Commission On Human Rights v. Sullivan, 17594.

Decision Date22 January 2008
Docket NumberNo. 17594.,17594.
Citation939 A.2d 541,285 Conn. 208
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesCOMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES et al. v. Michael SULLIVAN et al.

J. Bartschi, Hartford, for the appellants (defendants).

Cheryl A. Sharp, assistant commission counsel, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Sarah W. Poston, Bridgeport, for the appellee (relator Dennisse Colon).

Amy Eppler-Epstein, Naugatuck, filed a brief for the New Haven Legal Assistance Association et al. as amici curiae.

Joseph D. Rich, Washington, DC, and Nicole Birch filed a brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. as amici curiae.

ROGERS, C.J., and KATZ, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and SCHALLER, Js.

SCHALLER, J.

In this housing discrimination action, the defendants, Michael Sullivan and Robert Sullivan, appeal1 from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs, the commission on human rights and opportunities (commission) and Dennisse Colon, concluding that the defendants unlawfully had discriminated against Colon, a prospective tenant, on the basis of a lawful source of income in violation of General Statutes § 46a-64c. The defendants claim that: (1) this court should overrule its decision in Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Associates, 250 Conn. 763, 739 A.2d 238 (1999) (Sullivan I); (2) the trial court misapplied Sullivan I to conclude that the defendants violated § 46a-64c(a)(1);2 and (3) the trial court improperly prevented the defendants from litigating fully the reasonableness of Colon's attorney's fees. We agree with the defendants' third claim, and, therefore, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court found the following facts. On February 11, 1998, Colon called the defendants' office in response to a newspaper advertisement she had seen for a residential unit renting for $825 per month. She spoke to the defendants' office manager, Jane Swetckie, who confirmed that the unit was still available. Colon told Swetckie that she wanted to rent the unit, and that she would be living in the unit with her two daughters and her grandchild. She also informed Swetckie that her income was approximately $21,000 per year and that she would be receiving a rent subsidy under section 8 of the National Housing Act, as amended in 1974 and codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (section 8). When Swetckie asked Colon how much she would be receiving as rental assistance from section 8 and informed Colon that the amount of the subsidy would be essential to processing her rental application, Colon responded that she did not know, but would find out. After Colon stated, however that she wished to take occupancy at the end of March, or the beginning of April, 1998, Swetckie responded that the landlord would not hold the unit that long, and the conversation ended amicably.

On February 25, 1998, Colon again called the defendants' office to inquire about the rental because she had noticed that the unit was still advertised in the newspaper as available, and she had determined that she could take occupancy earlier. As soon as Colon identified herself, Swetckie informed her that she did not make enough income to qualify to rent the unit, for which the defendants had set a minimum income requirement of $40,000 per year. When Colon reminded Swetckie that she would be receiving a section 8 supplement, Swetckie repeated that Colon did not qualify. At that point, Colon became upset, raised her voice and became argumentative. She eventually accused Swetckie of discriminating against her and ultimately hung up the telephone on Swetckie.

Colon called back shortly afterwards and again asked Swetckie why she did not qualify. When Colon became agitated, Swetckie placed her on hold and transferred the call to Robert Sullivan. While Colon was on hold, Swetckie presented Sullivan3 with a handwritten log that Swetckie had created, according to regular office procedure, during her telephone calls with Colon. When Sullivan picked up the call, he immediately informed Colon that she did not qualify to rent the unit because she earned insufficient income, and because he chose not to participate in the section 8 program, which he claimed was voluntary. Colon became upset and hung up the telephone on Sullivan.

Colon next called the fair housing commission for the city of Bridgeport, and reported to Joseph Wincze the director, that the defendants had denied her the rental because she had informed them that she would be receiving a section 8 subsidy. Wincze told Colon that, because it was her word against that of the defendants, there was insufficient evidence of discrimination. He suggested that Colon call the defendants' office again, under the pretext of offering an apology for her earlier behavior, and elicit "incriminating" information from the defendants while Wincze monitored the call. When Colon called the defendants' office, she apologized to Swetckie, who transferred her to Sullivan. Sullivan again told Colon that she did not qualify for the rental because she had insufficient income and because he chose not to participate in the section 8 program. He also added that Colon had bad credit because she was delinquent on a student loan. Colon again became upset and accused Sullivan of surreptitiously checking her credit without her authorization.4 Sullivan denied this, and Colon hung up the telephone on him.

Colon subsequently filed a complaint with the commission, alleging that the defendants had discriminated against her on the basis of a lawful source of income in violation of § 46a-64c. An investigator for the special enforcement unit of the commission, Kathleen Northup, found reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice had been or was being committed, as alleged in Colon's complaint. In accordance with General Statutes § 46a-83(d)(2), the defendants elected a civil action in lieu of an administrative hearing. Following a bench trial, the court, relying in part on Sullivan I, found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages, but declined to award attorney's fees. Subsequently, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to reargue the issue of attorney's fees, and awarded $59,777 in attorney's fees to Colon, but no fees to the commission. This appeal followed.

Because the defendants' first two claims involve the section 8 program, it is helpful to set forth as background a summary of the structure of that program. "The section 8 program exists `[f]or the purpose of aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing. . . .' 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (1994). Section 8 is a cooperative venture between the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and state and local public housing agencies, which oversee the day-to-day operations of the program.5 While state and local housing agencies contract with landlords who own dwelling units to make assistance payments, HUD enters into annual contribution contracts with the agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1) (1994).

"Although it is the local public housing authorities that actually run the section 8 program, they must do so in accordance with applicable federal regulations. See 24 C.F.R. § 882.101 (1994) (applicability and scope of section 8 regulations). The section 8 program in Connecticut also must comply with state law, including the antidiscrimination provisions of § 46a-64c.

"Section 8 rental assistance is available only to persons who are classified as very low income or as low income within the meaning of 24 C.F.R. §§ 813.102 and 813.105 (1994).6 The program permits otherwise qualified tenants to rent private units7 and to pay personally only a small portion of the total rent, commensurate with their income.8 The local public housing authority contracts separately with the landlord to pay the remainder of the rent directly to the landlord. 24 C.F.R. § 882.105 (1994)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullivan I, supra, 250 Conn. at 769-71, 739 A.2d 238.

I

With this background in mind, we first address the defendants' claim that we should reconsider and overrule this court's decision in Sullivan I. The defendants contend that we should overrule our decision in Sullivan I because: (1) the subsequent passage of General Statutes § 1-2z requires that Sullivan I be overruled because that decision relied on extratextual sources to interpret the statutory provision at issue, even though the words of the statute are plain and unambiguous; and (2) even if the language of § 46a-64c is not plain and unambiguous, the decision ignored extratextual sources that indicate that Sullivan I misconstrued the relation between the prohibition in § 46a-64c against housing discrimination based on a lawful source of income and the statutory exception to that prohibition, which is codified at § 46a-64c(b)(5) and exempts the denial of accommodations solely on the basis of insufficient income. We conclude that Sullivan I was correctly decided.

"The doctrine of stare decisis counsels that a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic require it. . . . Stare decisis is justified because it allows for predictability in the ordering of conduct, it promotes the necessary perception that the law is relatively unchanging, it saves resources and it promotes judicial efficiency. . . . It is the most important application of a theory of decisionmaking consistency in our legal culture and it is an obvious manifestation of the notion that decisionmaking consistency itself has normative value. . . .

"In evaluating the force of stare decisis, our case law dictates that we should be especially wary of overturning a decision that involves the construction of a statute...

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