Commercial Ins. Co. v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 30 September 1872
• Citation: 16 Am.Rep. 557,64 Ill. 265,1872 WL 8304
• Parties: COMMERCIAL INSURANCE COMPANYv.ISAAC S. ROBINSON.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

64 Ill. 265

1872 WL 8304 (Ill.)

16 Am.Rep. 557

COMMERCIAL INSURANCE COMPANY

v.ISAAC S. ROBINSON.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1872.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Chicago; the Hon. WILLIAM A. PORTER, Judge, presiding.

This was an action on a policy of insurance. The policy contained, among other provisions, the following: “When personal property is damaged, the assured shall forthwith cause it to be put in order, assorting and arranging the various articles according to their kinds, separating the damaged from the undamaged, and shall cause an inventory to be made, and furnished to the company, of the whole, naming the quantity, quality and cost of each article. The amount of sound value and of damage shall then be ascertained by appraisal of each article by competent persons (not interested in the loss as creditors or otherwise, nor related to the assured or sufferers), to be mutually appointed by the assured and the company; their report in writing to be made under oath before any magistrate or other properly commissioned person; one-half of the appraisers' fees to be paid by the assured. The company reserves the right to take the whole or any part of the articles at their appraised value; and until such proofs, declarations and certificates are produced, and examinations and appraisals to be permitted by the claimant, the loss shall not be payable.”

A trial by jury in the circuit court resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

Mr. O. B. SANSUM, and Messrs. DENT & BLACK, for the appellant.

Messrs. E. & A. VANBUREN, for the appellee.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE LAWRENCE delivered the opinion of the Court:

The policy in this case provided that the company should not be liable “for any loss or damage by fire caused by means of an invasion, insurrection, riot, civil commotion or military or usurped power; * * * nor for any loss caused by the explosion of gunpowder, camphene, or any explosive substance, or explosion of any kind.”

The main question is as to the construction to be given to this last clause. It is contended by counsel for the company that it protects the company from liability for any loss by fire where the fire has been produced by an explosion. It is insisted on the other hand, by counsel for appellee, that the clause protects the company only against losses occasioned directly by an explosion, and not against losses from fire where the fire has been caused by an explosion.

Counsel for appellant, in support of their position, cite St. John v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co. 1 Kernan, 516; Haynard v. Liverpool and London Ins. Co. 7 Bosw. 385, and Stanley v. West. Ins. Co. 3 Exch. 71.

In the case in 1 Kernan, the court of appeals was divided. We have read the opinions of the majority and minority of the court, and consider the reasoning of the latter the more satisfactory. Even the majority of the court did not agree upon the grounds for affirming the judgment of the lower court. As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, the judgment was affirmed not merely upon different, but adverse reasons. The case is, therefore, worth little as authority. The case in 7 Bosw. is not correctly stated by counsel for appellant. In that case there were two clauses in the policy. Counsel gave but one. The other was explicit and, in terms, excluded liability for losses by fire arising from an explosion. The English case cited is in point for appellant.

If this were a question as to an alleged rule or principle of the common law, with these authorities cited on the one side, and none upon the other, we might repose securely upon them, and hold them decisive of the case before us. But it is simply a question as to the interpretation of a few words in a written instrument which are susceptible of two different interpretations. We are to determine which is the more reasonable construction, and if our judgment is satisfied on this point, we must accept its conclusions, though differing from those of the courts to which reference has been made.

Let us remark, in the first place, that equivocal expressions in a policy of insurance, whereby it is sought to narrow the range of the obligations these companies profess to assume, are to be interpreted most strongly against the company. Aurora Fire Ins. Co. v. Eddy, 49 Ill. 106. The companies have the preparation of their own policies, the choice of language in which to express their obligations, and they show a studious solicitude to limit their liability. Their policies are prolix with provisions of this character, and the public must accept them or go without insurance. We have no right to censure the companies for this, and do not, but the reading of a policy furnishes a sufficient reason for the rule of interpretation formerly laid down by this court.

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