to cross-examine the witnesses, or to appeal if dissatisfied with the judgment. Blackwell v. Yellow Cab Co, supra. The merchant or seller, Grumbine, reserved the legal title to the automobile and transferred this title to the plaintiff in error. Archer, the innocent purchaser of the automobile, had an equitable title only, and even after Grumbine transferred his legal title Archer still had his equitable title while the Commercial Credit Corporation had only the legal title. Hence, Archer and the Commercial Credit Corporation, while having different estates in the same property, the credit company was not the successor to the estate which...
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