Commissioner of Health Services v. Youth Challenge of Greater Hartford, Inc.

• Citation: 219 Conn. 657,594 A.2d 958
• Decision Date: 23 July 1991
• Docket Number: No. 14221,14221
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH SERVICES v. YOUTH CHALLENGE OF GREATER HARTFORD, INC., et al.

Page 958

594 A.2d 958

219 Conn. 657

COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH SERVICES v. YOUTH CHALLENGE OF GREATER HARTFORD, INC., et al.

No. 14221.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 22, 1991.

Decided July 23, 1991.

James W. Sherman, East Hartford, for appellant (named defendant).

Maite Barainca, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Clarine Nardi Riddle, then Atty. Gen., and Richard J. Lynch, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the appellee (plaintiff).

Before SHEA, GLASS, COVELLO, BORDEN and FRANCIS X. HENNESSY, JJ. BORDEN, Justice.

The issues raised in this appeal from a judgment of contempt and a modification of an injunction are whether: (1) the trial court's finding that the named defendant, Youth Challenge of Greater Hartford, Inc., ¹ was operating a drug and alcohol treatment facility without a license was clearly erroneous; and (2) the trial court's remedial enforcement order improperly expanded the trial court's earlier injunction. ² We affirm.

In August, 1986, the plaintiff, the commissioner of health services, filed a petition for enforcement, seeking to enjoin the defendants from operating two unlicensed substance abuse treatment facilities. The trial court, M. Hennessey, J., granted the plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction, and this court affirmed the judgment on appeal. Commissioner v. Youth Challenge of Greater Hartford, Inc., 206 Conn. 316, 318-19, 537 A.2d 480 (1988) (Youth Challenge I ).

Thereafter, in November, 1988, the plaintiff moved that the defendants be held in contempt, alleging that they were violating the permanent injunction by continuing to operate two unlicensed substance abuse treatment facilities. ³ The trial court, Satter, J., held the named defendant in contempt ⁴ and modified the 1986 injunction. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred that appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.

The facts leading to this appeal are as follows. The defendant operates a licensed substance abuse treatment facility at 15-17 May Street, Hartford. In August, 1986, the plaintiff filed a petition for enforcement seeking to enjoin the defendants from operating two unlicensed substance abuse treatment facilities, the Youth Challenge Ranch (Ranch) in Moosup, and the Youth Challenge Girls' Home (Girls' Home) in Hartford. In December, 1986, Judge Hennessey found that the defendants managed and operated the Ranch and the Girls' Home, and that the Ranch and the Girls' Home were drug and alcohol treatment facilities operating without a license. See Youth Challenge I, supra, at 319, 537 A.2d 480.

In particular, Judge Hennessey found that the tax returns of the defendants listed the Girls' Home as a "drug rehabilitation program," and the Ranch as a "resident drug program." The Girls' Home was described in its brochure as having the purpose of "instilling in the drug dependent person, the incentive to forsake his drug habit for the pursuit of a new life." The court further found that the Girls' Home was engaged in detoxification of its residents, and also provided a supervised and supportive living situation for abusing or drug dependent persons, treatment and rehabilitative programs, assessment of the residents' physical and psychological condition, referral for medical care, psychiatric evaluation and continuing treatment, and storage of medication. Similarly, Judge Hennessey found that the services provided by the Ranch, the second phase of a residential rehabilitation program for males that follows the induction phase at the defendants' licensed facility, included planned treatment and rehabilitation programs, training and vocational rehabilitation, referral for continuing treatment and/or medical care, dietary services, central storage of medication and administration of medication, assessment of the individual's physical and psychological condition to determine appropriateness for admission, and ongoing assessments to establish a program for maintaining alcohol and/or drug free status.

