Commercial Credit Corp. v. Carlson

Decision Date15 March 1932
Citation159 A. 352,114 Conn. 514
PartiesCOMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION v. CARLSON et al.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Edwin C. Dickenson Judge.

Replevin action by the Commercial Credit Corporation against Herbert A. Carlson and another to recover possession of an automobile alleged to belong to the plaintiff, brought to the superior court and tried to the court. Judgment for the defendant Carlson, and appeal by the plaintiff.

No error.

Charles A. Harrison and Milton G. Harrison, both of New Haven, for appellant.

Stephen F. Dunn, of New Haven, for appellees.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY, JJ.

BANKS J.

The Packard Sales & Service, incorporated, sold a Packard automobile to the defendant McGrath under a conditional sales contract providing that the title to the car should remain in the seller until the purchase price was fully paid. McGrath became in default in the payment of the purchase price, and the defendant Carlson, a deputy sheriff, attached the car as the property of McGrath in an action brought against him by one Montis. The plaintiff, which succeeded to the rights of the Packard Company under the contract, replevied the car from Carlson. Our statutes provide that conditional sale contracts shall be in writing, acknowledged before some competent authority, and filed in the town clerk's office in the town where the vendee resides, and that conditional sales not made in conformity with those provisions shall be held to be absolute sales except as between the vendor and vendee and their personal representatives. General Statutes. § § 4697, 4699.

The contract was executed by the vendor by W. C. Hayes, as treasurer, and the vendee, but the only acknowledgment was that of W. C. Hayes. The acknowledgment reads as follows: " On Aug. 9, 1930, personally appeared before me, W. C. Hayes, to me known to be the individual described in and who executed the conditional sale contract on the reverse side hereof, and severally acknowledged that be signed and sealed the same as his/their free and voluntary act and deed, for the uses and purposes therein mentioned." The court held that this did not meet the requirements of the statute for two reasons: First, that there was no acknowledgment by the vendee, McGrath, and, second, that the acknowledgment of Hayes, individually, was not an acknowledgment of the vendor corporation.

The purpose of our statute requiring conditional sale contracts to be in writing, acknowledged, and recorded is to protect those who, from the fact of possession and apparent ownership by the vendee, may be led to believe him to be the actual owner of property held by him under such contract, and the recording of the instrument is constructive notice to all the world of its contents, and therefore of the facts as to the true ownership of the property in the possession of the conditional vendee. National Cash Register Co. v Lesko, 77 Conn. 276, 280, 58 A. 967; Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Black, 102 Conn. 390, 394, 128 A. 514. The statute does not prescribe the particular form of the instrument by which conditional sales must be made. They may be made by instruments signed by the vendor alone, by those signed by both vendor and vendee, or by those signed by the vendee alone. National Cash Register Co. v. Lesko, supra, page 278 of 77 Conn., 58 A. 967. In the Lesko Case we held that such and instrument in the form of an order signed by the conditional vendee alone, acknowledged by him and recorded, complied with all the requirements of the statute. Here the instrument takes the form of an agreement executed by both parties, but acknowledged by one only. It is the contention of the defendant that the acknowledgment required by the statute is the acknowledgment of the party or parties who executed the instrument, and that, since this instrument was executed by both the vendor and vendee, the acknowledgment of both is required. An acknowledgment is the formal declaration, before an authorized official, by the person who executed an instrument, that it is his free act and deed. It serves to...

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25 cases
  • Agin v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC (In re Shubert)
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Massachusetts
    • August 19, 2015
    ...Jemison v. Howell, 230 Ala. 423, 161 So. 806, 99 A.L.R. 1511 ; Jackson v. Hudspeth, 208 Ark. 55, 184 S.W.2d 906 ; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Carlson, 114 Conn. 514, 159 A. 352 ; Riddle v. Keller, 16 Dickinson 513, 61 N.J. Eq. 513, 48 A. 818 ; Linderman v. Hastings Card & Paper Co., 38 A.D. ......
  • Bank of America v. Nino
    • United States
    • Connecticut Superior Court
    • December 31, 2015
    ... ... Uniform Commercial Code ... [See] General Statutes § ... 42a-1-101 et seq. Under ... Commercial ... Credit Corp. v. Carlson , 114 Conn. 514, 517, 159 A. 352 ... (1932). The ... ...
  • Twichell v. Guite
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • April 27, 1999
    ...before an authorized official, by the person who executed an instrument, that it is his free act and deed." Commercial Credit Corp. v. Carlson, 114 Conn. 514, 517, 159 A. 352 (1932). Moreover, the execution of the deed took place before witnesses. The trial court was not persuaded that this......
  • McOuatt v. McOuatt
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • November 12, 1946
    ...76;Jemison v. Howell, 230 Ala. 423, 161 So. 806, 99 A.L.R. 1511;Jackson v. Hudspeth, 208 Ark. 55, 184 S.W.2d 906;Commercial Credit Corp. v. Carlson, 114 Conn. 514, 159 A. 352;Riddle v. Keller, 16 Dick. 513,61 N.J.Eq. 513, 48 A. 818;Linderman v. Hastings Card & Paper Co., 38 App.Div. 488, 56......
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