Commercial Credit Corp. v. Morris
| Decision Date | 25 November 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 8827,8827 |
| Citation | 107 So.2d 563 |
| Parties | COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION, Individually and for the use and benefit of Calvert Fire Insurance Company, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Clifford MORRIS et al., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Dhu & Lea S. Thompson, Monroe, for appellant.
Theus, Grisham, Davis & Leigh, Monroe, for appellee.
This is an action in tort. The damages sought to be recovered were sustained in a motor vehicle collision occurring near 9:00 o'clock A.M. January 4, 1957, at the intersection of Louisville Avenue and Riverside Drive in the City of Monroe. The vehicles involved were a Ford automobile, owned by plaintiff and driven by its agent and employee, Bernard Marsal, and a Chevrolet truck owned by Foremost Dairies, Inc., operated at the time by its agent and employee, Clifford Morris. Made defendants were Morris and his employer, as was its public liability insurer. This suit is for the collection of $50 for plaintiff and $474.91 on behalf of its insurer and assignee, Calvert Fire Insurance Company, which had paid the property damages to the Ford automobile under the provisions of an insurance policy, less $50 deductible. From a judgment rejecting its demands, plaintiff appealed.
Louisville Avenue is a portion of U.S. Highway 80 as it traverses the City of Monroe. It is a four-lane concrete paved highway, two lanes for traffic in each direction. Its course is generally east and west and intersects Riverside Drive at right angles at the foot of a bridge spanning the Ouachita River. Traffic at this intersection is controlled by an automatic electric signal light suspended overhead. At the time of the accident the pavement was wet from an all-night rain, which was then continuing in a mist or drizzle.
Marsal's version of the accident is that he was proceeding in a southerly direction on Riverside Drive at a speed of approximately 20 miles per hour when, on approaching the intersection with Louisville Avenue, he observed he had a favorable light. Whereupon, after first looking ineffectively to his left or towards the east on Louisville Avenue, as his view was obstructed by the presence of cars on a used car lot on the corner, and then, after looking to his right, where he observed two cars headed east on Louisville but stopped, awaiting a favorable signal, he continued forward, and, when within about ten feet of the intersection he saw defendant's truck entering the intersection from the east on Louisville Avenue at a speed of 40 to 50 miles per hour; that he instantly applied his brakes but, nevertheless, due to the wet and slippery surface of the street, he skidded into the truck.
Morris' version of the accident is that he drove north on Walnut Street and then turned left on Louisville Avenue and proceeded in a westerly direction in the extreme right-hand side or in the northernmost lane of Louisville Avenue at a speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour; that when a half block from the intersection with Riverside Drive, he observed a favorable traffic light or signal which, however, he says, changed to 'caution' when he reached a point about 20 feet from the intersection, but that, nevertheless, he continued into the intersection without having seen plaintiff's car until he heard the brakes of his car squeal only momentarily before the impact.
The accident occurred in the northwest quadrant of the intersection. As the Ford on Riverside Drive entered the intersection, the Chevrolet truck crossed its path. The result was that the front of the Ford struck the rear right-hand side of the truck and spun it around, causing it to come to rest upon the end of the bridge facing in an easterly direction.
Negligence charged to the defendant's driver consists of his entrance into the intersection on a 'red' light and a failure to maintain a proper lookout or to accord plaintiff's driver his superior right to complete the negotiation of the intersection. Identical acts of negligence are charged by defendants to plaintiff's driver, with the additional specification that plaintiff's driver was speeding. Thus, it appears from these charges and the aforesaid re sume of the testimony of the drivers of the vehicles, who were the only known eye-witnesses to the accident, that the issues presented for resolution are primarily factual. Too, it will be noted that the testimony of these witnesses is conflicting and irreconcilable in many respects, particularly as pertains to the status of the signal light at the time of their entry into the intersection, as to the presence of eastbound cars on Louisville Avenue, stopped, awaiting a favorable light, and as to the speed of defendant's vehicle.
That Morris was negligent is amply established by the record. By his own admission, after entering the intersection on a 'caution' light, he totally disregarded the warning intended to be conveyed by such signal in that he utterly failed to make any observation of traffic approaching on the intersecting street. Whether the mere entry into an intersection on a 'caution' signal, when observed by a motorist at a distance of 20 feet from the intersection, constitutes negligence is unnecessary to determine in the instant case, but it could only be concluded that a motorist thus cautioned, but who entirely disregards the obvious warning intended to be conveyed by his complete failure to make any observation of the traffic on the intersecting street is clearly negligent.
The primary question, therefore, is whether plaintiff's driver was guilty of negligence proximately causing or contributing to the accident. By his own admission he failed to make proper and adequate observation of the traffic approaching from his left on Louisville Avenue and in the northernmost lane of a muchly traveled four-lane thoroughfare. The excuse for his failure was his view was obstructed by cars on a used car lot on the corner of the intersection.
The evidence as to the status of the signal light at the time the vehicles entered the intersection is in conflict, but, without resolving the issue and considering the matter from a standpoint most favorable to plaintiff...
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