Based on these findings, Judge Hennessey concluded that both facilities were drug or alcohol treatment facilities that were required to be licensed under the provisions of General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 19a-491(a). ⁵ The court rendered judgment granting a permanent injunction. The terms of the injunction provided, inter alia, that "[t]he defendants are enjoined from operating any unlicensed facilities providing treatment to drug and/or alcohol dependent persons unless, and until, they obtain a license from the Department of Health Services...." ⁶

In November, 1988, the plaintiff instituted these proceedings, seeking to have the defendants held in contempt for violation of the injunction, alleging that the defendants were continuing to operate the two unlicensed substance abuse treatment facilities. After four days of hearings, the trial court, Satter, J., found that since the injunction was entered in 1986, the operations at both the Ranch and the Girls' Home had remained unchanged. The court also found that virtually all of the residents of the Girls' Home had histories of drug or alcohol abuse problems, a fact it considered relevant under the definition of "substance- dependent persons" as "individuals who are physically or psychologically reliant upon alcohol or a drug (1) as a result of substance abuse...." Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 19a-495-570(a)(37). The court also found from an examination of the medical records of numerous residents of the Ranch and the Girls' Home that the residents were dependent psychologically on drugs, despite the fact that the residents may not have been actively using drugs or experiencing withdrawal symptoms at the time of admission. ⁷ This finding comports with the definition of a substance dependent person pursuant to the department of health service regulation § 19a-495-570(a)(37).

Based upon these findings, the court further found that the defendant had continued to operate the Girls' Home and the Ranch as unlicensed drug or alcohol treatment facilities in violation of paragraph one of the 1986 injunction, and, therefore, held the defendant in contempt. Pursuant to its finding of contempt, the trial court modified the injunction as follows: "(1) The defendant shall be fined $200.00 per day to begin 30 days after the Court's issuance of this contempt order unless and until the defendant has either (a) discharged all residents from the Girls' Home and Ranch by transferring them to a licensed substance abuse treatment facility or otherwise discharging them after giving them information about licensed substance abuse treatment facilities in their community, or (b) applied for a license from the Department of Health Services for the Ranch and the Girls' Home. If the applicant applies for a license in a timely fashion but has not received a license for a facility within 4 months of the application, the defendant must comply with the discharge provisions of this order within 30 days of the passage of the 4-month period. The defendant may request a written extension of time from the Department if it is in the process of applying for a license and it appears that a decision on the application will not be made within the 4 months. If the Department grants the extension of time, the applicant must meet the new deadline or implement the discharge provisions of this order within 30 days.

"(2) If the defendant chooses or becomes subject to the discharge of residents provision in (1) above, then the defendant must comply with the following additional provisions to ensure that the facilities do not revert back to substance abuse facilities: (a) The defendant shall not allow anyone to reside at the Ranch or Girls' Home who has had a history of substance abuse within one year prior to admission. This means that anyone applying to reside at the Ranch or Girls' Home who was abusing drugs or alcohol or who was in a substance abuse treatment facility within the preceding twelve-month period cannot be admitted.

"The defendant must verify this by questioning the individuals, the referring person, if known[,] and by checking the person's medical records. The defendant shall maintain documentation of this verification for each person it admits to the Ranch or Girls' Home. This documentation shall be made available to Department inspectors upon request.

"(b) The defendant shall report to the Department on a bi-monthly basis for the first two years following this order and annually thereafter and provide the Department with the following:

"(A) the names and dates of birth of any new residents; their date of admission and length of stay;

"(B) whether the resident is receiving any money and/or reimbursement for costs or is being provided with any services from any state, city or federal agency and the reason such services/money/reimbursement is being provided.

"(3) The Department shall have access to the Ranch and the Girls' Home for a period of two years from this order to verify compliance with the injunction and with this order. Access is to consist of unannounced visits by Department staff, Department staff are to be allowed to tour the facility, review any resident records, and talk to staff and residents."

I

The defendant first claims that "[t]here being no 'drug and/or alcohol dependent persons' in the Girls' Home and the Ranch, the court erred in finding the defendant in contempt of the December 4, 1986 Injunction...." The essence of the defendant's first claim is a challenge to the factual findings of the trial court. We reject this challenge.

We first note that this appeal is from a finding of civil contempt, and, therefore, "our review is technically limited to 'questions of jurisdiction such as whether the court had authority to impose the punishment inflicted and whether the act or acts for which the penalty was imposed could constitute a contempt.' ... This limitation originates because by its very nature the court...