Commercial Credit Corp. v. Miron

• Decision Date: 18 December 1928
• Citation: 143 A. 846,108 Conn. 524
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION v. MIRON.

143 A. 846

108 Conn. 524

COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION v. MIRON.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

December 18, 1928

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Robert L Munger, Judge.

Action of replevin by the Commercial Credit Corporation against John Miron, to recover possession of an automobile, brought to the court of common pleas for New Haven county and tried to a jury before Munger, J. The defendant filed a counterclaim and verdict and judgment on both the complaint and the counterclaim were for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed. Error, and new trial ordered.

Arthur B. Weiss and Bernard P. Saltman, both of Bridgeport, for appellant.

Franklin Coeller, of New Haven, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.

HAINES, J.

It appears from the record to be undisputed that in March, 1926, the New Haven Flint Company sold and delivered this automobile to the defendant for $1,433, of which there was paid upon delivery $583 in cash and an allowance made of $200 in trade, leaving a cash balance due from the defendant of $650, for which sum the defendant gave a note payable in equal monthly installments, the first of which matured one month from the date of the sale. The parties executed a conditional sale contract which provided, among other things, that if the defendant failed to pay any installment when due the seller or his representative might retake possession of the automobile. This conditional sale contract, with the note, was transferred by indorsement to this plaintiff, and the present action was brought by the latter upon the allegation that one of the installment payments had not been met when due. By this action of replevin the car was taken from the possession of the defendant. In his answer the defendant denied that he had failed to pay any installment when due, and by counterclaim he asked for the return of the automobile and damages for its retention. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant and assessed his damages at $800. It seems further to be conceded that this $800 represents the amount fixed by the jury as the value to the defendant of the use of the automobile for the time he had been deprived of it by the taking July 29, 1927, to the date of the verdict, May 23, 1928.

The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict as contrary to the law and the evidence, and specifically claimed that there was no evidence upon which the jury could legally and reasonably have determined the compensation for the loss of use as $800, and that that result was based upon conjecture only. This motion was denied.

That the defendant was entitled to fair and reasonable compensation for loss of use of the automobile is well settled. New England Iron Works v. Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 609, 614, 120 A. 281; Doolittle v. Otis Elevator Co., 98 Conn. 249, 118 A. 818; Hawkins v. Garford Trucking Co., 96 Conn. 337, 114 A. 94; Blakeslee Co. v. Rigo, 94 Conn. 481, 484, 109 A. 173; Cook v. Packard Motor Co., 88 Conn. 590, 92 A. 413, L.R.A. 1915C, 319.

The determination of what is " fair and reasonable compensation" is sometimes a matter of difficulty and dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case. We have heretofore had occasion to deal with the question in various aspects, as will be seen from the foregoing...